— Through another party? — Yes,
— Could we know who? — / think that would be a mistake,
/’[[ tell you for what reason,
Not to take this person to task in any way...
/n December 7955,
President Eisenhower had been so alarmed by charges that Oppenheimer was a Soviet agent
that he had ordered his security clearance to be revoked
till his case could be properly investigated
So, unknown to Oppenheimer, formal charges were instituted against him.
Much of the responsibility for framing these charges
fell upon the Atomic Energy Commission’s newly—appointed general manager.
(Door closes)
— General NichoLs? — Yes?
— Harold Green. — Ah. Come in, Harold.
— How Long have you been with the AEC? — Three years.
They say you're the smartest young Lawyer with a commission.
You've handled quite a few security cases, haven't you?
I guess I have.
— You like the work? — Ven/ much.
Good... Good.
Cos I got one for ya.
J. Robert Oppenheimer.
He's a big fish.
Think you can handle him?
Yes, sir. Yes, I do.
Good. Now, what I want you to do
is to draw up a draft of charges against Oppenheimer.
Have a look through his file. Make your recommendations.
Yes, sir. Er... Which is Oppenheimer's file?
It's all Oppenheimer's file, Harold.
This is a fella who's up to his neck in it. There's stuff from the 'SOs, early '40s.
A certain amount of material on the post—war period.
Oppie's attitude towards the H—bomb, air defence, his conduct as chairman of the GAC.
To my mind, this is the most interesting material.
However, I have to tell you that the commissioners of the AEC
have forbidden us to make use of that post—war material.
Something about not tn/ing a man for his opinions.
It's fair enough, I suppose.
It's a damn shame, though.
That post—war stuff is awfully interesting.
Well...
How's it going?
I've written in a few sentences about the post—war.
I told you, Harold. We're not allowed to frame charges on the basis of the man's opinions.
But it's not his opinions.
The way I've written it, we're not questioning his opinions on the H—bomb.
It's his voracity we're questioning.
— Voracity? — Sure. Look at the record.
1945, Oppenheimer says there's a good chance the H—bomb can be made.
1949, the GAC says the crash program could produce the hydrogen bomb in five years.
He's chairman of the GAC and there he is behind the bomb.
But, in the same year, 1949,
you also find him opposing the development of the bomb
by claiming, among other things, that "it is not feasible."
So at the same time, Oppenheimer's saying both yes and no to the H—bomb.
We can't attack his opinions, OK,
but what we can ask is how truthful is he being
about what his opinion is.
It's a test of his voracity,
not his opinions.
They didn't lie, did they, Harold?
General?
You are a smart young lawyer.
Ah. Hi.
— Lewis. — Sony to drag you down here from Princeton.
— Oppie. — You just got back from Europe.
— Yeah. — How was it?
Oh, you know. Declining.
— But the best part was... — Robert?
It makes me ven/ sad to have to do this
but as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
I have been authorized to deliver this to you in person.
As you will see, it's official notification of the charges against you.
Because of those charges, it had been decided it would be appropriate
to suspend your security clearance.
And because of that suspension,
the AEC is therefore disbarred from any further use of your sen/ices as an adviser.
Robert, as I've told you, this brings me great, deep personal anguish.
I can't believe it.
I just can't.
They can't do this to me!
Strauss was loving even/ minute of it.
And Nichols!
— They can't do this! — Well, they have. What are you gonna do?
(Knock on door)
When you called, I asked Herb Marks to come round.
He did a lot of legal work for the AEC. He could be useful. Come in, Herb.
Oh, Robert.
— This is terrible. I just want you to know... — Yeah, yeah.
Read this.
They say I have two choices.
I can resign, no fuss, ven/ discreet. Or I can request a hearing.
— Open or closed? — Closed, I would think.
Although Strauss didn't rate the chances of it staying closed ven/ highly.
Couldn't keep that quiet in Washington.
What do you think, Herb?
I can't believe they had the balls to put in this stuff about the H—bomb.
— It's opinion. — Unbelievable, isn't it?
Now, look. We have all expressed disgust and dismay.
Question is, what does he do now?
Well, he has to ask for a hearing.
If he accepts this, it's tantamount to an admission of guilt.
I don't know, Herb. There's a lot of stuff in there.
The Chevalier stuff. All those pre—war connections.
Christ, that lady. What's her name?
Jean Tatlock.
I know it's only garbage, but who wants one's garbage spread out for even/one to look at?
— Takes a sick mind to drag Jean into this. — It's a sick world.
I don't agree with you, Joe.
If he doesn't fight this, he leaves the charges on the record for even/one else to pick up.
And they will. Which would you have Robert face?
A closed hearing or a dogfight in the open
with Joe McCarthy, Senator Jenner or some other caveman?
— OK, but how long do you... — Joe!
If it's unanswered, he gives sticks of dynamite to even/ headline—grabber in Washington.
You have to do it, Robert.
Yes.
(Joe) Are you gonna fight?
I'm going to request a hearing.
if it’s unanswered, he gives sticks of dynamite to every headline—grabber in Washington.
You have to do it, Robert
Yes. /’m gonna ﬁght
/’m going to request a hearing.
So be it.
Well, thank you ven/ much. And thank Mr. Hoover for me, will you?
Well, if that's the way he wants it, we've got to move fast.
I can't be ven/ forward in this. You'll have to take the strain.
— Right. — We'll have to appoint a board
and naturally we'll need a lawyer to present our case.
— Got any ideas? — What are we looking for? Prestige?
We're looking for results.
I think I may know a fella.
I'm not really clear about this. Is this going to be some kind of a trial?
Emphatically not. I drew up the regulations that govern these hearings.
What I was most concerned about was there should be no element of a trial.
The whole thing should be a calm, Judicious enquin/ after the truth. Nothing more.
— Then we don't need a trial lawyer. — No, I wouldn't think so.
I think that from first to last
we should emphasize the quality of our case.
You're a distinguished man.
Most distinguished.
You'll have distinguished men prepared to come and give testimony to your quality and loyalty.
I think our choice of counsel should be governed by the same criteria. A man of quality.
Do you know Lloyd Garrison?
Name rings a bell.
He's a New York attorney. He's on the board of the institute.
Sure. On the Urban League?
And he's president of the Civil Liberties Union.
— I know him. — I don't know if he handles much trial work
— but if this isn't going to be a trial... — It isn't.
Lloyd Garrison.
A tremendous reputation.
All right, Lloyd. What's the verdict?
Yes.
Now, I can't say too much after reading this,
but clearly there's a great deal of derogaton/ items or allegations.
I take it this is not entirely a fain/ tale.
Well, sure. I was a member of... I can't even remember their names now.
Consumers Union? Cited as a Communist front organization, 1944.
— Sure, I... — Friends of the Chinese People?
Maybe.
The American Committee for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom.
Sure. This was all a hundred years ago, before the war.
I was cleared on this for Los Alamos, I was cleared on it for the AEC.
— They're scraping the barrel. — Mm...
My worn/ is that taken separately from the rest of your life,
all this adds up to a formidable list of errors of Judgment.
— Can't let that happen. — I would like to see a "whole man" approach.
We go to the board and say, "Yes, there are these..." What shall we...
— Errors of Judgment. — Youthful indiscretions.
But taken in the full context of a most distinguished career,
a record of unequalled sen/ice to the nation and to the government,
how little a part of the whole ston/ these blemishes truly are.
How ven/ little.
— That sounds OK. — Seems to me the right note.
Another problem occurs to me. These hydrogen bomb matters.
How they permitted themselves to include them defies belief.
It's incredible. "We don't agree with your opinions so you're a security risk." Nice thinking.
However, it's here. And what I would not like to see happening
is that a whole maze of complex scientific detail should obscure the issues.
I think we wanna keep this thing at all times on the higher level.
It should be a question of character, motives, not a lot of fussing with technicalities.
But I always had sound technical reasons for what I said.
I sense danger here. What do they say? You can prove anything with technicalities.
Statistics.
And I don't want to give them that chance.
Well, if we do wanna get technical, you'll have to apply for a high security clearance.
I'd rather not have to. It's Just a whole area I don't want to get into.
Robert isn't accused of scientific failings but failings of character.
And these I'm sure we can disprove.
However, we can think that one over.
I don't think there's anything else we can usefully discuss at this stage.
Any news?
Yeah. Some.
I was over at AEC. They named the chief counsel for the hearings.
— Roger Robb. — Who's he? I've never heard of him.
I have.
Washington bar. He's a damn good trial lawyer.
(Nichols) Mr. Robb.
I wouldn't presume to advise you on your tactics
but I've seen Oppie appear as a witness before committees and I was impressed.
This guy can charm you right out of your seat.
Well, he can by to charm me.
You know, one thing that... Well, I won't say it's bothering me.
I don't like to refuse free gifts
but I've been looking over the regulations governing these hearings.
They seem kinda weighted against the defendant, don't they?
— How do you mean? — Well, in trial law,
we have a concept called the blank pad rule.
It means the only matters on which a defendant can be Judged
are those matters which are actually raised within the courtroom.
There can't be... Well, there shouldn't be any prior knowledge.
— Yes. — Well, here, I see
that I'm gonna be allowed a period with the board before the hearing opens
to go over the files with them.
To assist them in evaluating the documents.
Oh, I'll assist them, all right. But you can see where it kicks the blank pad out of the window.
All I know is that it was Joe Volpe who drew up those regulations.
It was?
Well, that takes care of my conscience.
Still, if I were Oppenheimer's counsel, I'd raise hell about it.
Who is his counsel, by the way?
Fella named Lloyd Garrison.
Garrison...
— Ven/ distinguished. — You know him?
Sure. The birdwatcher.
— What? — I hear he watches birds in his spare time.
Oh. Well, if that's all, Mr. Robb...
Yeah, that's it. Though for a lot of this, I think I'm gonna need security clearance.
— You got it. — I imagine defending counsel
will avail themselves of the same facilities.
I really wouldn't know. Garrison hasn't asked for it.
I honestly believe we're as ready as we'll ever be.
What are our chances, Lloyd?
— We should be quietly confident. — We should be scared as hell.
No, no, no. As long as we keep our focus on the question of character.
Speak the truth and shame the devil.
— I feel pretty relaxed. — Well, you should.
I've seen you at hearings. No contest. Personally, I pity Robb tomorrow.
I'm so impressed by the amount of support we've got.
Even/body we've asked has been so glad to help.
— It's good of them. — Except Teller.
Little creep.
I was surprised. He seemed almost hostile. I wonder why.
That's easy. He's Jealous of Robert, always has been.
It crossed my mind he might give us trouble.
I don't think so. He's a scientist. Whatever it is, he'll keep it in the family.
He seemed almost angn/ with you.
Edward takes some understanding sometimes.
You're ven/ forgiving, Robert.
Tu comprends?
You pardonnez so goddamn much. Those bastards are tn/ing to nail you.
— Oh, now... — Oh, no, Just kidding. Obviously.
I think we all need a good night's rest.
I need another drink.
(Narrator) The hearing in the matter of] Robert Oppenheimer
opened on April the 72th, 7954.
The board consisted of Gordon Gray as chairman,
the industrialist 7'homas Morgan,
and a scientist, Dr. Ward I/ Evans of Northwestern University.
Unknown to Oppenheimer, their counsel Roger Robb
had in his possession tapes of wartime interviews
between Oppenheimer and the Manhattan Project security ofﬁcers.
— We've been waiting nearly half an hour. — I do apologize.
I can't say exactly where he might be.
— I'm sure we'll have news ven/ shortly. — Well, I hope so.
Mr. Robb, I apologize for this delay.
Quite all right with us, Mr. Chairman.
— What the... — She fell downstairs last night.
— Have they started? — They're waiting.
Mr. Chairman, members of the board.
I would like to say at the onset that we appreciate ven/ much
the willingness of men of your standing and responsibility
to undertake this exacting and onerous Job in the interests of the countly
We cannot but be conscious that for the past week,
members of the board have been examining a file containing items about Dr. Oppenheimer
to which we have had, and we now have, no access at all.
I'm sure it goes without saying
that we are confident that the minds of the members of the board
will be open to receive the testimony that we shall submit.
I think you have no need to have concern on that score, Mr. Garrison.
Gentlemen, you have in your possession copies of a letter written by Dr. Oppenheimer
and addressed to General Nichols, letter dated March 4th, 1954.
In this letter, written in the form of an autobiography,
he has sought to give an account
of the activities that have given rise to the derogaton/ items in his record
that have led to this hearing.
One of the things that struck me as I went through this account
was the quite evident fact that throughout, his energies were strongly devoted
almost entirely to his scientific undertakings.
In this whole post—war period, I do not think that there is a single association of his
that can possibly be questioned as derogatony,
or indeed anything other than a rich record of devotion to his science
and sen/ice to the government.
In the post—war period, even/thing in it is in truth utterly inconsistent
with the notion that this man could have been anything but a devoted supporter
of the American system that we love.
I think that's all I have to say of a preliminan/ character, Mr. Chairman.
Now Mr. Robb?
Dr. Oppenheimer, did you prepare your letter of March 4th, 1954 to General Nichols,
— this autobiography? — Yes.
— And you've read it ven/ carefully, I assume? — Yes.
Are all the statements in this letter the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
Yes, Mr. Robb.
Dr. Oppenheimer,
there's never been any question in your mind
that a man as closely associated with the Communist movement
has no business on a secret war proJect?
— That is right. — Then let me ask you a blunt question.
Didn't you know, certainly by 1943,
that the Communist Party was an instrument or vehicle of espionage in this countly?
— I was not clear about that. — Didn't you suspect it?
— No. — Wasn't your fear of espionage
one of the reasons why you felt membership in the Party
was inconsistent with work on a secret war proJect?
Yes.
— Your answer is that it was. — Yes.
What about a former member of the Party?
Is he an appropriate person to work on a secret war proJect?
That would depend on the totality and character of the disengagement
and what kind of a man he was, whether he was an honest man.
Let us take your brother Frank as an example. Tell us the kind of test you applied in his case.
In the case of a brother, you don't apply tests. At least I didn't.
— Well, now... — I knew my brother.
I never regarded him as dangerous.
I see. In other words, you felt that your brother was an exception to what you Just stated here.
No. I felt that though there was a danger of espionage,
that this was not a general danger.
How would you have tested to see if someone was dangerous back in 1943?
— Only the knowledge of a man's character. — Just what you knew of him?
I don't regard myself as a man to settle these questions. I am stating opinions.
That's Just what I'm getting at, Doctor.
On page 22 of this letter,
you refer to what for convenience I will call the Eltenton—Chevalier incident.
Would you please tell the board as accurately as you can what happened on that occasion?
This is one of those things I've had so many occasions to think about
that I'm not gonna recall actual words, I'm gonna recall the nature of the conversation.
Wherever possible, I would prefer that you'd use the actual words.
— I'm not going to do that. — Go on, Doctor.
One day, in the winter of 1942/'43,
Haakon Chevalier came to our house for drinks.
When I went into the pantly, he followed me.
Um... He said, "I saw George Eltenton recently."
Eltenton said he had means of communicating technical information to Soviet scientists.
He didn't describe the means.
I thought I said, "But that's treason," but I'm not sure.
Anyway, I said something. "This is a terrible thing."
Chevalier expressed complete agreement. That was the end of it.
— You used the word "treason"? — I don't know.
— Did you think it was treasonous? — I thought it was terrible.
Did you think it was treasonous?
To take information from the US and ship it abroad illegally? Sure.
In other words, you felt that the course of conduct suggested to you by Eltenton
was an attempt at espionage, didn't you?
— Sure. — Did Chevalier in that conversation to you
mention anything about the use of microfilm as a means of transmitting information?
— No. — You're sure of that?
— Yes. — Did he tell you or indicate in any way
that he'd spoken to anyone but you about this matter?
— No. — You're sure of this?
Yes.
When did you first mention your conversation with Chevalier to a security officer?
On a visit to Berkeley. I don't remember what security officer it was.
Well, if the record shows that it was to Lieutenant Johnson on August 25th, 1943,
— you would accept that? — Yes.
And the next day you were inten/iewed by Colonel Pash, were you not?
Yes.
Did you tell Pash the whole truth about this matter?
— No. — You lied to him?
Yes.
What did you tell Colonel Pash that was not true?
That Eltenton had approached three people on the Manhattan ProJect through an intermedialy.
Did you discuss with or disclose to Pash the identity of Chevalier?
No.
Let us then refer to Chevalier as X.
All right.
Did you tell Pash that X had approached three people on this proJect?
I'm not clear whether there were three X's or whether X had approached three people.
Didn't you say X had approached three people?
Probably.
Why did you do that, Doctor?
Because I was an idiot.
Is that your only explanation?
— I was reluctant to mention Chevalier. — Yes.
No doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself.
Why would you tell them Chevalier had gone to three people?
— Didn't that make it worse for Chevalier? — I didn't mention him.
No, no, but X. If X had gone to three people, that would have shown.
— He was deeply involved. — Yes.
I'm gonna have trouble making myself understandable.
The ston/ I told Pash was not a true stony.
There were not three or more people involved on the proJect.
There was one person involved. That was me.
Whether I embroidered the ston/ to underline the seriousness of it
or to hide the simple facts, namely that Chevalier had only talked to me about it,
I don't know.
Did Pash ask you for the name of X?
— I imagine he did. — Don't you know that he did?
I... Sure.
Didn't you know that your refusal to give him the identity of X impeded the investigation?
Actually, the only thing that needed investigating was Eltenton.
— What did Pash want to investigate? — I imagine the three others on the proJect.
You knew Colonel Pash would move heaven and earth to find these three, didn't you?
— Yes. — And that he'd want to know the identity of X?
— Yes. — And yet you wouldn't give it to him.
How long had you known this man Chevalier in 1943?
— For a number of years. — How had you known him?
— As a quite close friend. — Did you know him as a fellow traveler?
— Yes. — Had you any reason to suspect
he was a member of the Communist Party?
— No. — You knew he was quite a Red, didn't you?
— I would say quite pink. — Not red?
— I won't quibble. — When did you see him last?
— On my last trip to Europe. — That was in December 1953?
— Yes. — Six months ago?
Yes.
Let us return to your inten/iew with Colonel Pash.
I would like to read certain portions of the transcript of the inten/iew and ask you...
Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the existence of the rule
under which we cannot ask for access to the file.
But I wonder if it would not be proper, if counsel is going to read from a transcript,
for us to be furnished with a copy of it?
This would be orthodox in a court of law. I don't pretend this is a court of law, but...
Mr. Chairman, I know of no rule in any court of law
that you must furnish counsel with a copy of a transcript you're reading at the time.
This is presently marked "Secret",
so I could not possibly make it available to Mr. Garrison at this time.
But it is being read into the record.
That's right.
(Clears throat) Frankly, I don't know the answer to this, Mr. Garrison.
We will consider the request.
Now, Mr. Robb?
Your letter to General Nichols. On page four, you mention Jean Tatlock.
— Yes. — Who you saw for the last time in June 1943?
— Yes. — Why did you have to see her?
She had expressed a strong desire to see me.
She was undergoing psychiatric treatment.
She was extremely unhappy.
Did you find out why she had to see you?
Because she was still in love with me.
— Where did you see her? — At her home.
— Was she a Communist at that time? — We didn't even talk about it.
Do you have reason to believe she wasn't still a Communist in 1943?
— No. — You spent the night with her, didn't you?
— Yes. — You were working on a secret war proJect.
— Yes. — Was that consistent with good security?
— It was, as a matter of fact... — Spending the night with a Communist...
I don't believe she was a Communist.
— Oh, you don't? — I've had secrets in my head for a long time.
It doesn't matter who I associate with. I don't talk about those secrets.
Passing the time of day with a Communist, I...
I don't think it is wise.
But I don't see that it's necessarily dangerous if the man is discreet and knows what he's up to.
I should like to move now to the matter of the thermonuclear.
Doctor. Did you, subsequent to President Truman's decision in Januan/ 1950
to proceed with the thermonuclear program,
ever express any opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds?
I would think that I could ven/ well have said that it was a dreadful weapon.
Why do you think you could "ven/ well" have said that?
Because I have always thought it was a dreadful weapon.
Even when from a technical point of view, it was a sweet, lovely and beautifulJob,
I still felt it was a dreadful weapon.
— And have said so? — Yes.
Well, Doctor, at Los Alamos and running at least through the first year at the GAC,
you were encouraging investigation into the thermonuclear.
— Yes. — When did your moral qualms get so strong
that you opposed the actual production of the thermonuclear bomb?
When it was suggested that the United States produce these things at all costs.
What did moral qualms have to do with that?
— What did moral qualms have to do with that? — Yes, sir.
We freely used the atomic bomb.
Yes. In fact, Doctor, you assisted in selecting the target for the drop of the bomb on Japan?
— Yes. — How many were killed or inJured by that?
— 70,000. — Did you have moral qualms about that?
Terrible ones.
Would you have supported dropping the thermonuclear?
— It would have made no sense. — Why not?
The target was too small.
Supposing there was a target in Japan big enough for the thermonuclear weapon.
— Would you have opposed dropping it? — I believe I would.
At Los Alamos, you would have made the weapon, wouldn't you?
— I couldn't. — No, no. I didn't ask you that, Doctor.
If you could have discovered it, you would have, wouldn't you?
— Oh, yeah. Certainly. — You were working toward that end.
Yes.
I need to say that running a laboraton/ is one thing,
— advising the government is another. — Evidently.
Doctor, I have a note here that you testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
that there was a surprising unanimity
at the general advison/ committee meeting on October 29th, 1949,
that the United States should not take the initiative at that time
— in an all—out thermonuclear program. — Yes.
How many people run that committee?
— Nine. One man was in Sweden. — Oh. Who was that?
— Dr. Glenn Seaborg. — So you didn't know how he felt about it.
He was in Sweden. There was no communication with him.
I beg your pardon.
He was in Sweden. There was no communication with him.
I see.
I'm going to show you a letter, Dr. Oppenheimer,
taken from your files at Princeton
sent by you to the Atomic Energy Commission,
addressed to you, and signed by Glenn Seaborg.
I'm going to say before I see this that I have no recollection of it.
I would be certain of one thing. If the letter reached me before a meeting,
I would have read it to the committee.
— The letter was dated October 14th, 1949. — So it almost certainly reached me.
Unless it came by wagon train, it reached you, didn't it?
Right.
I will read relevant sections of this letter from Dr. Seaborg.
"Although I deplore the prospect of our countn/ putting a tremendous effort into this..."
He was talking about the thermonuclear, wasn't he?
Obviously.
"..I must confess that I've been unable to come to the conclusion that we should not.
"My present feeling would perhaps be best summarized
"by saying that I would have to hear some good arguments
"before I could take on sufficient courage
"to recommend not going toward such a program."
Isn't it clear to you now that Dr. Seaborg did express himself prior to the meeting?
It is. Not in unequivocal terms.
Why did you tell the Atomic Energy Commission
that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed himself on this subJect?
I would have to see the transcript. I don't remember the question or answer.
If you did make that statement, it was not true, was it?
Doctor, did you hear my question?
I heard it, but I have heard that kind of question too often.
I'm sure of that, Doctor, but would you answer it nevertheless?
Isn't he entitled to see testimony referred to instead of answering hypothetical questions?
(Robb) It is not hypothetical.
Doctor, if you told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed himself prior to the meeting on October 29th, 1949,
that was not true, was it?
— It would depend entirely on... — Yes or no?
I will not say yes or no. I would like to make a general protest.
I am told that I have said certain things.
— Doctor, the question... — I don't recall. If I said them...
— Doctor, a simple... — I will not say yes or no!
(Robb) That's all I have at the moment, Mr. Chairman.
We will recess at this point.
Mr. Robb, my congratulations. That was brilliant.
I've never seen Oppie in such a fix.
You were right. He did back down. Aren't you pleased?
I didn't entirely enJoy it.
I quite admire the guy.
— Joe. — I heard about it.
It was unbelievable. Unbelievable!
That tricky bastard. The truth doctor. "Yes or no!"
I can't believe any experienced Jurist would fall for that masquerade.
None of them is experienced.
Robert has told one...untruth in his life.
The way Robb handled that Chevalier garbage, it sounded like he'd told a million.
I deeply regret I did not challenge him on that.
How are you, Robert?
— How was it? — Idiotic.
And he's reading out this stuff, these transcripts.
We don't have any idea what's in his file. It's easy as hell to trip Robert up.
Demand access. Tell 'em if they won't give you access, you'll walk out.
This is no enquily It's a trial. You didn't agree to take part in a trial. Access, or you'll walk.
— That is not my advice. — Oh, hell.
And it must be Robert's decision.
— How about it? — I can't.
Robert, they're shafting you.
I know that. I can't walk out now. It'd be a confession of guilt.
And now it's public.
— I read it. — How did they get hold of it?
The Times has been after us for weeks.
Scottie Ruston called yesterday morning, said he couldn't sit on it any more.
I thought it was better they have the whole stony.
— I bet the board didn't like that. — I guess they didn't.
Robert, I still think you should quit.
Mr. Volpe, I am ready as always to be replaced.
But while I am still Robert's chief counsel, my advice is to proceed.
— I still think we have a reasonable chance. — On what grounds?
On the quality of our case.
This tricken/ of Robb's is based on nothing but tittle—tattle, third—rate informants,
FBI scourings.
When the board sees the caliber of the men prepared to stand by Robert,
I can't believe they'll be unimpressed.
(Garrison) Mr. McCloy. Would you state your present position?
I am presently chairman of the board of the Chase National Bank.
Would you also state positions you held in the defence establishment in the war?
I was Assistant Secretan/ of War until 1945.
After that, I sen/ed on various defence committees.
I was on the President's committee with Mr. Acheson and General Groves
with special reference to atomic weapons.
During those years, you had many contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer.
— Oh, yes. — Based on your acquaintance,
would you give the board your opinion as to his loyalty,
and as to his security risk or want of security risk.
In as much as I had any acquaintance with Dr. Oppenheimer,
I would say that I have no doubt as to his loyalty.
I have absolutely no doubt as to his value to the United States.
And I would say that in my opinion,
Dr. Oppenheimer does not represent any threat to the security of the United States.
(Garrison) Thank you.
(Gray) Mr. Robb?
Is the Chase National Bank the largest in the countly, Mr. McCloy?
No, it's... (Clears throat) Pardon me. It's the third largest.
— Do you have a great many branches? — Yes, we have.
As far as you know,
do you have any employee of your bank
who has been for any considerable period of time
on terms of rather friendly or intimate association with thieves or safe—crackers?
— Well, I don't know of any. — Suppose you had a branch manager.
One day a friend of his came to him and said,
"I have some friends who are thinking about coming to your bank to rob it.
"And I'd like to talk to you about maybe leaving the vault open some nights
"so that they could do it."
And your branch manager reJected this suggestion.
— Would you expect him to report the incident? — Yes, I would.
Suppose he waited six or eight months to report it.
Would you be rather concerned as to why he hadn't done so before?
Yes.
Suppose when he did report it, he said,
"This is a close friend of mine and I know he's innocent
"and therefore I'm not going to tell you who he was."
Would you be concerned about that?
Well, I'd certainly urge him to tell me, for the security of the bank.
Now, supposing a few years later, this branch manager came to you
and he said, "Mr. McCloy, I told you a scheme that my friend and his friends had all set up,
"with tear gas and getaway cars.
"But it was a lot of bunk. It Just wasn't true."
Would you be a bit puzzled as to why he told you such a false ston/ about his friend?
Yes, of course I would.
That's all.
(Garrison) General Groves. You appointed Dr. Oppenheimer to be the director at Los Alamos.
— Yes, sir. — How would you rate his achievement?
I think he did a magnificent Job while he was under my control.
Would you select him again?
I see of no reason why not,
assuming all the conditions are the same.
Based on your total acquaintance and experience with him,
would you say that in your opinion he would ever consciously commit a disloyal act?
I would be amazed if he did.
That is all I have to ask.
(Gray) Mr. Robb?
General, in the light of your experience in security matters
and in the light of your knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer's file, would you clear him today?
I think before answering that, I'd like to give my interpretation
of what the atomic energy act requires.
I, uh... I have it here somewhere.
On page 98 I think you'll find it, General.
Yes.
Thank you.
"The commission shall have determined
"that permitting such person to have access to restricted data
"will not endanger the common defence or security."
My interpretation of "endanger"
is that there is a reasonable presumption that there might be a danger.
It is not a case of proving that a man is a danger.
It's a case of thinking that he might be a danger.
I would not clear Dr. Oppenheimer today if I were a member of the commission
based on this interpretation.
(Gray) Yes, Mr. Garrison. (Garrison) General Groves.
You have given us your interpretation of the atomic energy act.
Is it your opinion that the common defence and security of the US would be endangered?
— Mr. Lansdale? — Mr. Robb.
My colleague has Just told me something which I find disturbing.
I gather you told him if you were asked to clear Oppenheimer today, you'd say yes.
— That is correct. — When we spoke a few weeks ago,
you said you would not clear him today.
— You've been talking to Garrison. — I'd prefer not to discuss this.
All right, Mr. Lansdale. Now, you're a lawyer and I'm a lawyer.
You're going to be asked in that room if you'd clear him on the basis of present loyalty criteria.
And I promise you. If you testify under oath in the affirmative,
— I swear to God I will impeach you. — You can do what you want.
Right.
Mr. Lansdale. During the war, you were the top security officer in the atomic bomb proJect.
— Yes, sir. — You had many inten/iews with Oppenheimer
touching on the Chevalier incident.
— And other matters. — Yes. What Judgment did you form
as to his political convictions at that time?
That he was not a Communist.
— You were satisfied that he was a loyal citizen. — Yes.
If you had the decision whether to clear Dr. Oppenheimer or not today,
would you do so?
I will answer that yes, based on the criteria and standards that we used then.
Those criteria were loyalty and discretion.
I am making no attempt to interpret the present law.
That is all I have at the moment, Mr. Chairman.
(Gray) Mr. Robb?
As I understand it, Mr. Lansdale,
you're not offering any opinion as to whether or not you would clear Dr. Oppenheimer
on the basis of presently—existing standards.
That's a standard that's strange to me.
I believed then that Dr. Oppenheimer was loyal and discreet.
I have not changed my mind.
Mr. Lansdale.
Do you have the feeling that you want to defend Dr. Oppenheimer here?
I feel strongly that Dr. Oppenheimer is loyal.
I am extremely disturbed by the hysteria of the times,
of which this seems to be a manifestation.
You think that this enquin/ is a manifestation of hysteria?
— I think... — Yes or no?
I will not answer that yes or no.
I don't think that this is a manifestation of hysteria.
I think the fact that associations to 1940 are regarded with the same seriousness
that similar associations would be regarded today is a manifestation of hysteria.
That's all.
Nice. You stood up to him, he didn't like it one bit.
— It was good of him. — Ven/ useful.
I Just wish he'd said he'd clear you today under present law.
You can't have even/thing.
Groves was a hell of a disappointment. Were you expecting that?
— Sure. He's regular Army. — Mm. Cover your ass.
He was the guy who appointed me in '43. He had to get out from under that.
Hello, Councilor.
— General Nichols? — Yes?
Is there any word on my security clearance?
These things take time.
I understand Mr. Robb was granted clearance within eight days.
I put in my request three weeks ago.
We're doing the best we can.
Dr. Bethe. On the basis of your association with him over many years,
at Los Alamos and after,
would you express an opinion about Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the United States?
I am happy to do this.
I have absolute faith in Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty.
I have absolutely no question
that he has sen/ed this countn/ ven/ long and ven/ well.
I have faith in him quite generally.
That's all.
(Gray) Mr. Robb.
Doctor, how many scientific divisions were there are Los Alamos?
It changed in the course of time. I think seven but it may have been eight or nine.
Which division was Klaus Fuchs in?
— He was in my division. — Thank you.
That's all.
Dr. Fermi, you were a member of the General Advison/ Committee
— for a period of four years till December 1950. — Yes.
You participated in its deliberations
concerning the advice to the AEC on the thermonuclear program in the fall of 1949.
I did.
Would you tell the board briefly about the deliberations?
Positions taken, the reasons for them.
I can testify to my own feelings.
I was concerned that to go ahead with the crash thermonuclear program
might weaken the development of conventional atomic weapons.
Do you remember, Dr. Fermi, whether or not there was an opportunity at this meeting
for the freest and fullest discussions?
Yes, I think so.
In his role as chairman of the GAC,
what opportunity did Dr. Oppenheimer afford the other members to express fully their views?
— A perfect opportunity. — That's all.
(Gray) Mr. Robb?
I believe he is a man of upstanding character, that he is a loyal individual.
I do not believe that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk.
(Gray) Mr. Robb asked you earlier whether you had spoken with Chairman Strauss.
I talked to Strauss. I never hid from him
my opinion that this whole proceeding was most unfortunate.
And there he was, a consultant. If you don't want to consult him, you don't have to, period.
Why you have to go through this kind of a thing...
There's a real positive record here.
We have an atom bomb and a whole armon/ of nuclear weapons.
What more do you want? Mermaids?
This is Just a tremendous achievement.
That the end of this road should be this kind of a hearing,
that can't help but be humiliating.
I thought it was a pretty bad show. I still think so.
(Gray) Thank you, Dr. Rabi. We will recess for a short while.
— That was so good. — I don't know if I made much sense in there.
I got drunk last night I was so disgusted with this.
You were fine. Robert appreciates it ven/ much.
Are you sure? He looked like he was in some kind of a trance.
Well, he's a little withdrawn.
Well, he looked like er...like a martyr.
Is that what he's doing? It is, isn't it?
I know Oppie. It's that goddamn actor in him.
I bet he's really enJoying himself.
He's going through a terrible experience, Dr. Rabi.
I know it. I feelfor him.
But tell him to keep fighting.
— Tell him not to be such a schmuck. — OK.
— Hello, Doctor. I'm early. — We're on schedule. You'll be on in 15 minutes.
I don't want to probe your testimony ahead of time, Doctor.
Will I have to say it in front of the board and Dr. Oppenheimer?
Of course, of course. There's one thing you might like to glance at while you're waiting.
What is this?
It's a resume of the FBI files on Oppenheimer.
15 minutes, Doctor.
Dr. Teller, may I ask you please,
are you appearing as a witness here today because you want to be here?
I appear because I've been asked to and because I consider it my duty.
I would have preferred not to appear.
— Did you work during the war at Los Alamos? — I did.
— What was the nature of your work there? — Theoretical work connected with the bomb.
During the war, did you have any discussions about the thermonuclear?
— Ven/ frequent discussions. — What was Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion?
I clearly remember that towards the end of the war,
he encouraged me to go ahead with the thermonuclear investigation.
I also know that ven/ shortly after the dropping of the bomb on Japan
that this plan was changed.
And, to the best of my belief, it was changed because of the opinion of Dr. Oppenheimer
that this was not the time to pursue the program further.
Doctor, as an expert on this question,
suppose you'd gone to work on the thermonuclear in 1945 or 1946,
I mean, really gone to work on it.
Do you have any opinion when you might have achieved the weapon?
It is my belief that if at the end of the war
some people like Dr. Oppenheimer would have lent moral support,
not even their own work, Just moral support,
I think we could have kept as many people in Los Alamos to work on the thermonuclear
as we later recruited in 1949...
under ven/ difficult conditions.
I believe that if we had gone to work in 1945,
we could have achieved a thermonuclear bomb Just about four years earlier than we did.
Now, Doctor. In Janualy, 1950,
the President decided that we should go ahead with the thermonuclear program.
— Do you recall that? — Yeah, I do.
— Was the program accelerated? — It was.
Did you have discussions with Dr. Oppenheimer as to whether he would assist you?
I had two discussions with him.
One was shortly before the President's decision.
At that time, I called Dr. Oppenheimer and asked him if it was a go—ahead decision,
would he please really help us with this thing?
And Dr. Oppenheimer's answer was in the negative.
A few months later, I called him up and asked him not for direct help
but for help in recruiting people.
Oppenheimer said then, "You know in this matter I'm neutral.
"I should be glad, however, to recommend some ven/ good people."
And he mentioned a few.
I wrote to all of these people, tried to persuade them to come to Los Alamos.
None of them came.
Where were these people located?
The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.
Doctor, to simplify the issues here,
is it your intention to suggest that Dr. Oppenheimer is disloyal to the United States?
I have always assumed and I now assume that he is loyal to the United States.
Do you believe or do you not believe that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk?
In a great number of cases, I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act in a way
which for me was exceedingly hard to understand.
I thoroughly disagreed with him on numerous issues.
And his actions, frankly, appeared to me confused and complicated.
To this extent, I would like to see the vital interests of this countn/ enhanced
which I understand better, and therefore trust more.
In this ven/ limited sense,
I would like to express a feeling that I would personally feel more secure
if public matters would rest in other hands.
Dr. Teller.
I would like to ask you this question.
Do you feel it would endanger the common defence and security
to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?
I believe the character of Dr. Oppenheimer
is such that he would never willingly or knowingly
do anything to endanger the safety of this countly
To the extent your question is directed towards intent,
I would say I do not see any reason to deny clearance.
If it is a question of wisdom and Judgment,
as demonstrated by actions since 1945,
then I would say one would be wiser not to grant clearance.
Thank you ven/ much, Dr. Teller. We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow.
I'm sorly
After what you've Just said, I don't know what you mean.
(Narrator) On May the 6th, 7954, after hearing 79 days of testimony
in the matter of]. Robert Oppenheimer,
the board retired to consider its verdict
Have a drink, Herb.
No, thanks. I'd like to finish this.
What is it?
Well, Lloyd thinks we should submit analysis of the testimony to the board.
Give 'em another nudge in the right direction.
Let's stop kidding ourselves.
— You think it's hopeless? — After Teller?
Oh, he didn't say much.
He said enough.
The rest were nothing.
Nobodies like Griggs, a couple of Air Force apes.
But Teller...
Teller is a great man.
Almost.
He's big enough for the board to hide behind if they want to.
It's unforgivable.
— My fault. — Yours?
I should have...stroked his vanity.
I couldn't do it.
Too many balls in the air.
Too many balls.
Too much bullshit.
I'll have that drink.
I am so tired.
You know, when this is over,
why don't you take a holiday?
I'd like to go off by myself for six months.
Well, why don't you?
— Kitty would understand. — Think so?
Well, she should.
You disapprove of her, don't you?
Well, I wouldn't say that.
You know, she's sick.
I don't Just mean the drinking, I mean really sick.
Intestinal.
She has a lot of pain.
That's why she drinks.
Part of the reason.
I know this couple in Georgetown.
They have separate apartments.
Ven/ close, but...
They have dinner together almost even/ night and then they go home.
Separately.
What do you make of that?
— Sounds like a mature arrangement. — Think so?
For Christ's sakes, Robert. You've only got one life.
It's not so bad.
Are you sure?
I've gotta go up.
Robert, I...
If you'd like to talk about this...
Thanks, Herb.
— Good morning, Mr. Marks. — Oh, hi.
— Is Robert up? — No.
I hear you've been encouraging him to leave me.
Did you think he wouldn't tell me?
— I Just thought that... — He would never leave me.
He's too scared.
One of his women killed herself. You know who I mean.
He's too damn scared I'll do it. And I keep him good and scared too.
I've got him and I'm gonna keep him. I couldn't go through a day without him.
— Do you think that's horrible? — People shouldn't live off other people.
Did it ever cross your bird brain he can't get through a day without me?
— There's no need to be insulting. — There's no need to stick your stupid nose in.
In my house.
What do you know about us?
I don't know anything.
No.
Now, are you gonna want eggs?
Just coffee.
On May the 27th, 7954,
the board of enguirJ/ delivered its verdict
By a two—to—one majority, it declared that
”it would need be consistent with the security interests of the United States
”to reinstate Dr. Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance. ”
The lone dissenter was the scientist Ward Evans.
He had some difficulty formulating his opinion.
He was helped in doing this by AEC counsel Roger Robb.
On the 29th of june, 7954,
the commissioners of the AEC confirmed the board of enguiry’s recommendation.
Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance would not be reinstated
Well, it ain't Siberia.
Look. There are people these days who have lost even/thing.
Guys who have to work in South America, guys who can't get a Job anywhere.
— Exiled to Princeton. Is that so bad? — Now, look...
Oh, I'm sorn/ for Oppie. Of course I am.
I'm Just tn/ing to cheer myself up.
(Radio plays swing music)
Oh, you made it.
— Joe. — Robert.
— Rabi, how's Columbia? — Still owns New York.
— How are you feeling, Robert? — How am I feeling?
— A lot of people wanna be remembered to you. — Good, good.
They're saying it's a tragedy, what happened.
— It was no tragedy. A farce, maybe. — They're still following your lead.
When Teller was at Los Alamos, even/body did what you did.
— Nobody would shake his hand. — I shook his hand.
I shook it.
Farce.
This is the meaning of my life, to divide the scientific community.
When I was a young man, I wanted to have a significant life.
Now they're saying it's a tragedy.
But I think it's been a farce all along.
— Oppie... — A bitter farce.
Have you seen Kitty yet?
Let's go see her.
No need.
Rabi.
— Joe. — Kitty.
So, how do you like our holy blessed martyr?
I think it's his finest part.
I'm sending a telegram to Stratford, England.
Watch out, Larly Competition.
There's drinks inside.
And I persuaded my son to turn down his Jungle music.
You go ahead.
This martyr's moving slower and slower.
I should trade him in.
Oh, come on. I was only kidding.
Go to hell, Kitty.
Well, Join me, Robert.
Oh, come on. We're not gonna Just lie down and die.
/n the years that followed the hearings,
Oppenheimer was honored and applauded in many foreign countries.
/n his own country, his security clearance, the mark of his government’s trust in him,
was never reinstated
But his good name was partially restored
when President johnson awarded him the Fermi Medal for Science in 7965
the year after it had been won by Edward Teller
Oppenheimer died from cancer in 7962
Kitty died in 7972
7'heir daughter 7'oni committed suicide in 7972
Their son Peter now lives with his family in New Mexico, not far from los Alamos,
where he works as a builder and restorer of homes.