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♪ ♪

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JOHN FARRELL:
Richard Nixon is

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getting his daughter married
at the White House.

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(guests applauding)

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In the meantime,
behind the scenes...

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...this fella Daniel Ellsberg
has leaked

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the secret history
of the Vietnam War

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to "The New York Times."

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And on the same Sunday
where there's the picture

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of Tricia Nixon being married,

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there's this story
about the Pentagon Papers.

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REPORTER: Daniel Ellsberg,
ex-Pentagon employee,

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made history by leaking
to "The New York Times"

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the Pentagon Papers,

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a top-secret study
of Vietnam policy.

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HEDRICK SMITH:
Pentagon Papers were
7,000 pages of secret history

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of the war in Vietnam

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commissioned by Robert McNamara,
the former secretary of defense,

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who became disillusioned
with the war,

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and wanted a full record

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of how we got into it
and how it went wrong.

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FARRELL:
Nixon reads his newspaper
and his daily briefings,

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and pfft, doesn't care about it.

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Most of the Pentagon Papers
are about Johnson and Kennedy.

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They're not about him.

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NIXON: Hello.
SECRETARY: Mr. President,

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I have Dr. Kissinger
calling you.
NIXON: Okay.

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FARRELL:
But for some reason,

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Henry Kissinger reads this story
in "The New York Times"

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and goes ballistic.

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KISSINGER:
It's, it's treasonable.

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There's no question
it's actionable.

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I'm absolutely certain
that this violates

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all sorts of security laws.

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NIXON:
What, what do we do about it?

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Kissinger is convinced
that Daniel Ellsberg,

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if he had access
to the Pentagon Papers,

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has access to what's going on
in Cambodia,

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and he's obsessed

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that Ellsberg's next step
is to release information

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about the secret bombing
campaign in Cambodia.

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Ten years in prison
is very cheap

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if they could contribute
to ending this war.

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FARRELL:
Ellsberg was
a Kissinger protégé,

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and so, Kissinger is worried
that the finger

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eventually is going
to come back at him.

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GREG GRANDIN:
Kissinger describes Ellsberg
as unhinged.

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KISSINGER:
Of course, that son of a bitch,
I know him well-- he was a...

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NIXON: You know him?
KISSINGER: Oh, well.

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From early '69 on,
he just went off his rocker.

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Just totally wild.

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And he's moved into
a more and more intransigent,

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radical position.

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So, it's Kissinger that
gins up Nixon about Ellsberg.

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NIXON: Let's get the son
of a bitch into jail.

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KISSINGER:
We've got to get him.

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We've got to get him.

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Kissinger's frantic
self-protective reaction

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to the exposure
of the Pentagon Papers

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drives Nixon to a place
which eventually

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becomes the first step
towards Watergate.

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(phone ringing)

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♪ ♪

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♪ ♪

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(explosions pounding)

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♪ ♪

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(explosions pounding)

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(shouting)

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♪ ♪

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WINSTON LORD:
From the very beginning
of Nixon's administration,

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Kissinger was running

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all the major elements
of foreign policy.

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The three major, immediate
objectives were all

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with communist countries: China,
Russia, and Vietnam.

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The broad strategy was to know

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where you want to go
over the long run,

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to see how the pieces fit.

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So, what you did
with one country,

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how it would affect
another country?

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And I think Kissinger felt
you had to reconcile

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the just with the possible.

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♪ ♪

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ROBERT BRIGHAM:
Vietnam, to Kissinger
and to Nixon,

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was a thorn in their side.

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They wanted it off page one

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so they could get
to all the kind of things

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that Nixon had on his very
expansive and aggressive

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foreign policy plate.

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You couldn't do those
until you had

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the Vietnam question settled.

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JEREMI SURI:
The United States seemed
hemmed in in Vietnam.

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We seemed unable to do
anything right.

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But Kissinger recognized
that there was

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a lot of power
in taking the initiative.

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He was willing to take risks

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and he was able
to manufacture opportunities

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where they did not exist before.

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♪ ♪

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NIALL FERGUSON:
Before they came to power,

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both Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger thought,

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"What might be done with China?"

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I think it took

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the two of them spending
time together,

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contemplating the great
chessboard

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of the Cold War,

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to realize that,
if we could only establish

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some communications with China,

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that could be helpful
in a number of ways.

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It could help you
with the Vietnam problem,

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but it could also help you

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with the Soviets.

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We had, for the last
few decades,

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assumed that communism was
a seamless whole.

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Well, suddenly, not so much.

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In the late '60s, you started
to see friction and then clashes

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between the Soviets and
the Chinese along border areas.
(shouting)

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HAASS:
And you had people
in the intelligence community

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saying, "Hey,

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"rather than being
on the same team,

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"these guys are
on different teams.

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There's actually a split."

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Which we began to call
the Sino-Soviet split.

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FILM NARRATOR:
A disputed frontier between

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the dragon and the bear.

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FERGUSON:
A war broke out,

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a border dispute
between the Soviet Union

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and the People's Republic
of China.

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(people shouting)

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More importantly,
there was an ideological battle

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for leadership
of the communist world.

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This was the setting

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within which Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger

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developed perhaps
the boldest ploy

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in all of Cold War statecraft.

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(band playing)

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(applauding and cheering)

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FAREED ZAKARIA:
Mao's China was

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probably the most closed country
in the world.

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There were very few people
who went in there.

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So, it really was

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this place on the moon.

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Nobody really knew what was
going on inside.

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FERGUSON:
Mao's policies had reduced China

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to one of the lowest standards
of living in the world.

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Wretched poverty enforced

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by the draconian measures
of communist rule.

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JIANYING ZHA:
I was born in late 1959,

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ten years after the communists
took over China.

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(crowd cheering and applauding)

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Mao was our Red Sun,
was the savior of China.

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(exclaiming)

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ZHA:
We were schooled

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on all this anti-Western
propaganda.

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(explosion pounds)

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I grew up seeing
this famous Korean War movies

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called "Heroic Children."

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(speaking Chinese)

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And in it,
you see American soldiers

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played by Chinese actors

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with fake noses
and white powder.

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And they were incredibly
ridiculous creatures who would

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be mowed down
by Chinese machine guns.

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(explosion roars)

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So that was

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the very cartoonish picture
of Americans

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that we had in our head.

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(band playing
"The Stars and Stripes Forever")

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(crowd cheering and applauding)

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LORD:
As we came into office, one
week after his inauguration...

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Do you,
Richard Milhous Nixon...

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LORD:
...Nixon sent a memo
to Kissinger and said,

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"Get in touch with the Chinese,
see what we can do."

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One week,
and you could see his priority.

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FERGUSON:
This is where the story gets

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the most cloak
and the most dagger.

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The process of trying to get
in touch with Beijing

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started almost immediately
in 1969,

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but it was extremely difficult,

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because the Chinese
were extremely hard to get to.

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The Chinese had no diplomatic
representatives

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anywhere in the world.

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Even having an address

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where you could confidentially
and reliably

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communicate with the Chinese
didn't exist.

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So, what they had to do
is find discreet intermediaries

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who could play that role.

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FERGUSON:
Of all countries,

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it turned out to be Pakistan

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that made the connection happen.

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REPORTER:
Today's highlight is
the new ambassador from Pakistan

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and his family.

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LORD:
And what would happen is
that the Chinese would send

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a secret message,
which would end up

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with the Pakistani ambassador
in Washington,

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who would call on Kissinger
with the message.

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In January 1971,

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we had sent a message,

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and we hadn't heard back
for months,

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and indeed,
we got quite nervous.

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FERGUSON:
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai,
the Chinese premier,

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were great believers
in the subtle approach, and so,

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the faintest of signals
was sent out from Beijing

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to the effect
that there might possibly be

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a conversation worth having.

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(crowd cheering)

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THOMAS SCHWARTZ:
April of 1971,

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in Japan,
an American Ping-Pong team

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was playing in, in international
Ping-Pong matches,

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and one of the participants
in that

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was the People's Republic
of China.

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ORVILLE SCHELL:
What happened was,
there was a young,

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sort of a hippie
Ping-Pong player,

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with long hair,
and tie-dyed shirts,

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and he got on the wrong bus--

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it was the Chinese bus--

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and met their star player.

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And they kind of
got to be friends.

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And on the basis of that,
I think Zhou Enlai saw

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a little flash of light.

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♪ ♪

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SCHWARTZ:
One of the coaches
from the People's Republic

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approached the Americans about
the possibility of them coming

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to China to play exhibition.

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This was an extraordinary moment

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and received incredible coverage

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in the American media.

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NEWS ANCHOR:
The first films are now
coming out of Red China

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of the visit
by the first U.S. group

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ever invited
by the Chinese communists.

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Today, Premier Zhou Enlai
met the visiting players.

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He told them their visit
opens a new door.

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FERGUSON:
It was a signal that, yes,

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there was an opportunity

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to send an American
representative to Beijing.

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The question was,
who would that be?

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Secrecy was crucial,
and that meant that Nixon

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could only really entrust it
to the one person

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who already knew that this
was his cherished goal,

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and that was Henry Kissinger.

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KISSINGER:
I knew nothing about China.

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That's a great qualification
for a secret mission,

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but it happens to be true.
(audience chuckling)

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I had the same thought
in the '50s

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that everyone else had,
that, that the Chinese

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were revolutionary near-madmen.

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♪ ♪

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LORD:
We had to set up
what the cover story would be.

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So we go on a public trip
to four countries.

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And we stop, of course,
in Pakistan.

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Henry's cover was going to be
that he's got a stomachache.

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00:12:13,666 --> 00:12:16,533
NEWS ANCHOR:
Presidential adviser
Henry Kissinger

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is staying an extra day
in Pakistan

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because of an upset stomach.

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00:12:21,466 --> 00:12:22,933
LORD:
You know, and at 2:00 a.m.,

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00:12:22,933 --> 00:12:27,600
we're driven to the Islamabad
airport by the defense minister.

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00:12:27,600 --> 00:12:29,433
The four of us get on the plane.

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00:12:31,500 --> 00:12:34,566
And so here we are,
flying toward Beijing.

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00:12:34,566 --> 00:12:36,766
None of the world
knows where we are.

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00:12:37,766 --> 00:12:39,833
We were exhilarated and anxious,
I mean,

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this was a gamble--
this was no sure thing.

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♪ ♪

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We land at a military airport
in Beijing,

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00:12:50,700 --> 00:12:53,000
and of course,
we drove in automobiles

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where the curtains were down,
nobody could see us.

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FERGUSON:
Kissinger was deeply impressed
by Zhou Enlai,

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the Chinese premier,

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00:13:02,433 --> 00:13:06,600
and this was one of the great
meetings of minds

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that happened in his career.

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KISSINGER:
He was a man of extraordinary
intelligence,

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00:13:12,933 --> 00:13:16,233
one of the most intelligent
people I've ever met.

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He had an extraordinarily
expressive face.

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He understood English,
though he did not admit it,

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00:13:23,166 --> 00:13:27,066
so his face registered
while you talked to him.

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SCHELL:
The driving force was hopes

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00:13:31,366 --> 00:13:35,000
that if we could pull China
more into our orbit,

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we could resolve
the Vietnam War.

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Most of the military equipment
going to North Vietnam

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was coming through China.

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JOHN NEGROPONTE:
I remember him telling
Zhou Enlai,

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"We don't want to wake up in the
morning in the second term

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reading battlefield reports
from Vietnam."

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One term was enough.

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00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:57,300
LORD:
The Chinese had two major goals.

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One was to balance
the Soviet Union,

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00:14:00,533 --> 00:14:02,633
which was increasingly
threatening them,

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00:14:02,633 --> 00:14:05,133
and the other was coming out
of diplomatic isolation.

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The key issue, of course,
we had to get around

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was the Taiwan issue.

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SCHWARTZ:
And so Kissinger made it clear
to the Chinese

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that the United States
would withdraw

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00:14:15,066 --> 00:14:16,600
some of its forces from Taiwan

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00:14:16,600 --> 00:14:18,566
if the Vietnam War
came to an end.

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00:14:18,566 --> 00:14:23,700
(talking in background)

294
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SCHWARTZ:
Toward the end of the talks,
it was finally raised

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00:14:26,900 --> 00:14:29,066
that President Nixon
would come to China.

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SCHELL:
I think Kissinger
did have a recognition

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something big had happened.

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After all, he had gotten
to the top of China.

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00:14:39,433 --> 00:14:40,966
And he had, in effect,

300
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triggered an invitation
for Nixon himself.

301
00:14:44,500 --> 00:14:48,600
♪ ♪

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00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:51,500
DAVID KISSINGER:
I do remember how jubilant
he was

303
00:14:51,500 --> 00:14:53,466
when he returned from
his secret trip.

304
00:14:53,466 --> 00:14:55,566
I had never seen him
like that before.

305
00:14:56,566 --> 00:14:58,800
 
He was just vibrating
with excitement.

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00:15:01,433 --> 00:15:03,433
SCHWARTZ:
Kissinger briefs Nixon,

307
00:15:03,433 --> 00:15:06,500
and Nixon schedules
a national television speech.

308
00:15:06,500 --> 00:15:07,833
Good evening.

309
00:15:07,833 --> 00:15:09,033
SCHWARTZ:
The secrecy was such

310
00:15:09,033 --> 00:15:12,200
that people thought
it was about Vietnam.

311
00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:16,966
It hit the nation on a Sunday
night as a complete surprise.

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NIXON:
I have taken this action

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00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:22,100
because of my profound
conviction

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that all nations will gain

315
00:15:25,100 --> 00:15:29,633
from a reduction of tensions
and a better relationship

316
00:15:29,633 --> 00:15:33,933
between the United States and
the People's Republic of China.

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00:15:33,933 --> 00:15:37,266
TOM JARRIEL: Details of Henry
Kissinger's secret trip,

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00:15:37,266 --> 00:15:38,833
which led to that announcement,

319
00:15:38,833 --> 00:15:40,433
 
were spelled out today
in a factual account

320
00:15:40,433 --> 00:15:43,400
which makes most detective story
fiction seem bland.

321
00:15:43,400 --> 00:15:45,000
REPORTER:
Henry, can you just tell us,

322
00:15:45,000 --> 00:15:46,766
do you feel encouraged
as a result

323
00:15:46,766 --> 00:15:48,300
of your trip to Peking?

324
00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:52,100
I think we,
we made some progress.

325
00:15:53,333 --> 00:15:56,166
JARRIEL:
The Taiwanese ambassador
was visibly upset.

326
00:15:56,166 --> 00:15:59,000
JAMES SHEN:
I got a 20 minutes' notice

327
00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:01,366
last night--
I couldn't believe it.

328
00:16:01,366 --> 00:16:04,866
We think it's not the kind
of thing a friend and an ally

329
00:16:04,866 --> 00:16:06,766
should do to another.

330
00:16:06,766 --> 00:16:10,466
(crowd cheering and applauding)

331
00:16:12,300 --> 00:16:14,700
REPORTER:
Observers may argue over
whether Dr. Henry Kissinger

332
00:16:14,700 --> 00:16:18,200
is a secret swinger or a square
masquerading as one,

333
00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:21,733
but there's no doubt he is the
deputy president on this trip.

334
00:16:21,733 --> 00:16:23,733
The brilliant,
elusive intellectual,

335
00:16:23,733 --> 00:16:26,300
who has structured the substance
of the top-level talks,

336
00:16:26,300 --> 00:16:28,766
will be at the president's side
throughout.

337
00:16:28,766 --> 00:16:30,400
(no dialogue)

338
00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:34,066
ZHA:
We heard this official
announcement

339
00:16:34,066 --> 00:16:35,800
that Nixon was coming to China.

340
00:16:36,800 --> 00:16:40,066
I still remember rounds
of school briefings

341
00:16:40,066 --> 00:16:43,766
to prepare,
in case you should encounter

342
00:16:43,766 --> 00:16:45,333
any Americans on the street.

343
00:16:45,333 --> 00:16:49,833
The correct attitude is
not too arrogant

344
00:16:49,833 --> 00:16:52,066
and not too obsequious.

345
00:16:52,066 --> 00:16:55,300
(band playing)

346
00:16:55,300 --> 00:16:59,466
And I remember,
when Nixon actually landed,

347
00:16:59,466 --> 00:17:02,666
somehow, I had a sense this was

348
00:17:02,666 --> 00:17:05,566
a super-important moment
that's going to,

349
00:17:05,566 --> 00:17:08,033
in some ways, change your life.

350
00:17:08,033 --> 00:17:10,933
REPORTER:
The first American president
ever to do so

351
00:17:10,933 --> 00:17:12,433
steps onto Chinese soil.

352
00:17:12,433 --> 00:17:17,466
(band playing)

353
00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:20,666
SCHELL:
The meetings with Mao Zedong
took place

354
00:17:20,666 --> 00:17:23,800
in an area adjacent
to the Forbidden City

355
00:17:23,800 --> 00:17:25,200
called Zhongnanhai.

356
00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:27,666
And that's where Mao held court.

357
00:17:27,666 --> 00:17:29,966
REPORTER:
The fact that Chairman Mao
arranged an immediate meeting

358
00:17:29,966 --> 00:17:32,100
with the American chief of state
in his home

359
00:17:32,100 --> 00:17:35,533
is considered significant
by diplomatic observers.

360
00:17:35,533 --> 00:17:38,733
SCHELL:
Just to be there was to be

361
00:17:38,733 --> 00:17:42,200
in the most forbidden,
inaccessible place on Earth.

362
00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:44,800
I think it must have been
quite exhilarating.

363
00:17:46,333 --> 00:17:48,866
KISSINGER: It's one of those
few experiences

364
00:17:48,866 --> 00:17:51,166
you have when you are an adult

365
00:17:51,166 --> 00:17:54,433
which have some of the quality
of childhood about them,

366
00:17:54,433 --> 00:17:56,733
that everything is totally new.

367
00:17:58,366 --> 00:17:59,633
LORD:
We were used

368
00:17:59,633 --> 00:18:03,300
to these elegant Mandarin
discourses by Zhou Enlai.

369
00:18:03,300 --> 00:18:08,366
What we got from Mao
was laconic phrases, allegories,

370
00:18:08,366 --> 00:18:09,966
either that were brilliant,

371
00:18:09,966 --> 00:18:12,466
and we stupid Westerners
couldn't understand,

372
00:18:12,466 --> 00:18:14,300
or he was slightly senile.
(chuckles)

373
00:18:15,833 --> 00:18:18,266
ZHA:
Mao was a great performer.

374
00:18:18,266 --> 00:18:20,800
He says a Chinese phrase.

375
00:18:20,800 --> 00:18:24,666
He said, "The wind and, and rain
are coming,

376
00:18:24,666 --> 00:18:26,700
so the swallows are busy."

377
00:18:26,700 --> 00:18:29,000
Kissinger's reaction was,

378
00:18:29,000 --> 00:18:32,500
"Oh, that was so deep,
it would take me several days

379
00:18:32,500 --> 00:18:34,566
to fully grasp that."

380
00:18:34,566 --> 00:18:36,633
But in fact, it's a very

381
00:18:36,633 --> 00:18:40,566
tacky, trite Chinese,
you know, sort of saying.

382
00:18:40,566 --> 00:18:42,800
Kissinger ate it right up.

383
00:18:44,533 --> 00:18:46,566
REPORTER:
Zhou and Nixon sit down
for conversations

384
00:18:46,566 --> 00:18:49,200
which last
for more than 30 hours.

385
00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:52,266
The result is
the Shanghai Communiqué.

386
00:18:52,266 --> 00:18:54,633
ZAKARIA:
You can see the mastery
of Kissinger's diplomacy

387
00:18:54,633 --> 00:18:57,933
by looking at what's called
the Shanghai Communiqué,

388
00:18:57,933 --> 00:19:00,100
which is, how do you get
around the problem

389
00:19:00,100 --> 00:19:02,866
that the United States basically
thinks Taiwan is the real China?

390
00:19:04,166 --> 00:19:07,866
SCHELL:
So what did they do to put
the Taiwan question aside?

391
00:19:07,866 --> 00:19:11,433
They agreed
on this very guileful solution

392
00:19:11,433 --> 00:19:12,966
where the United States...

393
00:19:12,966 --> 00:19:15,266
And there's a word in Chinese,

394
00:19:15,266 --> 00:19:17,033
they said was "ren shi dao."

395
00:19:17,033 --> 00:19:19,233
"We, we acknowledge,"

396
00:19:19,233 --> 00:19:22,200
"we take note of the fact"

397
00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:25,900
that China says
Taiwan is part of China.

398
00:19:25,900 --> 00:19:27,466
(talking in background)

399
00:19:27,466 --> 00:19:31,500
(chuckles):
It's masterful in
its obfuscation and vagueness,

400
00:19:31,500 --> 00:19:33,666
but it somehow
satisfied everyone.

401
00:19:33,666 --> 00:19:35,466
♪ ♪

402
00:19:37,900 --> 00:19:42,200
FERGUSON:
It was a dream come true
for Richard Nixon himself

403
00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:44,100
and also for Henry Kissinger.

404
00:19:45,333 --> 00:19:47,633
This was good news

405
00:19:47,633 --> 00:19:50,600
after an unremitting diet
of bad news

406
00:19:50,600 --> 00:19:53,466
over Vietnam and over Cambodia.

407
00:19:53,466 --> 00:19:57,166
It felt as though they were
changing the subject

408
00:19:57,166 --> 00:19:59,533
of the American conversation.

409
00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:02,466
SPIRO AGNEW:
We have witnessed,

410
00:20:02,466 --> 00:20:06,033
through the miracle
of satellite television,

411
00:20:06,033 --> 00:20:09,666
the sights and sounds
of a society

412
00:20:09,666 --> 00:20:13,866
that has been closed to
Americans for over two decades.

413
00:20:15,133 --> 00:20:18,333
SAM HOSKINSON:
The opening to China was
maybe, in the 20th century,

414
00:20:18,333 --> 00:20:23,166
the most strategic move that
any president has ever made.

415
00:20:23,166 --> 00:20:24,866
It was the height
of the Cold War,

416
00:20:24,866 --> 00:20:28,900
China and the Soviet Union
were allies,

417
00:20:28,900 --> 00:20:32,200
and we peeled off China--
it was that simple.

418
00:20:33,566 --> 00:20:37,233
ZHA:
I think to see the realpolitik
played out

419
00:20:37,233 --> 00:20:39,400
was very sobering.

420
00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:42,966
The whole thing was part
of a geopolitical game

421
00:20:42,966 --> 00:20:46,200
to balance the Soviet Union.

422
00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:49,533
Nixon and Kissinger
had no interest

423
00:20:49,533 --> 00:20:52,033
in helping improve

424
00:20:52,033 --> 00:20:55,400
the political situation
in China.

425
00:20:55,400 --> 00:21:00,233
They had no thoughts,
not a iota of thoughts,

426
00:21:00,233 --> 00:21:02,633
about human rights.

427
00:21:02,633 --> 00:21:04,166
At one level,

428
00:21:04,166 --> 00:21:07,133
how could I expect
anything more?

429
00:21:08,466 --> 00:21:12,000
ALVANDI:
I think it's a mistake to see
Kissinger's realpolitik

430
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:14,100
as an absence of morality.

431
00:21:14,100 --> 00:21:17,133
What he sees as the moral good

432
00:21:17,133 --> 00:21:21,333
is the preservation
of American security.

433
00:21:21,333 --> 00:21:24,233
Where I think we begin to enter

434
00:21:24,233 --> 00:21:27,233
into a moral gray area
for Kissinger

435
00:21:27,233 --> 00:21:29,533
is, what means are acceptable

436
00:21:29,533 --> 00:21:31,700
in order to achieve that end?

437
00:21:31,700 --> 00:21:36,266
And I think
he had very few limits.

438
00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:41,666
FERGUSON:
Every president,
every national security adviser,

439
00:21:41,666 --> 00:21:45,433
takes decisions
in which there are priorities

440
00:21:45,433 --> 00:21:47,166
accorded to countries

441
00:21:47,166 --> 00:21:49,233
and in which evils are ranked

442
00:21:49,233 --> 00:21:52,400
not just according
to their moral magnitude,

443
00:21:52,400 --> 00:21:57,066
but, more importantly, according
to their strategic magnitude.

444
00:21:57,066 --> 00:22:00,133
♪ ♪

445
00:22:03,033 --> 00:22:08,233
KISSINGER:
The East Pakistan crisis erupted

446
00:22:08,233 --> 00:22:10,166
at the time that Pakistan

447
00:22:10,166 --> 00:22:13,533
was our only channel
of communication to China.

448
00:22:14,566 --> 00:22:19,266
We were in the process
of arranging my secret trip

449
00:22:19,266 --> 00:22:22,933
in the precise period
that West Pakistan

450
00:22:22,933 --> 00:22:27,133
was trying to put down
the uprising in East Pakistan.

451
00:22:28,966 --> 00:22:31,700
FERGUSON:
The partition of British India
had produced

452
00:22:31,700 --> 00:22:34,033
a strange situation
in which there were

453
00:22:34,033 --> 00:22:36,800
essentially
two parts to Pakistan.

454
00:22:36,800 --> 00:22:40,766
What we know today as Pakistan
was West Pakistan.

455
00:22:40,766 --> 00:22:44,700
What we know today as Bangladesh
was East Pakistan.

456
00:22:45,833 --> 00:22:48,100
RAAD RAHMAN:
East Pakistan and West Pakistan
did not

457
00:22:48,100 --> 00:22:49,533
share a language,

458
00:22:49,533 --> 00:22:51,566
they did not share culture,
they did not share history.

459
00:22:51,566 --> 00:22:54,233
It's a complete recipe
for conflict.

460
00:22:54,233 --> 00:22:56,233
(protesters shouting)

461
00:22:56,233 --> 00:22:57,866
SCHWARTZ:
In 1970,

462
00:22:57,866 --> 00:23:01,633
the residents of East Pakistan
voted overwhelmingly

463
00:23:01,633 --> 00:23:04,466
for a different government
from the West Pakistanis.

464
00:23:04,466 --> 00:23:05,733
(shouting)

465
00:23:05,733 --> 00:23:08,433
ROGER MORRIS:
The eastern portion is beginning

466
00:23:08,433 --> 00:23:10,200
to revolt against the authority

467
00:23:10,200 --> 00:23:12,266
of the West Pakistani
government.

468
00:23:13,266 --> 00:23:15,000
It's got its own
elected parliament,

469
00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:19,233
its own elected leadership,
a man named Mujib,

470
00:23:19,233 --> 00:23:20,866
and it's on the verge
of civil war.

471
00:23:20,866 --> 00:23:25,933
(chanting, cheering)

472
00:23:26,933 --> 00:23:29,033
ALVANDI:
Yahya Khan is the channel

473
00:23:29,033 --> 00:23:30,433
through which
Nixon and Kissinger

474
00:23:30,433 --> 00:23:33,166
are communicating with China,

475
00:23:33,166 --> 00:23:35,900
and it's absolutely vital
that he remain in power.

476
00:23:35,900 --> 00:23:38,700
President Yahya Khan of Pakistan

477
00:23:38,700 --> 00:23:41,000
flies to East Pakistan tomorrow

478
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:42,566
to try to talk his opposition

479
00:23:42,566 --> 00:23:44,266
into obeying
the central government.

480
00:23:44,266 --> 00:23:45,900
(protesters shouting)

481
00:23:45,900 --> 00:23:48,500
W. SCOTT BUTCHER:
In Dhaka, I was the junior
political officer.

482
00:23:49,933 --> 00:23:55,133
At 1:26 in the morning
of the 26th of March,

483
00:23:55,133 --> 00:23:57,333
all hell broke loose.

484
00:23:58,666 --> 00:24:01,600
The West Pakistani military
were unleashed

485
00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:03,000
with a vengeance.

486
00:24:03,000 --> 00:24:06,033
Automatic weapons
right outside of our bedroom.

487
00:24:06,033 --> 00:24:08,766
♪ ♪

488
00:24:08,766 --> 00:24:10,433
MORRIS:
The Pakistanis murdered

489
00:24:10,433 --> 00:24:13,200
large numbers of the opposition
politicians

490
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:16,366
in their beds at night, killed
their families,

491
00:24:16,366 --> 00:24:21,500
 
raked Dhaka-- the capital of
East Pakistan-- with artillery,

492
00:24:21,500 --> 00:24:24,300
wantonly killing
innocent civilians.

493
00:24:26,633 --> 00:24:31,200
RAHMAN:
The Pakistani army went
into Dhaka University

494
00:24:31,200 --> 00:24:34,900
and just rounded up academics,
including my uncles,

495
00:24:34,900 --> 00:24:36,133
and disappeared them.

496
00:24:36,133 --> 00:24:38,633
(people shouting in background)

497
00:24:38,633 --> 00:24:40,333
HOSKINSON:
I mean, what was happening was

498
00:24:40,333 --> 00:24:42,866
genocide before our very eyes.

499
00:24:42,866 --> 00:24:44,533
(people calling in background)

500
00:24:44,533 --> 00:24:46,633
KISSINGER:
We are in the process
of attempting

501
00:24:46,633 --> 00:24:49,433
to negotiate a ceasefire
in the Dhaka area

502
00:24:49,433 --> 00:24:52,700
in order to be able
to evacuate the Americans.

503
00:24:52,700 --> 00:24:55,066
GARY BASS:
The Nixon administration

504
00:24:55,066 --> 00:24:57,766
had lots of information

505
00:24:57,766 --> 00:24:59,133
about what's happening.

506
00:24:59,133 --> 00:25:01,333
They're getting
real-time reporting

507
00:25:01,333 --> 00:25:04,766
from the U.S. consulate
in Dhaka.

508
00:25:04,766 --> 00:25:06,333
These Foreign Service officers

509
00:25:06,333 --> 00:25:08,600
have seen that kind of violence
before,

510
00:25:08,600 --> 00:25:09,766
and they're saying,

511
00:25:09,766 --> 00:25:13,533
"This is in a completely
different category.

512
00:25:13,533 --> 00:25:16,166
We've never seen
anything like this."

513
00:25:16,166 --> 00:25:17,600
 
NIXON:
None of them reliable.

514
00:25:17,600 --> 00:25:20,433
ALVANDI:
There's enormous pressure
on Nixon and Kissinger

515
00:25:20,433 --> 00:25:25,533
to cut aid and military support
for Pakistan.

516
00:25:25,533 --> 00:25:27,366
But they choose not to do that.

517
00:25:28,533 --> 00:25:31,566
BUTCHER:
We were absolutely mortified
that our government

518
00:25:31,566 --> 00:25:35,533
was not responding
in what was a,

519
00:25:35,533 --> 00:25:38,533
a humanitarian disaster
inflicted by a government

520
00:25:38,533 --> 00:25:39,833
that we supported.

521
00:25:39,833 --> 00:25:43,400
So, a number of us,
especially younger officers,

522
00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:47,366
felt that we needed to send in
this, an expression of dissent.

523
00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:51,000
"Our government has failed
to denounce

524
00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:52,633
"the suppression of democracy.

525
00:25:52,633 --> 00:25:57,133
"Our government has failed
to denounce atrocities.

526
00:25:57,133 --> 00:25:58,800
"Our government has evidenced

527
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:02,433
what many will consider
moral bankruptcy."

528
00:26:02,433 --> 00:26:04,233
NIXON:
We've been in touch,

529
00:26:04,233 --> 00:26:05,533
of course,
with the Pakistanis

530
00:26:05,533 --> 00:26:08,833
through messages we've sent
to President Yahya.

531
00:26:08,833 --> 00:26:11,233
And incidentally,
he's been very forthcoming.

532
00:26:11,233 --> 00:26:12,700
Well, we can't be blamed for it.

533
00:26:12,700 --> 00:26:14,366
There are many, many areas
of the world

534
00:26:14,366 --> 00:26:17,333
that, that we just can't,

535
00:26:17,333 --> 00:26:19,233
we can't be responsible for.

536
00:26:19,233 --> 00:26:21,633
HOSKINSON:
I was shocked by the lack

537
00:26:21,633 --> 00:26:25,266
of reaction
from Kissinger and Nixon.

538
00:26:25,266 --> 00:26:29,100
They seemed, uh,
unaffected by it,

539
00:26:29,100 --> 00:26:33,566
except in, in the sense
that they wanted it to go away.

540
00:26:34,833 --> 00:26:37,366
RAHMAN:
As far as Kissinger
was concerned,

541
00:26:37,366 --> 00:26:41,033
these lives in South Asia,
they just didn't matter.

542
00:26:42,466 --> 00:26:45,433
We've never recovered the bodies
of my uncles.

543
00:26:47,500 --> 00:26:49,066
SCHWARTZ:
There could have been
an arms cutoff,

544
00:26:49,066 --> 00:26:52,600
there could have been stronger
measures taken against Pakistan

545
00:26:52,600 --> 00:26:53,633
which were not taken.

546
00:26:55,433 --> 00:26:56,600
BARBARA KEYS:
Ultimately, it comes down

547
00:26:56,600 --> 00:26:58,200
to Kissinger's assessment

548
00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:01,266
that what matters is China,

549
00:27:01,266 --> 00:27:03,733
and what happens
in East Pakistan

550
00:27:03,733 --> 00:27:09,000
is almost a footnote relative
to these larger objectives.

551
00:27:10,033 --> 00:27:11,900
KISSINGER:
There are governments in power

552
00:27:11,900 --> 00:27:16,100
that may not meet
all our criteria

553
00:27:16,100 --> 00:27:18,800
for democratic principles,

554
00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:20,233
but the alternative to which

555
00:27:20,233 --> 00:27:24,000
are likely to be positively
hostile to our interests.

556
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:27,033
To manipulate
the domestic politics

557
00:27:27,033 --> 00:27:28,366
of another country

558
00:27:28,366 --> 00:27:32,233
is always
an extremely complicated matter.

559
00:27:32,233 --> 00:27:34,833
And you can start a process
which you cannot control,

560
00:27:34,833 --> 00:27:36,633
and you may not know
how to do it.

561
00:27:36,633 --> 00:27:42,100
♪ ♪

562
00:27:42,100 --> 00:27:43,366
JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS:
My first encounter

563
00:27:43,366 --> 00:27:45,300
with the "great man"

564
00:27:45,300 --> 00:27:50,200
was when there was a luncheon
at our residence.

565
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:52,833
My father was
foreign affairs minister.

566
00:27:52,833 --> 00:27:57,000
And in this luncheon,
there was a big debate,

567
00:27:57,000 --> 00:28:01,166
and Kissinger says, "Look, I
don't care about Latin America.

568
00:28:01,166 --> 00:28:03,966
"I don't care
about your development.

569
00:28:03,966 --> 00:28:06,833
"History doesn't go
through the South.

570
00:28:06,833 --> 00:28:10,400
"History comes
from Russia to Japan

571
00:28:10,400 --> 00:28:12,200
"to Europe
and to the United States.

572
00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:14,466
The South has no importance."

573
00:28:14,466 --> 00:28:16,633
♪ ♪

574
00:28:16,633 --> 00:28:18,733
(bell ringing)

575
00:28:18,733 --> 00:28:20,233
KEYS:
Kissinger called Chile

576
00:28:20,233 --> 00:28:23,300
"a dagger pointed
at the heart of Antarctica."

577
00:28:23,300 --> 00:28:25,166
He did not think
that Latin America

578
00:28:25,166 --> 00:28:26,633
was important.

579
00:28:26,633 --> 00:28:29,100
He, in fact, said, "Latin
America is not important."

580
00:28:30,433 --> 00:28:32,233
VALDÉS:
Chile was probably the country

581
00:28:32,233 --> 00:28:35,333
that first had a stable
democracy in the region.

582
00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:39,366
We had a democracy even
before some European countries.

583
00:28:40,366 --> 00:28:44,100
Salvador Allende was a person
who had represented

584
00:28:44,100 --> 00:28:47,700
the hopes of the poor in Chile
for decades.

585
00:28:47,700 --> 00:28:52,066
And poor people felt
that he was their leader.

586
00:28:52,066 --> 00:28:53,566
(people chanting)

587
00:28:53,566 --> 00:28:55,666
PETER KORNBLUH:
Allende was head
of the Socialist Party.

588
00:28:55,666 --> 00:28:59,400
He believed in the need
for social change,

589
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:00,933
redistribution of wealth,

590
00:29:00,933 --> 00:29:03,800
and that this could be done
through the, the ballot box.

591
00:29:03,800 --> 00:29:06,466
ARIEL DORFMAN:
There is a sense in Kissinger

592
00:29:06,466 --> 00:29:08,866
that Allende's example

593
00:29:08,866 --> 00:29:11,566
could proliferate all over
the continent.

594
00:29:11,566 --> 00:29:16,033
And he considers that one must
stop the contagion.

595
00:29:17,033 --> 00:29:21,466
Allende made no secret
of his determination

596
00:29:21,466 --> 00:29:25,000
to bring about
a revolutionary transformation.

597
00:29:25,000 --> 00:29:28,033
FERGUSON:
Nobody wanted another Cuba.

598
00:29:28,033 --> 00:29:30,933
And so, when any left-wing
leader showed signs

599
00:29:30,933 --> 00:29:34,733
of coming to power
in a Latin American country,

600
00:29:34,733 --> 00:29:37,000
the red lights started flashing

601
00:29:37,000 --> 00:29:39,433
on the dashboard
in the Situation Room.

602
00:29:39,433 --> 00:29:42,800
♪ ♪

603
00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:46,566
KEYS:
In the Cold War,
every inch of territory matters.

604
00:29:46,566 --> 00:29:48,766
It's a zero-sum game.

605
00:29:48,766 --> 00:29:52,566
Any victory for the communists
is a loss

606
00:29:52,566 --> 00:29:54,066
for the United States.

607
00:29:55,666 --> 00:29:57,566
KORNBLUH:
And so, all eyes were on Chile

608
00:29:57,566 --> 00:30:01,933
on September 4, 1970,
as this election took place.

609
00:30:01,933 --> 00:30:04,733
(people talking in background)

610
00:30:04,733 --> 00:30:09,400
♪ ♪

611
00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:12,233
KEYS:
The presidential election
in Chile in 1970

612
00:30:12,233 --> 00:30:16,033
is a three-way race
in which Salvador Allende wins

613
00:30:16,033 --> 00:30:19,000
36.6% of the vote.

614
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:21,000
(people cheering,
car horns honking)

615
00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:24,333
DORFMAN:
But this must be ratified
by Congress.

616
00:30:24,333 --> 00:30:26,633
So, there is a chance for
those who are against Allende

617
00:30:26,633 --> 00:30:30,900
to try to find a way to stop
Allende from becoming president.

618
00:30:32,733 --> 00:30:35,200
KORNBLUH:
Kissinger talks
to C.I.A. director Richard Helms

619
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:36,766
on the phone and basically says,

620
00:30:36,766 --> 00:30:38,800
"We cannot let Chile
go down the drain."

621
00:30:38,800 --> 00:30:41,233
And Helms says, "I'm with you."

622
00:30:41,233 --> 00:30:43,800
And they start to plot out
how they're going

623
00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:45,466
to keep Allende

624
00:30:45,466 --> 00:30:48,333
from actually being inaugurated
as president.

625
00:30:48,333 --> 00:30:51,533
(chanting):
Allende! Allende!

626
00:30:51,533 --> 00:30:53,766
KEYS:
Kissinger says, "I don't see
why we should

627
00:30:53,766 --> 00:30:55,166
"let a country go communist

628
00:30:55,166 --> 00:30:56,733
"just because
of the irresponsibility

629
00:30:56,733 --> 00:30:57,866
of its own people."

630
00:30:57,866 --> 00:31:01,600
(crowd clamoring)

631
00:31:02,566 --> 00:31:05,500
KORNBLUH:
President Nixon called in
to Richard Helms and Kissinger

632
00:31:05,500 --> 00:31:07,200
to the Oval Office,

633
00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:10,700
and Helms took handwritten notes
on Nixon's orders.

634
00:31:10,700 --> 00:31:12,266
"Save Chile.

635
00:31:12,266 --> 00:31:13,933
"Don't tell the ambassador.

636
00:31:13,933 --> 00:31:15,566
"Make the economy scream.

637
00:31:15,566 --> 00:31:17,433
48-hour game plan."

638
00:31:17,433 --> 00:31:20,566
KEYS:
Nixon authorizes two tracks,

639
00:31:20,566 --> 00:31:22,933
and then Kissinger
carries these out.

640
00:31:22,933 --> 00:31:24,966
Track one is essentially
an attempt

641
00:31:24,966 --> 00:31:27,233
to bribe the Chilean members
of Congress

642
00:31:27,233 --> 00:31:29,800
from ratifying Allende.

643
00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:32,033
Track two
is what becomes infamous.

644
00:31:32,033 --> 00:31:36,500
It is an effort to help
the Chilean military

645
00:31:36,500 --> 00:31:39,333
institute a coup
against Allende.

646
00:31:40,833 --> 00:31:43,700
VALDÉS:
The Chilean "consultants"

647
00:31:43,700 --> 00:31:47,766
that the C.I.A. had
and Kissinger had at the time

648
00:31:47,766 --> 00:31:50,233
recommended the kidnapping

649
00:31:50,233 --> 00:31:52,900
of the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.

650
00:31:52,900 --> 00:31:55,533
That meant General Schneider.

651
00:31:56,833 --> 00:31:58,233
KORNBLUH:
General René Schneider,

652
00:31:58,233 --> 00:32:00,000
head of the Chilean
armed forces,

653
00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,066
was pro-constitution.

654
00:32:02,066 --> 00:32:04,866
He was the principal obstacle
to any coup plot

655
00:32:04,866 --> 00:32:06,566
involving the military,

656
00:32:06,566 --> 00:32:11,000
and so he had to be removed,
neutralized, eliminated.

657
00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:13,333
(teletype machine clacking)

658
00:32:13,333 --> 00:32:14,966
VALDÉS:
They sent machine guns

659
00:32:14,966 --> 00:32:17,000
through the pouch
of the American embassy

660
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:19,866
and $30,000 for the general

661
00:32:19,866 --> 00:32:22,333
who was in charge of Santiago.

662
00:32:24,700 --> 00:32:26,300
KORNBLUH:
On October 22,

663
00:32:26,300 --> 00:32:29,100
General Schneider
got into his car.

664
00:32:29,100 --> 00:32:31,666
The car drove
three or four blocks.

665
00:32:31,666 --> 00:32:34,566
It was intercepted
by several other vehicles

666
00:32:34,566 --> 00:32:36,866
filled with thugs.

667
00:32:36,866 --> 00:32:38,466
One thug got out
with a sledgehammer

668
00:32:38,466 --> 00:32:40,266
and started
smashing in the windows.

669
00:32:41,666 --> 00:32:45,033
VALDÉS:
General Schneider had a, a gun,

670
00:32:45,033 --> 00:32:47,066
and he tried to defend himself,
and they killed him.

671
00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:50,233
KORNBLUH:
Henry Kissinger...

672
00:32:50,233 --> 00:32:51,466
(phone ringing)
...gets on the phone
with Richard Nixon

673
00:32:51,466 --> 00:32:54,733
as General René Schneider
lies dying

674
00:32:54,733 --> 00:32:56,100
in a military hospital,

675
00:32:56,100 --> 00:32:57,533
and he says,

676
00:32:57,533 --> 00:33:00,466
"The first step of the coup plot
took place,

677
00:33:00,466 --> 00:33:03,766
"but, such an incompetent bunch,
these Chilean military officers,

678
00:33:03,766 --> 00:33:06,266
that the rest of the plot
is not going forward."

679
00:33:07,666 --> 00:33:10,566
(crowd murmuring)

680
00:33:10,566 --> 00:33:12,633
(bell ringing)

681
00:33:12,633 --> 00:33:13,933
VALDÉS:
The shock

682
00:33:13,933 --> 00:33:17,200
that this murder produced
in Chilean society,

683
00:33:17,200 --> 00:33:20,633
instead of weakening Allende,

684
00:33:20,633 --> 00:33:23,266
gave an enormous strength
to the election of Allende.

685
00:33:23,266 --> 00:33:25,133
(crowd chanting)

686
00:33:25,133 --> 00:33:27,200
Allende, therefore,
was proclaimed president

687
00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:28,833
ten days later.

688
00:33:28,833 --> 00:33:30,933
(crowd cheering and applauding)

689
00:33:30,933 --> 00:33:33,800
KEYS:
Kissinger does not give up.

690
00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:35,733
He wants Allende out of there.

691
00:33:35,733 --> 00:33:39,100
So there's an American effort
to undermine his government.

692
00:33:40,533 --> 00:33:43,600
And that includes cutting off
loans and aid,

693
00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:48,066
funding opposition parties,
opposition media,

694
00:33:48,066 --> 00:33:50,900
and fomenting strikes.

695
00:33:50,900 --> 00:33:53,066
VALDÉS:
The first thing that Nixon said

696
00:33:53,066 --> 00:33:55,166
after the election of Allende
was,

697
00:33:55,166 --> 00:33:56,500
"Make the economy scream."

698
00:33:56,500 --> 00:33:58,500
In fact, the economy screamed.

699
00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:03,766
A country becomes tense,
becomes polarized,

700
00:34:03,766 --> 00:34:06,633
and then you have a society
which was a healthy society

701
00:34:06,633 --> 00:34:08,100
in political terms

702
00:34:08,100 --> 00:34:11,733
that becomes absolutely
out of control.

703
00:34:11,733 --> 00:34:13,766
(people shouting,
weapons firing)

704
00:34:13,766 --> 00:34:17,600
REPORTER:
Army, navy, air force,
and national police

705
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:19,800
staged the coup
that ends 46 years

706
00:34:19,800 --> 00:34:21,900
of democratic rule in Chile.

707
00:34:21,900 --> 00:34:25,433
The military moves in,
the palace is surrounded.

708
00:34:26,633 --> 00:34:28,766
KORNBLUH:
September 11, 1973,

709
00:34:28,766 --> 00:34:33,066
the Chilean military undertook
a very violent coup.

710
00:34:33,066 --> 00:34:35,133
They launched rocket attacks,

711
00:34:35,133 --> 00:34:37,233
bombarding the Moneda Palace.

712
00:34:37,233 --> 00:34:39,433
(explosions pound)

713
00:34:41,333 --> 00:34:43,833
ALLENDE (in Spanish on radio):

714
00:34:47,500 --> 00:34:50,100
 
VALDÉS:
Allende was in
the presidential palace.

715
00:34:50,100 --> 00:34:52,066
He began talking on the radio.

716
00:34:52,066 --> 00:34:55,100
ALLENDE (speaking Spanish):

717
00:34:55,100 --> 00:34:56,833
 
VALDÉS:
He persuaded the rest
of the people who were inside

718
00:34:56,833 --> 00:34:58,633
to leave the palace.

719
00:35:00,900 --> 00:35:02,366
When they were leaving
the palace,

720
00:35:02,366 --> 00:35:04,200
one of the doctors of Allende

721
00:35:04,200 --> 00:35:07,166
decided that he would come back

722
00:35:07,166 --> 00:35:09,300
to where
the office of the president was,

723
00:35:09,300 --> 00:35:11,200
and he saw Allende sitting

724
00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:14,366
with a machine gun here,
and he shot himself.

725
00:35:17,766 --> 00:35:19,833
KEYS:
There is no direct evidence

726
00:35:19,833 --> 00:35:24,566
that Nixon and Kissinger
knew about that coup in advance,

727
00:35:24,566 --> 00:35:27,233
and there's no evidence
that they helped plan it.

728
00:35:27,233 --> 00:35:30,666
But they were thrilled
that Allende was gone,

729
00:35:30,666 --> 00:35:34,766
and they immediately threw
U.S. support behind Pinochet.

730
00:35:34,766 --> 00:35:36,400
(band playing)

731
00:35:36,400 --> 00:35:37,566
VALDÉS:
Augusto Pinochet

732
00:35:37,566 --> 00:35:39,466
was the commander-in-chief
of the army

733
00:35:39,466 --> 00:35:41,133
at the moment
in which the coup happened.

734
00:35:41,133 --> 00:35:42,200
(shouts in Spanish)

735
00:35:42,200 --> 00:35:43,566
 
(respond in Spanish)

736
00:35:43,566 --> 00:35:46,266
VALDÉS:
Pinochet came late
to the conspiracy

737
00:35:46,266 --> 00:35:50,166
to organize a coup,
and in order to persuade

738
00:35:50,166 --> 00:35:52,566
those who had been
from the first moment

739
00:35:52,566 --> 00:35:54,133
in favor of the coup,

740
00:35:54,133 --> 00:35:57,733
he had to be more brutal
than them when he took power.

741
00:35:57,733 --> 00:36:01,400
♪ ♪

742
00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:03,666
KYLE BURKE:
Pinochet began rounding up

743
00:36:03,666 --> 00:36:06,700
leftists and suspected
subversives,

744
00:36:06,700 --> 00:36:10,466
 
gathered them up in a series
of detention centers,

745
00:36:10,466 --> 00:36:12,900
including
the national soccer stadium,

746
00:36:12,900 --> 00:36:17,166
and began the process
of executing many of them.

747
00:36:17,166 --> 00:36:19,800
Many were tortured
for information.

748
00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:23,600
Many more were tortured simply
for the purpose

749
00:36:23,600 --> 00:36:25,800
of instilling the Chilean
population with fear.

750
00:36:27,933 --> 00:36:29,500
VALDÉS:
There were thousands of people
killed,

751
00:36:29,500 --> 00:36:31,100
thousands of people tortured,

752
00:36:31,100 --> 00:36:34,033
thousands of people
who had to live abroad forever.

753
00:36:34,033 --> 00:36:36,500
I would say
that it is incomparable

754
00:36:36,500 --> 00:36:40,266
to any other event
in, in our history.

755
00:36:41,666 --> 00:36:44,733
KORNBLUH:
After the coup,
Nixon seems preoccupied

756
00:36:44,733 --> 00:36:47,066
that the United States
might be exposed,

757
00:36:47,066 --> 00:36:49,766
and Kissinger says,
we didn't do it.

758
00:36:49,766 --> 00:36:53,366
I mean, we helped them
"create the conditions

759
00:36:53,366 --> 00:36:55,566
as best as possible."

760
00:36:58,033 --> 00:37:01,433
KEYS:
You would think that as
a refugee from Nazi Germany,

761
00:37:01,433 --> 00:37:05,700
that Kissinger would be
deeply committed to democracy.

762
00:37:05,700 --> 00:37:08,333
But he seemed to think
that it was not a problem at all

763
00:37:08,333 --> 00:37:10,333
to have dictators
be on the side of the U.S.

764
00:37:10,333 --> 00:37:11,400
in the struggle
against communism.

765
00:37:12,500 --> 00:37:14,133
And in cases like Chile,

766
00:37:14,133 --> 00:37:18,000
he was clearly willing
to subvert democracy.

767
00:37:18,000 --> 00:37:21,000
The argument that Kissinger
makes is

768
00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:23,033
that everything that he is doing
is in the service

769
00:37:23,033 --> 00:37:25,266
of the best outcome
for the world.

770
00:37:25,266 --> 00:37:28,466
He's thinking
about the global chessboard.

771
00:37:28,466 --> 00:37:30,466
And the fact that there
are gonna be people suffering,

772
00:37:30,466 --> 00:37:32,100
dying on the ground,

773
00:37:32,100 --> 00:37:34,733
that to him is
a necessary consequence

774
00:37:34,733 --> 00:37:36,833
of pursuing policies
that are going

775
00:37:36,833 --> 00:37:38,566
to result in global stability.

776
00:37:38,566 --> 00:37:43,866
♪ ♪

777
00:37:43,866 --> 00:37:46,500
REPORTER:
Russia puts on its annual
May Day show of strength

778
00:37:46,500 --> 00:37:48,633
in these just-released films
from Moscow.

779
00:37:50,266 --> 00:37:53,300
FERGUSON:
The Soviet Union
at the beginning

780
00:37:53,300 --> 00:37:54,900
of the Nixon administration

781
00:37:54,900 --> 00:37:57,600
had good reason to think that
they were winning the Cold War.

782
00:37:57,600 --> 00:37:59,100
♪ ♪

783
00:37:59,100 --> 00:38:02,233
The United States
was bogged down in Vietnam,

784
00:38:02,233 --> 00:38:03,533
but that wasn't
its only problem.

785
00:38:04,833 --> 00:38:06,233
With every passing year,

786
00:38:06,233 --> 00:38:09,366
the Soviets built
more nuclear weapons

787
00:38:09,366 --> 00:38:11,233
until they achieved parity,

788
00:38:11,233 --> 00:38:13,066
and then overtook
the United States

789
00:38:13,066 --> 00:38:15,066
in terms of the size
of their nuclear arsenal.

790
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:20,000
SURI:
From 1945, from Hiroshima,

791
00:38:20,000 --> 00:38:22,766
until the early '70s,

792
00:38:22,766 --> 00:38:25,666
it's a breakneck race to build
more nuclear weapons.

793
00:38:25,666 --> 00:38:27,933
This was a very
unstable situation,

794
00:38:27,933 --> 00:38:29,733
 
and there was
no obvious end to it.

795
00:38:29,733 --> 00:38:31,366
(explosion roars)

796
00:38:31,366 --> 00:38:33,566
KISSINGER:
When the decision of peace
and war involves

797
00:38:33,566 --> 00:38:36,633
the survival of tens of millions
of people,

798
00:38:36,633 --> 00:38:38,700
you're no longer playing
power politics

799
00:38:38,700 --> 00:38:40,100
in the traditional sense.

800
00:38:40,100 --> 00:38:42,700
To conduct
confrontation politics

801
00:38:42,700 --> 00:38:46,066
when the stakes
are going to be determined

802
00:38:46,066 --> 00:38:47,866
by nuclear weapons

803
00:38:47,866 --> 00:38:49,366
is the height
of irresponsibility.

804
00:38:49,366 --> 00:38:51,333
This is what we mean
by "détente."

805
00:38:51,333 --> 00:38:52,566
(people exclaiming)

806
00:38:52,566 --> 00:38:55,333
FERGUSON:
"Détente" is a French word

807
00:38:55,333 --> 00:38:58,566
that really just meant
improving relations.

808
00:38:58,566 --> 00:39:02,033
It was about buying some time,

809
00:39:02,033 --> 00:39:04,866
reducing the risk
of World War III,

810
00:39:04,866 --> 00:39:06,466
and trying to recover

811
00:39:06,466 --> 00:39:08,400
from what was becoming

812
00:39:08,400 --> 00:39:11,500
the insolvable problem
of Vietnam.

813
00:39:11,500 --> 00:39:13,900
(crowd talking in background)

814
00:39:13,900 --> 00:39:15,500
CAROLYN EISENBERG:
Kissinger definitely saw

815
00:39:15,500 --> 00:39:19,033
a role for the Soviet Union
in the resolution of Vietnam,

816
00:39:19,033 --> 00:39:23,866
and he is very clear

817
00:39:23,866 --> 00:39:25,933
that he's interested in getting
help from them

818
00:39:25,933 --> 00:39:27,933
in bringing this to a close.

819
00:39:29,033 --> 00:39:30,966
 
FERGUSON:
Kissinger would creatively
suggest

820
00:39:30,966 --> 00:39:33,000
the possibility
of a summit meeting,

821
00:39:33,000 --> 00:39:36,533
and the Soviets would say,
"Nyet."

822
00:39:36,533 --> 00:39:41,833
This changed
with the opening to China.

823
00:39:41,833 --> 00:39:43,600
KISSINGER:
When we opened to China,

824
00:39:43,600 --> 00:39:46,800
the Soviets suddenly realized
that we had

825
00:39:46,800 --> 00:39:51,033
a bigger canvas to paint on
than they had calculated.

826
00:39:51,033 --> 00:39:53,266
And in that sense,
there was leverage.

827
00:39:54,733 --> 00:39:57,066
SMITH:
The Soviets who are looking
at the world stage

828
00:39:57,066 --> 00:39:58,400
are saying, "Wait a minute.

829
00:39:58,400 --> 00:40:00,533
"We've just been outflanked.

830
00:40:00,533 --> 00:40:03,766
"And if we don't get into talks
with the Americans

831
00:40:03,766 --> 00:40:07,966
"and strike a deal that makes us
an equal superpower,

832
00:40:07,966 --> 00:40:10,733
the Chinese
are gonna replace us."

833
00:40:10,733 --> 00:40:12,633
Good evening.

834
00:40:12,633 --> 00:40:14,333
President Nixon has announced
that he'll be going

835
00:40:14,333 --> 00:40:15,833
to Moscow next May

836
00:40:15,833 --> 00:40:18,166
for a summit conference
with Soviet leaders.

837
00:40:18,166 --> 00:40:20,466
It'll be the first trip
to the Soviet Union

838
00:40:20,466 --> 00:40:22,966
by an American president
since Franklin Roosevelt

839
00:40:22,966 --> 00:40:25,733
journeyed to Yalta in
the waning days of World War II.

840
00:40:25,733 --> 00:40:28,900
♪ ♪

841
00:40:28,900 --> 00:40:30,633
NEGROPONTE:
Kissinger and Nixon

842
00:40:30,633 --> 00:40:33,400
accepted an invitation
to stay in the Kremlin.

843
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:35,633
I mean,

844
00:40:35,633 --> 00:40:37,533
whether you, as president
of the United States,

845
00:40:37,533 --> 00:40:39,433
would have wanted
everything you did...

846
00:40:39,433 --> 00:40:42,866
(chuckling):
...in your guest room
bugged and photographed,

847
00:40:42,866 --> 00:40:44,233
I don't know.

848
00:40:44,233 --> 00:40:46,766
But that's, that's what Henry
agreed to do.

849
00:40:46,766 --> 00:40:50,133
So they stayed in the Kremlin.

850
00:40:51,966 --> 00:40:55,900
ALVANDI:
The Soviet leadership had
installed Leonid Brezhnev.

851
00:40:55,900 --> 00:40:57,366
Not the sharpest knife
in the drawer

852
00:40:57,366 --> 00:40:58,933
intellectually, let's put it
that way.

853
00:41:00,100 --> 00:41:03,800
SMITH:
Brezhnev is a classic
Communist Party apparatchik

854
00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:05,633
who has risen to the top

855
00:41:05,633 --> 00:41:10,900
by being very careful at playing
all sides against each other.

856
00:41:11,900 --> 00:41:13,966
He's not a thug,

857
00:41:13,966 --> 00:41:15,800
but he's not very far
from a thug.
(chuckling)

858
00:41:18,033 --> 00:41:21,133
♪ ♪

859
00:41:21,133 --> 00:41:24,233
FERGUSON:
The most surreal moment
in their relationship

860
00:41:24,233 --> 00:41:27,966
must have been when Brezhnev
treated Kissinger to a visit

861
00:41:27,966 --> 00:41:30,633
to his hunting lodge.

862
00:41:32,133 --> 00:41:34,900
Henry Kissinger
was not the kind of person

863
00:41:34,900 --> 00:41:39,466
who goes shooting wild boar
as a recreational pastime.

864
00:41:39,466 --> 00:41:41,600
KISSINGER:
They put out the food.

865
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:42,600
You sit in a tower

866
00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:44,133
and shoot these poor bastards

867
00:41:44,133 --> 00:41:46,633
as they come by to feed.

868
00:41:46,633 --> 00:41:49,600
When he had killed
about three boars

869
00:41:49,600 --> 00:41:53,800
and God knows what else,
he unpacked a picnic and said,

870
00:41:53,800 --> 00:41:55,566
"Look, I want
to talk to you privately."

871
00:41:55,566 --> 00:41:57,733
And he said, "Look,
you and me are partners.

872
00:41:57,733 --> 00:41:59,733
You and me are going
to run the world."

873
00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:03,000
NEGROPONTE:
I participated in the meeting
with Brezhnev

874
00:42:03,000 --> 00:42:04,233
at his dacha.

875
00:42:04,233 --> 00:42:06,700
It was an evening devoted
to Vietnam.

876
00:42:07,766 --> 00:42:10,433
LORD:
The meeting was just three
or four top Soviet leaders,

877
00:42:10,433 --> 00:42:11,533
including Brezhnev,

878
00:42:11,533 --> 00:42:14,100
took turns lambasting Nixon

879
00:42:14,100 --> 00:42:17,133
about his Vietnam policy,

880
00:42:17,133 --> 00:42:20,166
all of which was to show Hanoi
how tough they were.

881
00:42:20,166 --> 00:42:22,900
 
NEGROPONTE:
And we met for four hours!

882
00:42:22,900 --> 00:42:25,933
And I remember Nixon leaning
over to Kissinger saying,

883
00:42:25,933 --> 00:42:28,466
you know, "Jesus Christ,
we gotta get out of here."

884
00:42:28,466 --> 00:42:30,100
(chuckling):
At that point, Brezhnev says,

885
00:42:30,100 --> 00:42:31,900
"Well, now we're going upstairs
for dinner."

886
00:42:31,900 --> 00:42:33,833
(people talking in background)

887
00:42:33,833 --> 00:42:36,133
LORD:
The whole mood changed,

888
00:42:36,133 --> 00:42:38,133
everyone got half-drunk.

889
00:42:38,133 --> 00:42:41,300
And then, toward
the end of that dinner,

890
00:42:41,300 --> 00:42:43,600
Brezhnev says to Nixon,
"I think Kissinger should go off

891
00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:46,800
and negotiate with my people
on, on the SALT agreement."

892
00:42:48,666 --> 00:42:53,166
FERGUSON:
SALT was the first treaty
ever negotiated

893
00:42:53,166 --> 00:42:55,100
to limit the growth

894
00:42:55,100 --> 00:43:00,100
of what were euphemistically
called "strategic arms."

895
00:43:00,100 --> 00:43:02,833
♪ ♪

896
00:43:02,833 --> 00:43:04,433
NEGROPONTE:
We go back to Moscow.

897
00:43:04,433 --> 00:43:07,600
We needed
to Xerox the SALT treaty,

898
00:43:07,600 --> 00:43:09,200
because it was being signed.

899
00:43:09,200 --> 00:43:12,833
And suddenly, the Xerox machine
wouldn't work anymore.

900
00:43:12,833 --> 00:43:15,766
And so Henry goes
to the Xerox machine,

901
00:43:15,766 --> 00:43:19,433
he grabs the treaty, he
holds it up to the chandelier.

902
00:43:19,433 --> 00:43:23,366
And he says, "General Antonov"--
Antonov was our KGB minder.

903
00:43:23,366 --> 00:43:24,866
(laughing):
He said, "General Antonov,

904
00:43:24,866 --> 00:43:27,366
can I have six copies of this,
please?"

905
00:43:27,366 --> 00:43:29,700
(laughs)

906
00:43:30,966 --> 00:43:33,100
REPORTER:
SALT I was signed.

907
00:43:33,100 --> 00:43:35,766
One of the results was the
anti-ballistic missile treaty

908
00:43:35,766 --> 00:43:38,533
and agreement to shelve
the elaborate and expensive

909
00:43:38,533 --> 00:43:40,366
anti-ballistic missile apparatus
in the U.S.

910
00:43:40,366 --> 00:43:41,733
and the Soviet Union.

911
00:43:43,400 --> 00:43:45,766
FERGUSON:
The first SALT agreement

912
00:43:45,766 --> 00:43:48,766
was not a trivial achievement.

913
00:43:48,766 --> 00:43:51,133
Of course,
it didn't stop the Soviets

914
00:43:51,133 --> 00:43:53,533
building nuclear warheads,

915
00:43:53,533 --> 00:43:56,166
but I think, from Kissinger's
point of view,

916
00:43:56,166 --> 00:43:59,366
you'd created a new basis
for the relationship,

917
00:43:59,366 --> 00:44:02,300
and you'd at least created
a mode within which

918
00:44:02,300 --> 00:44:07,133
arms limitation
could be achieved.

919
00:44:07,133 --> 00:44:08,566
♪ ♪

920
00:44:08,566 --> 00:44:11,900
SMITH:
The psychological impact
was powerful.

921
00:44:11,900 --> 00:44:14,566
Powerful because
we're acknowledging

922
00:44:14,566 --> 00:44:17,166
we're vulnerable to each other,
and we're saying,

923
00:44:17,166 --> 00:44:20,266
"Hey, this is crazy
to keep spending money this way

924
00:44:20,266 --> 00:44:22,133
and threatening each other."

925
00:44:22,133 --> 00:44:23,733
♪ ♪

926
00:44:23,733 --> 00:44:25,200
My recollection is,

927
00:44:25,200 --> 00:44:27,800
they let Nixon go
on Soviet television,

928
00:44:27,800 --> 00:44:31,200
which was unheard of--
we couldn't believe it.

929
00:44:31,200 --> 00:44:33,000
NIXON:
Dobry vecher.

930
00:44:33,000 --> 00:44:35,666
I deeply appreciate
this opportunity

931
00:44:35,666 --> 00:44:38,233
your government has given me
to speak directly

932
00:44:38,233 --> 00:44:41,200
with the people
of the Soviet Union,

933
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:43,066
to bring you a message
of friendship

934
00:44:43,066 --> 00:44:45,400
from all the people
of the United States.

935
00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:47,100
SCHWARTZ:
The SALT agreement at the time

936
00:44:47,100 --> 00:44:49,366
was seen almost as the end
of the Cold War.

937
00:44:50,633 --> 00:44:52,966
To many Americans,
the idea that the Soviets

938
00:44:52,966 --> 00:44:55,100
and the Americans could
actually meet

939
00:44:55,100 --> 00:44:57,500
and negotiate about their arms

940
00:44:57,500 --> 00:44:59,133
signaled that we were not headed

941
00:44:59,133 --> 00:45:00,933
toward nuclear destruction.

942
00:45:03,100 --> 00:45:05,633
 
ALVANDI:
What it really did was establish
a relationship of trust.

943
00:45:05,633 --> 00:45:09,366
They weren't two enemies

944
00:45:09,366 --> 00:45:11,400
on either sides
of the barricades anymore.

945
00:45:13,066 --> 00:45:16,566
But détente did not end
the Vietnam War.

946
00:45:16,566 --> 00:45:19,566
The Vietnamese Communist Party
was not going to abandon

947
00:45:19,566 --> 00:45:23,866
the idea of reunifying Vietnam
simply because Moscow said so.

948
00:45:23,866 --> 00:45:27,033
I think Nixon and Kissinger
and a lot of other people

949
00:45:27,033 --> 00:45:30,533
saw the North Vietnamese
as being linked to

950
00:45:30,533 --> 00:45:33,966
and run by the Russians and the
Chinese, and they weren't.

951
00:45:33,966 --> 00:45:36,266
They were running the war
themselves

952
00:45:36,266 --> 00:45:39,233
for their own national mission.

953
00:45:39,233 --> 00:45:43,866
♪ ♪

954
00:45:43,866 --> 00:45:46,100
REPORTER:
This was the 17th
private meeting

955
00:45:46,100 --> 00:45:47,900
and the fourth time
in the last two months

956
00:45:47,900 --> 00:45:51,566
that Kissinger has met secretly
with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy.

957
00:45:51,566 --> 00:45:53,900
He left the meeting grim-faced
and solemn,

958
00:45:53,900 --> 00:45:55,600
without answering questions,

959
00:45:55,600 --> 00:45:58,266
giving no indication
of what happened inside.

960
00:45:59,700 --> 00:46:02,866
FERGUSON:
The pace of negotiations
with the North Vietnamese

961
00:46:02,866 --> 00:46:06,933
picked up in 1971-72.

962
00:46:06,933 --> 00:46:11,700
A big question was what exactly
Kissinger was playing for.

963
00:46:12,866 --> 00:46:16,733
Was he playing
for the long-term survival

964
00:46:16,733 --> 00:46:19,366
of South Vietnam?

965
00:46:19,366 --> 00:46:21,733
Or was he playing
for a decent interval,

966
00:46:21,733 --> 00:46:23,900
a respectable amount of time

967
00:46:23,900 --> 00:46:26,966
that South Vietnam
would survive,

968
00:46:26,966 --> 00:46:31,433
long enough for, say,
Richard Nixon to get re-elected?

969
00:46:31,433 --> 00:46:33,200
(cheering and applauding)

970
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:35,433
REPORTER:
Mr. Nixon is running
for a second term,

971
00:46:35,433 --> 00:46:37,466
but as he does,

972
00:46:37,466 --> 00:46:40,200
what happens in the war
is his responsibility.

973
00:46:40,200 --> 00:46:42,666
CROWD:
Four more years!

974
00:46:42,666 --> 00:46:45,633
FERGUSON:
Nixon and Kissinger could
sometimes sound as if they

975
00:46:45,633 --> 00:46:48,533
were focused on getting
through the '72 election,

976
00:46:48,533 --> 00:46:50,633
and after that,
the fate of South Vietnam

977
00:46:50,633 --> 00:46:53,100
would really not be
their problem.

978
00:46:54,133 --> 00:46:56,300
NEGROPONTE:
If you read some of the tapes,

979
00:46:56,300 --> 00:46:58,733
there's one place where
Nixon and Kissinger are talking,

980
00:46:58,733 --> 00:47:00,633
and Kissinger says to Nixon,

981
00:47:00,633 --> 00:47:03,166
"Well, Mr. President,
if Saigon collapses

982
00:47:03,166 --> 00:47:05,733
"before the election,
you really have a problem.

983
00:47:05,733 --> 00:47:08,800
But if it collapses afterwards,
it doesn't really matter."

984
00:47:09,800 --> 00:47:12,933
KISSINGER: The, the question is
now, how can we maneuver it

985
00:47:12,933 --> 00:47:16,133
so that it can look like a
settlement by Election Day,

986
00:47:16,133 --> 00:47:18,900
but that the process
is still open?

987
00:47:18,900 --> 00:47:20,933
If we can get that done,

988
00:47:20,933 --> 00:47:24,166
then we can screw them after
Election Day, if necessary.

989
00:47:25,366 --> 00:47:29,033
LORD:
The North Vietnamese worried
about Nixon getting re-elected.

990
00:47:29,033 --> 00:47:30,766
Their latest offensive had been

991
00:47:30,766 --> 00:47:33,433
blunted by
our military response.

992
00:47:33,433 --> 00:47:35,900
They thought Nixon
might be anxious

993
00:47:35,900 --> 00:47:38,366
for a settlement
before the election.

994
00:47:39,366 --> 00:47:41,400
The breakthrough came in
early October

995
00:47:41,400 --> 00:47:45,100
when Le Duc Tho handed us a
counter-proposal

996
00:47:45,100 --> 00:47:47,900
 
which essentially left the South
Vietnamese government in place.

997
00:47:47,900 --> 00:47:49,466
(speaking indistinctly)

998
00:47:49,466 --> 00:47:53,133
LORD:
As soon as Le Duc Tho read out
his proposal to us,

999
00:47:53,133 --> 00:47:55,800
we called for a break
in the negotiations,

1000
00:47:55,800 --> 00:47:58,733
and Henry and I went outside
in the Paris garden,

1001
00:47:58,733 --> 00:48:00,433
and we shook hands

1002
00:48:00,433 --> 00:48:02,566
and smiled at each other
and said, "We've done it!"

1003
00:48:02,566 --> 00:48:04,566
♪ ♪

1004
00:48:04,566 --> 00:48:06,600
SCHWARTZ:
Kissinger was overjoyed.

1005
00:48:06,600 --> 00:48:10,566
And he was absolutely convinced
that the October Agreement

1006
00:48:10,566 --> 00:48:12,600
was the real achievement
for American diplomacy.

1007
00:48:14,566 --> 00:48:16,766
NEGROPONTE:
Kissinger went back
to Washington,

1008
00:48:16,766 --> 00:48:18,866
and, on the 26th of October,

1009
00:48:18,866 --> 00:48:20,733
had a famous press conference

1010
00:48:20,733 --> 00:48:24,166
where he said peace was at hand.

1011
00:48:24,166 --> 00:48:25,900
REPORTER:
Months of secret meetings,

1012
00:48:25,900 --> 00:48:28,633
days of persistent rumors,
reached their climax

1013
00:48:28,633 --> 00:48:33,266
as presidential adviser Henry
Kissinger met with reporters.

1014
00:48:33,266 --> 00:48:37,300
We believe
that peace is at hand.

1015
00:48:39,266 --> 00:48:40,766
SCHWARTZ:
What he overlooked, of course,

1016
00:48:40,766 --> 00:48:43,133
was whether he could get
the South Vietnamese to agree.

1017
00:48:44,900 --> 00:48:47,166
LORD:
Henry and I were
quite optimistic

1018
00:48:47,166 --> 00:48:49,600
that, with some nudging
and reassurance

1019
00:48:49,600 --> 00:48:51,200
about support in the future,

1020
00:48:51,200 --> 00:48:53,566
that President Thieu
would be so pleased

1021
00:48:53,566 --> 00:48:55,000
that we'd get him aboard.

1022
00:48:55,000 --> 00:48:59,000
But we went in there,
and we ran into a buzzsaw.

1023
00:48:59,000 --> 00:49:01,600
REPORTER:
The Saigon government-controlled
radio

1024
00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:03,100
says any separate agreement

1025
00:49:03,100 --> 00:49:05,366
between North Vietnam
and the United States

1026
00:49:05,366 --> 00:49:08,266
will not concern South Vietnam
in any way.

1027
00:49:09,500 --> 00:49:12,033
SCHWARTZ: There were about
100,000 North Vietnamese troops

1028
00:49:12,033 --> 00:49:13,933
in South Vietnam at the time,

1029
00:49:13,933 --> 00:49:17,600
and the South Vietnamese
government wanted them out.

1030
00:49:17,600 --> 00:49:19,533
But the agreement

1031
00:49:19,533 --> 00:49:21,500
did not insist
that North Vietnamese troops

1032
00:49:21,500 --> 00:49:23,066
withdraw from South Vietnam.

1033
00:49:25,166 --> 00:49:27,333
EISENBERG:
The South Vietnamese government
blows up.

1034
00:49:27,333 --> 00:49:29,166
They're absolutely furious.

1035
00:49:29,166 --> 00:49:31,966
And they make that clear
immediately,

1036
00:49:31,966 --> 00:49:34,366
that they, this is
completely unacceptable,

1037
00:49:34,366 --> 00:49:35,700
it's a sellout.

1038
00:49:37,133 --> 00:49:38,900
NEGROPONTE:
We excluded them entirely

1039
00:49:38,900 --> 00:49:42,366
from the negotiation
of their own fate.

1040
00:49:42,366 --> 00:49:43,666
I mean, this is a negotiation

1041
00:49:43,666 --> 00:49:45,166
about the future
of South Vietnam.

1042
00:49:45,166 --> 00:49:48,966
REPORTER:
Henry Kissinger confirming
Radio Hanoi's claim

1043
00:49:48,966 --> 00:49:51,133
that October 31 had been
tentatively agreed upon

1044
00:49:51,133 --> 00:49:53,566
as the date for signing
a Vietnam ceasefire.

1045
00:49:53,566 --> 00:49:56,466
But Kissinger went on to say
Saigon's President Thieu

1046
00:49:56,466 --> 00:49:59,333
declined to go along until
more guarantees were given.

1047
00:49:59,333 --> 00:50:02,533
SCHWARTZ:
I think he believed that we had

1048
00:50:02,533 --> 00:50:05,200
such leverage
on the South Vietnamese,

1049
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:07,633
and that they didn't
really have a choice.

1050
00:50:09,333 --> 00:50:11,800
(band playing
"Hail to the Chief")

1051
00:50:11,800 --> 00:50:14,200
REPORTER:
Richard Nixon,
re-elected president

1052
00:50:14,200 --> 00:50:16,333
by one of the largest margins
in history.

1053
00:50:16,333 --> 00:50:19,266
The mandate he sought he got.

1054
00:50:19,266 --> 00:50:21,800
(crowd cheering and applauding,
music ends)

1055
00:50:21,800 --> 00:50:23,433
LORD:
After the election,

1056
00:50:23,433 --> 00:50:26,933
we re-engaged the North
Vietnamese in negotiations.

1057
00:50:26,933 --> 00:50:29,233
And not only did
we not make progress,

1058
00:50:29,233 --> 00:50:31,366
but they began to, to slip back

1059
00:50:31,366 --> 00:50:33,333
on some of the concessions
they had made.

1060
00:50:34,333 --> 00:50:36,333
KISSINGER:
I was extremely depressed,

1061
00:50:36,333 --> 00:50:39,366
because things had reached
the point where we were so close

1062
00:50:39,366 --> 00:50:41,333
to a settlement,
and the thing blew up again.

1063
00:50:41,333 --> 00:50:43,433
I warned Hanoi
that we would do something.

1064
00:50:43,433 --> 00:50:44,833
I didn't tell them what,

1065
00:50:44,833 --> 00:50:46,866
because I didn't know
what we were going to do.

1066
00:50:48,133 --> 00:50:50,900
BRIGHAM:
Kissinger said repeatedly,
"This raggedy-ass

1067
00:50:50,900 --> 00:50:52,866
"fourth-rate country has
a breaking point.

1068
00:50:52,866 --> 00:50:54,000
I'm going to find it."

1069
00:50:54,000 --> 00:50:57,166
KISSINGER:
Nixon was of the view

1070
00:50:57,166 --> 00:50:59,666
that something shocking
had to be done.

1071
00:51:00,900 --> 00:51:03,500
And I think Nixon turned out
to be right.

1072
00:51:07,733 --> 00:51:12,433
SCHWARTZ:
Nixon and Kissinger decide
on a massive bombing campaign:

1073
00:51:12,433 --> 00:51:14,466
the so-called Christmas bombing.

1074
00:51:14,466 --> 00:51:20,000
(explosions pounding)

1075
00:51:20,000 --> 00:51:22,133
NEWS ANCHOR:
North Vietnam has gone
through another day

1076
00:51:22,133 --> 00:51:23,633
of the most intense bombing

1077
00:51:23,633 --> 00:51:25,000
in the history
of the Indochina war.

1078
00:51:25,000 --> 00:51:27,066
REPORTER:
North Vietnamese officials
claim

1079
00:51:27,066 --> 00:51:29,366
that thousands of civilians
have been killed

1080
00:51:29,366 --> 00:51:30,766
or wounded,

1081
00:51:30,766 --> 00:51:32,700
and that large sections of Hanoi
have been wiped out.

1082
00:51:32,700 --> 00:51:34,566
(people calling,
crying in background)

1083
00:51:34,566 --> 00:51:38,566
EISENBERG:
The Christmas bombing inflicted
tremendous damage

1084
00:51:38,566 --> 00:51:40,900
not only to their soldiers,
but to civilians.

1085
00:51:42,066 --> 00:51:44,466
It was just inflicting
as much damage as you could.

1086
00:51:46,066 --> 00:51:48,333
LORD:
A lot of people said,
"Oh, this was heartless

1087
00:51:48,333 --> 00:51:50,933
and lots of innocent people
were killed."

1088
00:51:50,933 --> 00:51:53,900
Now, I'm sure there
was some collateral damage.

1089
00:51:53,900 --> 00:51:56,133
But basically,
we did hit military targets.

1090
00:51:56,133 --> 00:52:00,433
♪ ♪

1091
00:52:00,433 --> 00:52:02,900
BRIGHAM:
Kissinger believed
the Christmas bombings

1092
00:52:02,900 --> 00:52:05,633
actually drove Hanoi
back to the bargaining table.

1093
00:52:06,833 --> 00:52:08,100
Good morning from New York.

1094
00:52:08,100 --> 00:52:10,300
Peace is not only at hand,
it is here.

1095
00:52:10,300 --> 00:52:13,700
KISSINGER:
There is to be issued
a new order

1096
00:52:13,700 --> 00:52:17,066
on the ceasefire,
which is to go into effect

1097
00:52:17,066 --> 00:52:20,333
roughly 36 hours
from now,

1098
00:52:20,333 --> 00:52:23,700
and which we hope, and expect,

1099
00:52:23,700 --> 00:52:27,233
will be implemented
fully.

1100
00:52:27,233 --> 00:52:28,666
♪ ♪

1101
00:52:28,666 --> 00:52:30,466
LIEN-HANG NGUYEN:
The Paris agreement
to end the war

1102
00:52:30,466 --> 00:52:32,933
and restore the peace
failed to do either.

1103
00:52:32,933 --> 00:52:34,466
It did not end the war,
it did not end the fighting,

1104
00:52:34,466 --> 00:52:37,600
and it did not bring about
peace and stability to Vietnam.

1105
00:52:39,600 --> 00:52:42,333
All that it achieved
was allowing the United States

1106
00:52:42,333 --> 00:52:44,733
to withdraw militarily
from Vietnam.

1107
00:52:45,933 --> 00:52:48,333
Kissinger knew full well

1108
00:52:48,333 --> 00:52:51,166
that the fighting would resume

1109
00:52:51,166 --> 00:52:53,933
even before the ink would dry
on the piece of paper.

1110
00:52:55,666 --> 00:52:57,866
FARRELL:
Nixon and Kissinger
definitely knew

1111
00:52:57,866 --> 00:53:01,866
the deal they signed
in January 1973 would condemn

1112
00:53:01,866 --> 00:53:05,200
South Vietnam to eventual
defeat.

1113
00:53:10,700 --> 00:53:14,566
(band playing
"Hail to the Chief")
(crowd cheering and applauding)

1114
00:53:14,566 --> 00:53:16,533
(band pauses)
ANNOUNCER:
Ladies and gentlemen,

1115
00:53:16,533 --> 00:53:18,700
the president
of the United States.

1116
00:53:18,700 --> 00:53:20,733
(band resumes,
crowd cheering and applauding)

1117
00:53:22,900 --> 00:53:25,533
NIXON:
We stand on the threshold

1118
00:53:25,533 --> 00:53:28,933
of a new era of peace
in the world.

1119
00:53:28,933 --> 00:53:30,600
(crowd cheers and applauds)

1120
00:53:30,600 --> 00:53:34,566
MORRIS:
1972 was a landslide victory.

1121
00:53:34,566 --> 00:53:36,533
But Watergate, of course,

1122
00:53:36,533 --> 00:53:39,833
begins to sink Nixon
despite the massive re-election

1123
00:53:39,833 --> 00:53:43,800
and begins to erode
that landslide support

1124
00:53:43,800 --> 00:53:45,833
almost immediately.

1125
00:53:47,200 --> 00:53:49,700
FARRELL:
There's this tick-tick-ticking

1126
00:53:49,700 --> 00:53:54,966
coming from closets and file
cabinets in the White House,

1127
00:53:54,966 --> 00:53:58,333
because a bunch of ding-dongs
had been caught burglarizing

1128
00:53:58,333 --> 00:54:00,766
the Democratic National
Committee headquarters.

1129
00:54:00,766 --> 00:54:03,933
NEWS ANCHOR:
The Watergate bugging case
involves a bizarre break-in

1130
00:54:03,933 --> 00:54:07,300
at the Democratic Party
headquarters in which two men

1131
00:54:07,300 --> 00:54:10,100
connected with the Nixon
re-election campaign

1132
00:54:10,100 --> 00:54:11,600
were arrested.

1133
00:54:11,600 --> 00:54:13,033
FARRELL:
From that point on,

1134
00:54:13,033 --> 00:54:16,200
everything else goes
on back burners,

1135
00:54:16,200 --> 00:54:18,666
while Nixon focuses
almost exclusively

1136
00:54:18,666 --> 00:54:23,166
on dealing with this threat
to his presidency.

1137
00:54:24,633 --> 00:54:28,033
FERGUSON:
When he came under attack
for Watergate,

1138
00:54:28,033 --> 00:54:29,866
Richard Nixon hoped
that his way out

1139
00:54:29,866 --> 00:54:32,400
was yet more foreign policy
success.

1140
00:54:33,400 --> 00:54:35,800
And if Kissinger
could deliver success,

1141
00:54:35,800 --> 00:54:40,400
somehow, Nixon could extricate
himself from the scandal.

1142
00:54:40,400 --> 00:54:43,466
SCHWARTZ:
This was the moment
when Nixon decides

1143
00:54:43,466 --> 00:54:46,700
to appoint Kissinger
to secretary of state.

1144
00:54:46,700 --> 00:54:48,633
NEWS ANCHOR:
The Senate today
approved the nomination

1145
00:54:48,633 --> 00:54:51,400
of Henry Kissinger
as secretary of state.

1146
00:54:51,400 --> 00:54:54,066
So a country boy
from Fürth, Germany,

1147
00:54:54,066 --> 00:54:56,166
becomes the first American
secretary of state

1148
00:54:56,166 --> 00:54:57,800
ever born in another country.

1149
00:54:57,800 --> 00:54:59,233
♪ ♪

1150
00:54:59,233 --> 00:55:01,333
KISSINGER: By the time I became
secretary of state,

1151
00:55:01,333 --> 00:55:03,366
the executive authority
of the president

1152
00:55:03,366 --> 00:55:06,100
was eroding at an alarming rate.

1153
00:55:06,100 --> 00:55:09,466
One of my jobs was
to give the impression

1154
00:55:09,466 --> 00:55:12,333
that we were capable
of a purposeful foreign policy

1155
00:55:12,333 --> 00:55:14,800
in this miasma of a president

1156
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:17,600
who was on the verge
of being indicted or impeached.

1157
00:55:17,600 --> 00:55:19,600
♪ ♪

1158
00:55:19,600 --> 00:55:22,500
MORRIS:
If you're going to have a crisis
in which you face

1159
00:55:22,500 --> 00:55:24,200
the possibility of impeachment,

1160
00:55:24,200 --> 00:55:27,000
Kissinger is the one firm thing.

1161
00:55:27,000 --> 00:55:30,066
He becomes
the indispensable man.

1162
00:55:31,733 --> 00:55:34,133
FILM NARRATOR:
October 6, 1973.

1163
00:55:34,133 --> 00:55:37,333
A surprise attack
on the holiest of days.

1164
00:55:39,033 --> 00:55:41,500
FERGUSON:
With the outbreak
of the Yom Kippur War,

1165
00:55:41,500 --> 00:55:46,900
Kissinger faced the most
complex problem of his career.

1166
00:55:46,900 --> 00:55:49,866
♪ ♪

1167
00:55:49,866 --> 00:55:52,300
SCHWARTZ:
The Yom Kippur War
began with an attack

1168
00:55:52,300 --> 00:55:56,333
by the Egyptian army
crossing the Suez Canal

1169
00:55:56,333 --> 00:55:58,866
and the Syrian army
attacking in the Golan Heights.

1170
00:55:58,866 --> 00:56:00,700
(firing)

1171
00:56:00,700 --> 00:56:04,433
SALIM YAQUB:
The Israelis had an inkling
that something might occur.

1172
00:56:04,433 --> 00:56:06,633
But they did not realize
how effective

1173
00:56:06,633 --> 00:56:09,166
the Egyptian and Syrian assaults
would be.

1174
00:56:11,100 --> 00:56:15,133
 
KISSINGER:
6:30 on October 6, 1973,

1175
00:56:15,133 --> 00:56:18,966
my assistant secretary
woke me up and said,

1176
00:56:18,966 --> 00:56:21,300
"There's some trouble
on the Suez Canal,

1177
00:56:21,300 --> 00:56:23,400
"and if you get on the phone
right away,

1178
00:56:23,400 --> 00:56:26,100
you can get it under control."

1179
00:56:27,500 --> 00:56:30,800
HOSKINSON:
We're in the Situation Room
with the secretary of defense,

1180
00:56:30,800 --> 00:56:32,100
and the director of C.I.A.,

1181
00:56:32,100 --> 00:56:34,166
and everybody's wringing
their hands,

1182
00:56:34,166 --> 00:56:36,766
including me, on the back bench.

1183
00:56:36,766 --> 00:56:39,500
Henry, chairing the meeting,
says,

1184
00:56:39,500 --> 00:56:40,766
"There's an opportunity here."

1185
00:56:41,933 --> 00:56:44,600
Henry always was looking
for the opportunity.

1186
00:56:45,633 --> 00:56:48,266
LORD:
He immediately saw
that we could use this,

1187
00:56:48,266 --> 00:56:51,400
if we'd play our cards right,
to begin negotiations

1188
00:56:51,400 --> 00:56:54,533
between Israel
and some of its neighbors,

1189
00:56:54,533 --> 00:56:57,266
and also to begin to displace
Soviet influence

1190
00:56:57,266 --> 00:56:58,833
in that region.

1191
00:56:58,833 --> 00:57:02,766
(guns firing,
explosions pounding)

1192
00:57:02,766 --> 00:57:05,333
YAQUB:
There was panic
inside the Israeli government.

1193
00:57:06,333 --> 00:57:08,833
The Israelis were running short
of ammunition,

1194
00:57:08,833 --> 00:57:10,766
and so they appealed desperately

1195
00:57:10,766 --> 00:57:13,766
for resupply
from the United States.

1196
00:57:15,300 --> 00:57:18,700
Kissinger wanted to ensure
that Israel got the upper hand.

1197
00:57:21,233 --> 00:57:23,033
KISSINGER:
We were trying to prevent

1198
00:57:23,033 --> 00:57:25,233
a military victory
achieved by Soviet arms.

1199
00:57:26,300 --> 00:57:27,700
So, we started an airlift

1200
00:57:27,700 --> 00:57:32,200
and put an overwhelming amount
of arms.

1201
00:57:33,400 --> 00:57:35,533
REPORTER:
Now the counter-offensive
has begun.

1202
00:57:36,766 --> 00:57:38,633
The Israelis claim to have
knocked out

1203
00:57:38,633 --> 00:57:41,566
most of the bridges the
Egyptians laid across the canal.

1204
00:57:41,566 --> 00:57:43,833
YAQUB:
By the middle of October,

1205
00:57:43,833 --> 00:57:47,700
the momentum had shifted
in favor of Israel.

1206
00:57:49,966 --> 00:57:52,133
LORD:
The Israelis had struck back

1207
00:57:52,133 --> 00:57:54,666
and they had surrounded
the Egyptian army.

1208
00:57:54,666 --> 00:57:58,433
Kissinger knew that if we
could freeze that moment,

1209
00:57:58,433 --> 00:58:01,933
you might have a psychological
impetus on both sides

1210
00:58:01,933 --> 00:58:03,800
to finally talk to each other.

1211
00:58:04,966 --> 00:58:07,100
WILLIAM QUANDT:
Kissinger said to the Israelis,

1212
00:58:07,100 --> 00:58:09,500
"You're in a very strong
position right now,

1213
00:58:09,500 --> 00:58:11,366
"but don't overdo it.

1214
00:58:11,366 --> 00:58:12,866
"Take your win,

1215
00:58:12,866 --> 00:58:16,200
and then we get serious
about the diplomacy."

1216
00:58:16,200 --> 00:58:18,233
♪ ♪

1217
00:58:18,233 --> 00:58:22,433
FERGUSON:
Kissinger gets a ceasefire
just in time

1218
00:58:22,433 --> 00:58:26,033
for the Egyptian position
not to collapse.

1219
00:58:26,033 --> 00:58:28,333
He can then embark
on a negotiation.

1220
00:58:28,333 --> 00:58:32,333
♪ ♪

1221
00:58:32,333 --> 00:58:34,733
YAQUB:
You get this phenomenon
that becomes

1222
00:58:34,733 --> 00:58:37,000
known as "shuttle diplomacy."

1223
00:58:38,000 --> 00:58:39,966
Kissinger is going
back and forth

1224
00:58:39,966 --> 00:58:42,400
between various
Middle Eastern capitals

1225
00:58:42,400 --> 00:58:45,366
to meet separately
with Middle East leaders.

1226
00:58:47,166 --> 00:58:48,600
LORD:
He knew

1227
00:58:48,600 --> 00:58:51,200
you could only make progress
if you talked to each side,

1228
00:58:51,200 --> 00:58:53,900
understood its needs,

1229
00:58:53,900 --> 00:58:55,766
that it wouldn't work
just through cables.

1230
00:58:55,766 --> 00:58:58,200
This was too emotional,
too precarious.

1231
00:58:58,200 --> 00:59:01,300
You had to go in person
to Sadat,

1232
00:59:01,300 --> 00:59:03,900
and go in person to Golda Meir,

1233
00:59:03,900 --> 00:59:07,300
and then go back to the other
and explain

1234
00:59:07,300 --> 00:59:09,233
where they were willing
to move ahead

1235
00:59:09,233 --> 00:59:11,766
and where they really
had a need to dig in.

1236
00:59:13,666 --> 00:59:15,800
SCHWARTZ:
They negotiated with Kissinger.

1237
00:59:15,800 --> 00:59:17,833
They didn't negotiate
with each other.

1238
00:59:17,833 --> 00:59:21,133
And Kissinger frequently used
American guarantees

1239
00:59:21,133 --> 00:59:24,100
to get the parties to agree.

1240
00:59:25,100 --> 00:59:26,766
DICK CAVETT:
Were you ever so tired,
you couldn't remember

1241
00:59:26,766 --> 00:59:30,033
whether you were talking
to Sadat or Barbara Walters?

1242
00:59:30,033 --> 00:59:32,833
That distinction I never lost.
(Cavett murmurs)

1243
00:59:32,833 --> 00:59:34,633
(audience laughs)
But...

1244
00:59:36,300 --> 00:59:40,333
There's one thing
that keeps you going,

1245
00:59:40,333 --> 00:59:42,133
which is that you know
there's nothing more important

1246
00:59:42,133 --> 00:59:43,566
you could possibly be doing.

1247
00:59:43,566 --> 00:59:46,866
And that has
an exhilarating effect.

1248
00:59:49,200 --> 00:59:52,866
SURI:
Kissinger literally spends
most of two years

1249
00:59:52,866 --> 00:59:57,266
going from Damascus to Cairo
to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem,

1250
00:59:57,266 --> 00:59:59,633
meeting with one leader
after another,

1251
00:59:59,633 --> 01:00:03,433
cajoling them,
negotiating at a detailed level.

1252
01:00:03,433 --> 01:00:05,533
And as he himself says,
it's literally

1253
01:00:05,533 --> 01:00:08,166
a Middle Eastern bazaar.

1254
01:00:08,166 --> 01:00:10,600
ANWAR SADAT:
Henry, when I met him
for the first time

1255
01:00:10,600 --> 01:00:15,633
in November '73,
I found him quite acquainted

1256
01:00:15,633 --> 01:00:19,300
with the minute detail
of all the dimensions.

1257
01:00:19,300 --> 01:00:22,866
For that, we, we didn't spend
except one hour,

1258
01:00:22,866 --> 01:00:25,166
and after that,
we felt that we are friends

1259
01:00:25,166 --> 01:00:27,600
since years and years before.

1260
01:00:27,600 --> 01:00:29,500
(people talking in background)

1261
01:00:29,500 --> 01:00:30,766
ALVANDI:
The massive achievement
for Kissinger

1262
01:00:30,766 --> 01:00:32,500
was Sadat's decision

1263
01:00:32,500 --> 01:00:35,500
to essentially throw the Soviets
out of Egypt

1264
01:00:35,500 --> 01:00:39,333
and to take Egypt, the most
important, biggest Arab state,

1265
01:00:39,333 --> 01:00:42,333
essentially out of the conflict

1266
01:00:42,333 --> 01:00:44,833
and into friendship with
the United States,

1267
01:00:44,833 --> 01:00:46,666
and eventually,
a few years later,

1268
01:00:46,666 --> 01:00:48,300
into peace
with Israel.

1269
01:00:48,300 --> 01:00:51,700
Now, that came at the expense

1270
01:00:51,700 --> 01:00:54,233
of the Palestinian question.

1271
01:00:55,233 --> 01:00:57,800
He left this issue
of the Palestinians

1272
01:00:57,800 --> 01:01:00,366
to kind of fester away,
unaddressed.

1273
01:01:01,866 --> 01:01:04,966
KISSINGER:
Whatever you solve in
foreign policy is not final.

1274
01:01:06,233 --> 01:01:09,466
It is simply an admissions
ticket for some other crisis.

1275
01:01:12,733 --> 01:01:14,133
NEWS ANCHOR:
Good evening.

1276
01:01:14,133 --> 01:01:17,300
The news is dominated tonight
by one explosive story.

1277
01:01:17,300 --> 01:01:20,666
REPORTER:
The White House mounted
an elaborate cover-up operation

1278
01:01:20,666 --> 01:01:22,866
in the Watergate affair.

1279
01:01:22,866 --> 01:01:24,366
JEB MAGRUDER:
And there was, of course,
the projects

1280
01:01:24,366 --> 01:01:26,066
including wiretap, tapping,

1281
01:01:26,066 --> 01:01:28,933
electronic surveillance,
and photography.

1282
01:01:28,933 --> 01:01:30,966
NEWS ANCHOR:
The number-two man in
the Nixon re-election campaign

1283
01:01:30,966 --> 01:01:32,500
today admitted his own guilt

1284
01:01:32,500 --> 01:01:35,233
in the planning and cover-up
of Watergate.

1285
01:01:35,233 --> 01:01:36,900
REPORTER:
Sources say there is no question

1286
01:01:36,900 --> 01:01:39,033
that the president knew
of the cover-up operation,

1287
01:01:39,033 --> 01:01:42,066
which may be the most
damning accusation of all.

1288
01:01:44,033 --> 01:01:46,466
KEYS:
As the Watergate scandal
dragged on,

1289
01:01:46,466 --> 01:01:49,533
it seemed like the president
and his closest aides

1290
01:01:49,533 --> 01:01:51,466
were being drawn into the mire.

1291
01:01:52,633 --> 01:01:56,066
And Americans were relieved
to see

1292
01:01:56,066 --> 01:01:57,566
that at least Kissinger
was untainted

1293
01:01:57,566 --> 01:01:58,700
by the scandal.

1294
01:01:59,733 --> 01:02:01,666
GRANDIN:
He survived Watergate largely

1295
01:02:01,666 --> 01:02:05,100
because he was seen as the only
adult in the room.

1296
01:02:05,100 --> 01:02:08,866
♪ ♪

1297
01:02:08,866 --> 01:02:11,066
FERGUSON:
This was the height
of Kissinger's fame.

1298
01:02:11,066 --> 01:02:13,766
This was when he was, like,
a kind of

1299
01:02:13,766 --> 01:02:17,900
diplomatic version of Superman.

1300
01:02:17,900 --> 01:02:21,833
KEYS:
Kissinger was the most admired
man in the United States.

1301
01:02:21,833 --> 01:02:23,800
He was tremendously popular.

1302
01:02:25,100 --> 01:02:27,433
ELIZABETH BECKER:
The world was so happy

1303
01:02:27,433 --> 01:02:30,400
that the United States was
finally getting out of Vietnam

1304
01:02:30,400 --> 01:02:33,500
that Henry Kissinger received
the Nobel Peace Prize.

1305
01:02:34,666 --> 01:02:37,300
But his Vietnamese colleague,
Le Duc Tho,

1306
01:02:37,300 --> 01:02:39,066
said, "This is not
the end of the war,

1307
01:02:39,066 --> 01:02:42,133
and I'm not accepting
the peace prize."

1308
01:02:44,166 --> 01:02:45,733
In Oslo,

1309
01:02:45,733 --> 01:02:48,100
several thousand Norwegian
students demonstrated today

1310
01:02:48,100 --> 01:02:50,100
against the awarding
of the Nobel Peace Prize

1311
01:02:50,100 --> 01:02:52,700
to Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger.

1312
01:02:52,700 --> 01:02:55,933
(chanting in Norwegian)

1313
01:02:55,933 --> 01:02:56,966
DAVID KISSINGER:
I was on the playground,

1314
01:02:56,966 --> 01:03:00,166
and some kid came up to me
and said,

1315
01:03:00,166 --> 01:03:02,233
"You know, my parents don't
think your father

1316
01:03:02,233 --> 01:03:04,633
should have won the Nobel
Peace Prize."

1317
01:03:04,633 --> 01:03:07,233
And I apparently replied,

1318
01:03:07,233 --> 01:03:09,566
"That's okay,
neither does my mother."

1319
01:03:09,566 --> 01:03:11,400
(audience applauding)

1320
01:03:11,400 --> 01:03:13,400
KISSINGER:
That's the most important goal

1321
01:03:13,400 --> 01:03:15,533
any administration can
set itself,

1322
01:03:15,533 --> 01:03:19,933
is to work for a world
in which the award

1323
01:03:19,933 --> 01:03:23,033
will become irrelevant,

1324
01:03:23,033 --> 01:03:26,366
because peace will have
become so normal.

1325
01:03:26,366 --> 01:03:28,800
DAVID KISSINGER: Of course,
he was deeply honored,

1326
01:03:28,800 --> 01:03:32,566
but I think it also presented

1327
01:03:32,566 --> 01:03:34,166
a huge headache for him,

1328
01:03:34,166 --> 01:03:36,833
because he knew
that it would not be

1329
01:03:36,833 --> 01:03:39,166
well received
by President Nixon.

1330
01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:44,866
FARRELL:
Knowing Richard Nixon,
it must have driven him crazy

1331
01:03:44,866 --> 01:03:48,333
that Kissinger was the one
awarded the peace prize.

1332
01:03:49,700 --> 01:03:53,666
He managed to keep his jealousy
under control,

1333
01:03:53,666 --> 01:03:55,633
to a great extent,

1334
01:03:55,633 --> 01:03:57,566
in part because he needed
Kissinger more and more.

1335
01:03:59,833 --> 01:04:01,666
SCHWARTZ:
The relationship
between Nixon and Kissinger

1336
01:04:01,666 --> 01:04:04,433
begins to reverse--
there is a way

1337
01:04:04,433 --> 01:04:06,500
in which Nixon now is almost
pleading

1338
01:04:06,500 --> 01:04:09,100
for reassurance and support from
Kissinger.

1339
01:04:10,366 --> 01:04:12,733
NIXON:
I've even been considering
the possibility of,

1340
01:04:12,733 --> 01:04:17,000
frankly, just kind of throwing
myself on the sword and...

1341
01:04:17,000 --> 01:04:18,433
(Nixon and Kissinger
talking at once)

1342
01:04:18,433 --> 01:04:20,733
NIXON:
...and letting Agnew take
over, what the hell?

1343
01:04:20,733 --> 01:04:22,300
KISSINGER:
That is out of the question,

1344
01:04:22,300 --> 01:04:23,733
with all due respect,
Mr. President.

1345
01:04:23,733 --> 01:04:26,400
That cannot be considered.

1346
01:04:26,400 --> 01:04:28,766
You have saved this country,
Mr. President.

1347
01:04:28,766 --> 01:04:31,333
The history books will show that

1348
01:04:31,333 --> 01:04:33,966
when no one will know
what Watergate means.

1349
01:04:36,333 --> 01:04:39,633
FERGUSON:
Henry Kissinger often said to me
that there was

1350
01:04:39,633 --> 01:04:44,366
a Shakespearean quality
to Richard Nixon's presidency.

1351
01:04:45,600 --> 01:04:47,600
The culmination of the tragedy

1352
01:04:47,600 --> 01:04:53,866
is Nixon's final, agonized
decision to resign.

1353
01:04:55,200 --> 01:04:57,566
FARRELL:
One day, Kissinger goes over
to the White House,

1354
01:04:57,566 --> 01:05:03,066
and they talk, and there's
this moment where Nixon says,

1355
01:05:03,066 --> 01:05:06,933
"Henry, I'm not a praying man,
but pray with me."

1356
01:05:06,933 --> 01:05:10,233
And you have this amazing scene
of the two of them

1357
01:05:10,233 --> 01:05:13,166
on their knees, praying,
in the White House.

1358
01:05:14,800 --> 01:05:17,666
DAVID KISSINGER:
I remember him coming home
that night,

1359
01:05:17,666 --> 01:05:21,266
and the sense of sorrow
and compassion

1360
01:05:21,266 --> 01:05:24,300
that he had for Nixon
at that moment.

1361
01:05:25,733 --> 01:05:28,000
KISSINGER:
The human problem of a man

1362
01:05:28,000 --> 01:05:30,366
who had spent all of his life

1363
01:05:30,366 --> 01:05:33,000
trying to become president,

1364
01:05:33,000 --> 01:05:37,500
whose personality really did not
lend itself to politics--

1365
01:05:37,500 --> 01:05:39,466
he didn't like to meet
new people,

1366
01:05:39,466 --> 01:05:41,933
he didn't like to give
direct orders--

1367
01:05:41,933 --> 01:05:45,400
he made himself
do all these things,

1368
01:05:45,400 --> 01:05:47,466
and everything collapsed on him.

1369
01:05:47,466 --> 01:05:49,366
(crowd applauding)

1370
01:05:49,366 --> 01:05:53,366
♪ ♪

1371
01:05:58,900 --> 01:06:01,466
WARREN BURGER:
...and repeat after me:
I, Gerald R. Ford,

1372
01:06:01,466 --> 01:06:02,933
do solemnly swear...

1373
01:06:02,933 --> 01:06:05,766
I, Gerald R. Ford,
do solemnly swear...

1374
01:06:05,766 --> 01:06:08,033
...that I will support and
defend the constitution...

1375
01:06:08,033 --> 01:06:10,500
FERGUSON:
Gerald Ford was as different

1376
01:06:10,500 --> 01:06:14,466
in personal, temperamental terms
from Richard Nixon

1377
01:06:14,466 --> 01:06:16,633
as it's possible to imagine.

1378
01:06:16,633 --> 01:06:19,000
...against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.

1379
01:06:19,000 --> 01:06:21,666
FERGUSON:
And yet,

1380
01:06:21,666 --> 01:06:23,766
when Ford became president,

1381
01:06:23,766 --> 01:06:26,733
one of the very first decisions
that he took

1382
01:06:26,733 --> 01:06:30,566
was to keep Kissinger on
in both roles,

1383
01:06:30,566 --> 01:06:34,733
national security adviser
and secretary of state.

1384
01:06:35,866 --> 01:06:38,100
Somebody said
that as soon as Nixon was gone,

1385
01:06:38,100 --> 01:06:41,500
Kissinger would lose
his Teflon position

1386
01:06:41,500 --> 01:06:45,566
and become the lightning rod
in turn.

1387
01:06:45,566 --> 01:06:47,066
And so it proved.

1388
01:06:47,066 --> 01:06:50,166
Good evening to all of you
from California.

1389
01:06:50,166 --> 01:06:53,733
FERGUSON:
Within a relatively short time
of Nixon's departure,

1390
01:06:53,733 --> 01:06:57,900
the attacks on Kissinger began.

1391
01:06:57,900 --> 01:07:00,200
Dr. Kissinger is quoted
as saying

1392
01:07:00,200 --> 01:07:03,366
that he thinks
of the United States as Athens

1393
01:07:03,366 --> 01:07:06,066
and the Soviet Union as Sparta.

1394
01:07:06,066 --> 01:07:08,200
The day of the U.S. is past

1395
01:07:08,200 --> 01:07:10,566
and today is the day
of the Soviet Union.

1396
01:07:10,566 --> 01:07:14,833
But peace does not come
from weakness or from retreat.

1397
01:07:14,833 --> 01:07:18,200
DAVID KISSINGER:
My father had played
such a dominant role

1398
01:07:18,200 --> 01:07:22,966
for six years that in the nature
of American politics,

1399
01:07:22,966 --> 01:07:26,566
it's almost inevitable
that you become a focal point,

1400
01:07:26,566 --> 01:07:28,166
and that the, uh,

1401
01:07:28,166 --> 01:07:30,066
the worm turns.

1402
01:07:30,066 --> 01:07:37,133
♪ ♪

1403
01:07:37,133 --> 01:07:40,833
JOHN PILGER:
At 7:30 a.m.
on April the 17th, 1975,

1404
01:07:40,833 --> 01:07:43,700
the war in Cambodia was over.

1405
01:07:43,700 --> 01:07:46,933
It was a unique war,
for no country has ever

1406
01:07:46,933 --> 01:07:49,966
experienced
such concentrated bombing.

1407
01:07:49,966 --> 01:07:52,766
On this, perhaps the most gentle
and graceful land

1408
01:07:52,766 --> 01:07:54,400
in all of Asia,

1409
01:07:54,400 --> 01:07:57,100
President Nixon
and Mr. Kissinger

1410
01:07:57,100 --> 01:07:59,166
unleashed 100,000 tons of bombs,

1411
01:07:59,166 --> 01:08:03,133
the equivalent
of five Hiroshimas.

1412
01:08:03,133 --> 01:08:06,500
Then, out of the forest,
came the victors,

1413
01:08:06,500 --> 01:08:08,066
the Khmer Rouge,

1414
01:08:08,066 --> 01:08:11,366
whose power had grown out of
all proportion to their numbers.

1415
01:08:12,600 --> 01:08:14,666
KHATHARYA UM:
The Khmer Rouge was essentially

1416
01:08:14,666 --> 01:08:19,466
an insignificant movement
up until 1970.

1417
01:08:19,466 --> 01:08:21,433
And the question is,

1418
01:08:21,433 --> 01:08:24,566
how is it that this relatively
marginal force were able

1419
01:08:24,566 --> 01:08:27,100
to seize power in five years?

1420
01:08:28,366 --> 01:08:30,733
The bombing did not create
the Khmer Rouge,

1421
01:08:30,733 --> 01:08:32,866
but it was
a powerful recruitment tool.

1422
01:08:32,866 --> 01:08:34,300
♪ ♪

1423
01:08:34,300 --> 01:08:36,466
PILGER:
The horror began
almost immediately.

1424
01:08:36,466 --> 01:08:39,533
Phnom Penh, a city of
two-and-a-half million people,

1425
01:08:39,533 --> 01:08:43,800
was forcibly emptied
within hours of their coming.

1426
01:08:43,800 --> 01:08:45,733
SOPHAL EAR:
Within 24 hours,

1427
01:08:45,733 --> 01:08:50,166
they announced that the city
would have to be evacuated.

1428
01:08:50,166 --> 01:08:51,933
They emptied the hospitals
while people

1429
01:08:51,933 --> 01:08:53,566
were still in the middle
of surgery.

1430
01:08:53,566 --> 01:08:56,966
 
Patients were left
to die on the gurneys.

1431
01:08:56,966 --> 01:09:00,700
And that was just
the beginning of the killing.

1432
01:09:01,866 --> 01:09:06,266
PILGER:
The Khmer Rouge interrogated
and then exterminated

1433
01:09:06,266 --> 01:09:08,333
anyone they suspected
of opposing them.

1434
01:09:08,333 --> 01:09:13,566
♪ ♪

1435
01:09:13,566 --> 01:09:16,100
UM:
I have yet to find anyone
who have not

1436
01:09:16,100 --> 01:09:18,833
been affected by a loss.

1437
01:09:18,833 --> 01:09:21,266
We have a Khmer word,
which is baksbat.

1438
01:09:21,266 --> 01:09:23,233
It's the broken spirit.

1439
01:09:23,233 --> 01:09:27,466
It's, like, when the spirit
has been so broken under fear,

1440
01:09:27,466 --> 01:09:29,666
under terror,

1441
01:09:29,666 --> 01:09:31,233
that it doesn't recover.

1442
01:09:32,733 --> 01:09:34,633
MORRIS:
I think the tragedy
of Cambodia

1443
01:09:34,633 --> 01:09:36,433
is directly attributable

1444
01:09:36,433 --> 01:09:39,466
to the policies
of Kissinger and Nixon.

1445
01:09:40,600 --> 01:09:41,866
There's no question

1446
01:09:41,866 --> 01:09:44,100
that our continued bombing
of the countryside,

1447
01:09:44,100 --> 01:09:46,266
which was savage and relentless,

1448
01:09:46,266 --> 01:09:48,466
led to the rise
of the Khmer Rouge.

1449
01:09:49,500 --> 01:09:50,766
LORD:
The North Vietnamese,

1450
01:09:50,766 --> 01:09:54,366
they had bases in not only
Cambodia, but Laos.

1451
01:09:54,366 --> 01:09:56,933
They were coming over, killing
American troops

1452
01:09:56,933 --> 01:09:58,900
 
and South Vietnamese,
and then retreating.

1453
01:09:58,900 --> 01:10:00,600
So they spread the war
to these countries.

1454
01:10:00,600 --> 01:10:01,633
We did not spread it.

1455
01:10:02,866 --> 01:10:04,600
DAVID FROST:
You say in your book...
(Kissinger murmurs)

1456
01:10:04,600 --> 01:10:05,866
FROST:
...that you considered
bombing North Vietnam,

1457
01:10:05,866 --> 01:10:07,166
so that you had the alternative

1458
01:10:07,166 --> 01:10:10,800
of bombing North Vietnam
and not embroiling Cambodia.

1459
01:10:10,800 --> 01:10:12,800
And...
Cambodia was embroiled!

1460
01:10:12,800 --> 01:10:15,966
It is an absurdity to say
that a country can occupy

1461
01:10:15,966 --> 01:10:18,966
a part of another country,
kill your people,

1462
01:10:18,966 --> 01:10:21,300
and that then you are violating
its neutrality

1463
01:10:21,300 --> 01:10:24,900
when you respond
against the foreign troops

1464
01:10:24,900 --> 01:10:26,733
that are
on that neutral territory.

1465
01:10:26,733 --> 01:10:29,066
I, I...
It is total hypocrisy!

1466
01:10:29,066 --> 01:10:33,066
EAR: They were all supposed
to be well-intended decisions.

1467
01:10:33,066 --> 01:10:36,433
My father, who died, my oldest
brother, who's still missing

1468
01:10:36,433 --> 01:10:39,666
to this day, are they
the victims of geopolitics

1469
01:10:39,666 --> 01:10:42,466
and of decisions
made with good intentions,

1470
01:10:42,466 --> 01:10:44,466
but that led to disaster?

1471
01:10:44,466 --> 01:10:45,866
Yes, absolutely.

1472
01:10:46,833 --> 01:10:49,433
UM:
Sometime it makes me wonder

1473
01:10:49,433 --> 01:10:51,766
about the hierarchy
of suffering,

1474
01:10:51,766 --> 01:10:53,400
and the unequal value

1475
01:10:53,400 --> 01:10:55,633
that's attributed
to people's lives.

1476
01:10:55,633 --> 01:10:58,166
Some lives are worth more
than others, right?

1477
01:10:58,166 --> 01:11:00,400
Some countries
are worth sacrificing

1478
01:11:00,400 --> 01:11:03,100
in order
that others can prosper.

1479
01:11:03,100 --> 01:11:06,766
♪ ♪

1480
01:11:06,766 --> 01:11:08,066
NEWS ANCHOR:
Good evening.

1481
01:11:08,066 --> 01:11:09,366
The fighting is over

1482
01:11:09,366 --> 01:11:11,766
for American ground soldiers
in Vietnam.

1483
01:11:11,766 --> 01:11:14,933
REPORTER:
The extraction
of the last combat soldiers

1484
01:11:14,933 --> 01:11:16,833
is a slow process.

1485
01:11:16,833 --> 01:11:19,600
While the men wait,
they happily donate

1486
01:11:19,600 --> 01:11:21,600
some of their leftover
ammunition

1487
01:11:21,600 --> 01:11:24,033
to their South Vietnamese
replacements.

1488
01:11:24,033 --> 01:11:26,300
It is now their war.

1489
01:11:27,700 --> 01:11:29,433
BURKE:
Ultimately,
when the United States

1490
01:11:29,433 --> 01:11:32,400
extricated itself
from the Vietnam War,

1491
01:11:32,400 --> 01:11:34,300
the South Vietnamese government

1492
01:11:34,300 --> 01:11:36,000
hobbled along for two years.

1493
01:11:36,000 --> 01:11:39,166
So great was the South
Vietnamese entire dependence

1494
01:11:39,166 --> 01:11:40,766
upon the United States

1495
01:11:40,766 --> 01:11:42,833
that in no way, shape, or form

1496
01:11:42,833 --> 01:11:45,033
could it stand on its own.

1497
01:11:45,033 --> 01:11:46,933
CHARLES TRAN VAN LAM:
I'm still hopeful

1498
01:11:46,933 --> 01:11:49,000
that the United States

1499
01:11:49,000 --> 01:11:50,933
will respond positively

1500
01:11:50,933 --> 01:11:52,600
to our request for aid.

1501
01:11:52,600 --> 01:11:54,066
 
REPORTER:
Sir, Mr. Kissinger
said today

1502
01:11:54,066 --> 01:11:55,133
that if that aid
is not approved,

1503
01:11:55,133 --> 01:11:57,333
the collapse of your country
is inevitable.

1504
01:11:57,333 --> 01:11:58,833
Do you share
that assessment?

1505
01:11:59,933 --> 01:12:01,433
(stammering)

1506
01:12:01,433 --> 01:12:03,800
I still think that the aid
will be forthcoming.

1507
01:12:06,100 --> 01:12:09,700
♪ ♪

1508
01:12:09,700 --> 01:12:14,433
DAVID KISSINGER:
If my father had one regret
that he often expressed to me,

1509
01:12:14,433 --> 01:12:18,266
it was that Congress prevented
the United States

1510
01:12:18,266 --> 01:12:21,966
from having
an ongoing military role

1511
01:12:21,966 --> 01:12:24,133
after the peace accords.

1512
01:12:25,133 --> 01:12:29,266
He believed that there was
a path for at least preventing

1513
01:12:29,266 --> 01:12:31,533
the human catastrophe

1514
01:12:31,533 --> 01:12:35,166
that occurred in Vietnam
after we withdrew,

1515
01:12:35,166 --> 01:12:36,833
and that we failed to do that.

1516
01:12:38,866 --> 01:12:40,766
KISSINGER:
We consider we have
a moral obligation

1517
01:12:40,766 --> 01:12:44,666
to the tens of thousands
of people who worked with us,

1518
01:12:44,666 --> 01:12:48,633
relying on us for 15 years,

1519
01:12:48,633 --> 01:12:50,400
and we are positive
that the American people

1520
01:12:50,400 --> 01:12:51,666
will fulfill
that obligation.

1521
01:12:51,666 --> 01:12:52,666
Thank you,
Mr. Secretary.

1522
01:12:52,666 --> 01:12:56,533
(planes roar overhead)

1523
01:12:56,533 --> 01:12:57,666
BURKE:
When the North Vietnamese

1524
01:12:57,666 --> 01:13:00,666
began the final assault
in April of 1975,

1525
01:13:00,666 --> 01:13:03,800
the regime basically disappeared
overnight.

1526
01:13:05,166 --> 01:13:08,200
REPORTER:
Saigon, April the 30th, 8:00.

1527
01:13:08,200 --> 01:13:09,800
The last American helicopter
on the roof

1528
01:13:09,800 --> 01:13:12,200
of the American embassy
prepares to lift off

1529
01:13:12,200 --> 01:13:13,400
the last of the evacuees

1530
01:13:13,400 --> 01:13:17,666
fleeing before the advancing
communist armies.

1531
01:13:17,666 --> 01:13:19,900
(car horns honking)

1532
01:13:19,900 --> 01:13:22,400
MORRIS:
I felt great anger

1533
01:13:22,400 --> 01:13:25,000
at the United States government.

1534
01:13:25,000 --> 01:13:28,333
We had deceived and misled
not only ourselves,

1535
01:13:28,333 --> 01:13:33,666
but we had deceived and misled
a whole people in South Vietnam.

1536
01:13:33,666 --> 01:13:37,966
♪ ♪

1537
01:13:37,966 --> 01:13:40,700
There was a chance,
given his talents,

1538
01:13:40,700 --> 01:13:44,466
that Henry alone might have been
able to end that war

1539
01:13:44,466 --> 01:13:45,833
much, much earlier.

1540
01:13:48,066 --> 01:13:51,900
That he did not, I find that,
like the rest of the war,

1541
01:13:51,900 --> 01:13:53,700
rather unforgivable.

1542
01:13:55,933 --> 01:13:57,400
HANG:
At the end of the day,

1543
01:13:57,400 --> 01:13:59,666
when Kissinger was alone
with his own thoughts,

1544
01:13:59,666 --> 01:14:03,833
I think he would've admitted
to himself

1545
01:14:03,833 --> 01:14:05,666
that South Vietnam did not have

1546
01:14:05,666 --> 01:14:07,533
the ability to defend itself.

1547
01:14:08,966 --> 01:14:10,900
I think all of the allegations,

1548
01:14:10,900 --> 01:14:12,966
to say that Congress
lost the will to fight,

1549
01:14:12,966 --> 01:14:15,200
that the American people lost
the will to fight,

1550
01:14:15,200 --> 01:14:17,733
that the media misreported
that war,

1551
01:14:17,733 --> 01:14:19,200
was a way for him

1552
01:14:19,200 --> 01:14:20,766
to assuage his guilt.

1553
01:14:22,600 --> 01:14:27,766
KISSINGER:
The collapse of South Vietnam
and the evacuation of Saigon

1554
01:14:27,766 --> 01:14:30,133
was, without doubt,

1555
01:14:30,133 --> 01:14:34,500
the saddest moment
of my governmental experience.

1556
01:14:34,500 --> 01:14:39,500
I am unreconstructed
in my conviction

1557
01:14:39,500 --> 01:14:41,800
that Vietnam did not have
to fall,

1558
01:14:41,800 --> 01:14:43,866
that we did that to ourselves.

1559
01:14:43,866 --> 01:14:47,000
(crowd cheering)

1560
01:14:47,000 --> 01:14:48,800
LAKE:
He was not a monster.

1561
01:14:48,800 --> 01:14:50,600
But he was wrong,

1562
01:14:50,600 --> 01:14:53,466
and the result was millions
of people,

1563
01:14:53,466 --> 01:14:56,266
not just American soldiers,
55,000-plus,

1564
01:14:56,266 --> 01:14:58,233
but millions of Indochinese--

1565
01:14:58,233 --> 01:15:01,966
Laos, Cambodia,
South Vietnam, North Vietnam--

1566
01:15:01,966 --> 01:15:04,300
died as a result
of this horrendous,

1567
01:15:04,300 --> 01:15:06,366
horrendous mistaken effort.

1568
01:15:08,133 --> 01:15:11,233
(crowd cheering and applauding)

1569
01:15:11,233 --> 01:15:13,266
REPORTER:
With 272 electoral votes,

1570
01:15:13,266 --> 01:15:18,266
James Earl Carter is the next
president of the United States.

1571
01:15:18,266 --> 01:15:20,633
(cheers and applause continue)

1572
01:15:20,633 --> 01:15:24,666
KISSINGER:
Our new president
and secretary of state deserve

1573
01:15:24,666 --> 01:15:28,366
the understanding and
the support of all Americans.

1574
01:15:28,366 --> 01:15:32,066
I expect to lead

1575
01:15:32,066 --> 01:15:35,200
a happy and full life

1576
01:15:35,200 --> 01:15:36,766
once I leave the government.

1577
01:15:36,766 --> 01:15:38,066
(audience laughs)

1578
01:15:39,766 --> 01:15:42,533
KEYS:
One of Kissinger's
most impressive achievements

1579
01:15:42,533 --> 01:15:45,566
was staying famous for 50 years.

1580
01:15:45,566 --> 01:15:46,733
GILDA RADNER:
Secwetary of State

1581
01:15:46,733 --> 01:15:49,600
Dr. Henwy Kissinger.
(audience laughs)

1582
01:15:49,600 --> 01:15:52,266
Have you any final words
for the Amewican pubwic?

1583
01:15:52,266 --> 01:15:55,100
No.
(audience laughs)

1584
01:15:55,100 --> 01:15:56,100
He institutes this kind of

1585
01:15:56,100 --> 01:15:57,900
remarkable self-levitation feat,

1586
01:15:57,900 --> 01:15:59,633
where he stays in the public eye

1587
01:15:59,633 --> 01:16:02,000
for nearly half a century.

1588
01:16:02,000 --> 01:16:04,000
Partly because
he devotes his entire life

1589
01:16:04,000 --> 01:16:05,266
to foreign policy.

1590
01:16:06,500 --> 01:16:09,033
He's advising leaders.

1591
01:16:09,033 --> 01:16:10,533
You know,
I'm here as a private citizen.

1592
01:16:10,533 --> 01:16:12,900
I'm here
as a private citizen.

1593
01:16:12,900 --> 01:16:15,333
KISSINGER:
I'm now speaking
of my personal view,

1594
01:16:15,333 --> 01:16:17,500
not necessarily
Governor Reagan's.

1595
01:16:17,500 --> 01:16:19,533
KEYS:
He's giving speeches,

1596
01:16:19,533 --> 01:16:21,600
going to conferences.

1597
01:16:21,600 --> 01:16:24,300
He's a ubiquitous presence
on television.

1598
01:16:24,300 --> 01:16:27,333
He was always invited to opine
on whatever crisis

1599
01:16:27,333 --> 01:16:28,733
is happening at the moment.

1600
01:16:28,733 --> 01:16:30,866
KISSINGER:
I think that the warning
of the president

1601
01:16:30,866 --> 01:16:32,733
that a continuation
of repression

1602
01:16:32,733 --> 01:16:35,700
could harm U.S.-Chinese
relations was correct.

1603
01:16:35,700 --> 01:16:38,666
KEYS:
He publishes hundreds
of articles and op-eds,

1604
01:16:38,666 --> 01:16:40,433
and many books,

1605
01:16:40,433 --> 01:16:42,000
putting out his own version
of history.

1606
01:16:42,000 --> 01:16:45,933
HOST:
Dr. Kissinger has a new book
hitting bookstores tomorrow.

1607
01:16:45,933 --> 01:16:49,133
ZAKARIA:
If you looked at his schedule
on any given day,

1608
01:16:49,133 --> 01:16:52,133
it was packed with meetings,

1609
01:16:52,133 --> 01:16:54,833
breakfasts, lunches,
TV interviews.

1610
01:16:54,833 --> 01:16:58,333
He stayed in the game
because he loved

1611
01:16:58,333 --> 01:17:00,200
international relations.

1612
01:17:00,200 --> 01:17:02,000
And he loved power.

1613
01:17:04,233 --> 01:17:07,533
FERGUSON:
Throughout the long years
out of government,

1614
01:17:07,533 --> 01:17:09,133
Henry Kissinger fought

1615
01:17:09,133 --> 01:17:12,700
to uphold his reputation
against all comers.

1616
01:17:12,700 --> 01:17:16,733
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY:
If an Allende were to come to
power tomorrow, you would not

1617
01:17:16,733 --> 01:17:19,566
feel that you could
recommend such action

1618
01:17:19,566 --> 01:17:21,300
as you thought appropriate
in 1970?

1619
01:17:21,300 --> 01:17:22,866
No, I'm not saying that.

1620
01:17:22,866 --> 01:17:25,000
FERGUSON:
No criticism went unanswered.

1621
01:17:25,000 --> 01:17:27,900
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS:
The statement "Henry Kissinger
is a war criminal"

1622
01:17:27,900 --> 01:17:30,800
is not a piece of rhetoric,
it's not a metaphor,

1623
01:17:30,800 --> 01:17:32,433
it's a job description.

1624
01:17:32,433 --> 01:17:34,466
And it might feature
on an indictment.

1625
01:17:34,466 --> 01:17:36,300
MAN:
I want to know how
you would amend

1626
01:17:36,300 --> 01:17:37,533
your testimony today.

1627
01:17:38,866 --> 01:17:41,966
Uh, why should I amend
my testimony?

1628
01:17:41,966 --> 01:17:42,966
(audience chuckles)

1629
01:17:42,966 --> 01:17:45,233
ALVANDI:
He was determined

1630
01:17:45,233 --> 01:17:48,533
that he would be the one
to write his own history.

1631
01:17:48,533 --> 01:17:51,266
But it really was
a double-edged sword,

1632
01:17:51,266 --> 01:17:55,233
because he kind of made himself
a big target,

1633
01:17:55,233 --> 01:17:58,200
and in many ways
became a kind of scapegoat

1634
01:17:58,200 --> 01:18:00,600
for all the failures
of American foreign policy.

1635
01:18:00,600 --> 01:18:04,500
PROTESTERS (chanting):
Arrest Henry Kissinger
for war crimes!

1636
01:18:04,500 --> 01:18:09,233
Arrest Henry Kissinger
for war crimes!

1637
01:18:09,233 --> 01:18:11,066
LORD:
When people attack Kissinger

1638
01:18:11,066 --> 01:18:12,333
by saying, "You're dealing
with tyrants,"

1639
01:18:12,333 --> 01:18:15,666
or, "You're ignoring
human rights,"

1640
01:18:15,666 --> 01:18:16,900
they, they don't remember

1641
01:18:16,900 --> 01:18:19,633
the agonizing choices
that had to be made.

1642
01:18:19,633 --> 01:18:21,966
After all,
preserving civilization

1643
01:18:21,966 --> 01:18:23,766
is a human right, as well.

1644
01:18:23,766 --> 01:18:26,400
KISSINGER:
The average person thinks

1645
01:18:26,400 --> 01:18:30,666
that morality can be applied
as directly

1646
01:18:30,666 --> 01:18:33,133
to the conduct of states
to each other

1647
01:18:33,133 --> 01:18:36,500
as it can to human relations.

1648
01:18:36,500 --> 01:18:40,133
That is not always the case,

1649
01:18:40,133 --> 01:18:41,800
because sometimes statesmen

1650
01:18:41,800 --> 01:18:43,900
have to choose among evils.

1651
01:18:45,133 --> 01:18:47,900
MORRIS:
I think he thought
whatever he was sacrificing

1652
01:18:47,900 --> 01:18:49,533
of American values,

1653
01:18:49,533 --> 01:18:51,933
he was doing so
for American interests.

1654
01:18:53,533 --> 01:18:57,133
My view of that is
that the sacrifice of, of values

1655
01:18:57,133 --> 01:19:00,966
was intrinsically
a sacrifice of interests.

1656
01:19:00,966 --> 01:19:04,433
BEN RHODES:
One of the sources of strength
that the United States has

1657
01:19:04,433 --> 01:19:06,033
is the story that we've been
telling around the world,

1658
01:19:06,033 --> 01:19:08,500
which is a story about freedom

1659
01:19:08,500 --> 01:19:12,066
and equality of peoples
and nations.

1660
01:19:12,066 --> 01:19:14,433
Yeah, I think Kissinger's theory
was,

1661
01:19:14,433 --> 01:19:17,466
it's the credibility of being
willing to use power,

1662
01:19:17,466 --> 01:19:19,466
being willing to kill a lot
of people,

1663
01:19:19,466 --> 01:19:22,166
 
being willing
to destroy countries

1664
01:19:22,166 --> 01:19:25,300
to send a message
to other potential adversaries,

1665
01:19:25,300 --> 01:19:27,166
"This is what happens

1666
01:19:27,166 --> 01:19:29,300
if you challenge the will
of the United States."

1667
01:19:30,800 --> 01:19:32,866
I think the fundamental problem
with that is,

1668
01:19:32,866 --> 01:19:35,033
it just obliterates
the credibility

1669
01:19:35,033 --> 01:19:36,266
of the story that we tell.

1670
01:19:37,700 --> 01:19:40,300
DAVID KISSINGER:
My father was a realist,

1671
01:19:40,300 --> 01:19:44,600
but it was realism
in the cause of principles

1672
01:19:44,600 --> 01:19:47,600
that he believed in deeply.

1673
01:19:47,600 --> 01:19:50,166
He was not just trying
to advance the power

1674
01:19:50,166 --> 01:19:51,366
of the United States

1675
01:19:51,366 --> 01:19:54,933
in some kind
of Darwinian struggle.

1676
01:19:54,933 --> 01:19:59,666
He was advancing the strength of
the United States, in his mind,

1677
01:19:59,666 --> 01:20:04,300
because America was
the last, best hope of humanity,

1678
01:20:04,300 --> 01:20:07,266
and he had experienced that
personally.

1679
01:20:07,266 --> 01:20:09,100
♪ ♪

1680
01:20:09,100 --> 01:20:14,333
The final days of his life
were deeply revealing.

1681
01:20:14,333 --> 01:20:18,133
He was transported back
to the trauma of his childhood.

1682
01:20:18,133 --> 01:20:20,866
He was right back there.

1683
01:20:21,833 --> 01:20:23,500
He was speaking German.

1684
01:20:23,500 --> 01:20:27,300
He was afraid
that pogroms were at the door.

1685
01:20:28,666 --> 01:20:31,700
He was showing
the deep-seated injury

1686
01:20:31,700 --> 01:20:34,466
that he had experienced
as a child.

1687
01:20:34,466 --> 01:20:38,400
But there was also
a tremendously moving

1688
01:20:38,400 --> 01:20:42,500
final hallucination.

1689
01:20:42,500 --> 01:20:44,966
♪ ♪

1690
01:20:44,966 --> 01:20:48,666
He was lying in a bed
looking out on this garden

1691
01:20:48,666 --> 01:20:50,833
that he loved in Connecticut,

1692
01:20:50,833 --> 01:20:53,366
and he imagined
that his brother,

1693
01:20:53,366 --> 01:20:57,100
who had died a couple of years
earlier, was outside

1694
01:20:57,100 --> 01:20:59,433
building a platform.

1695
01:20:59,433 --> 01:21:03,233
It wasn't clear whether this
was some kind of train stop,

1696
01:21:03,233 --> 01:21:07,966
or a platform for my father
to ascend onto,

1697
01:21:07,966 --> 01:21:11,300
but it seemed to give him
a great deal of peace.
(audience cheers and whistles)

1698
01:21:12,866 --> 01:21:14,600
KISSINGER:
At an early age,

1699
01:21:14,600 --> 01:21:18,100
I have seen what can happen
to a society

1700
01:21:18,100 --> 01:21:21,266
that is based on hatred

1701
01:21:21,266 --> 01:21:24,266
and strength and distrust,

1702
01:21:24,266 --> 01:21:27,533
and that I experienced then

1703
01:21:27,533 --> 01:21:31,500
what America means
to other people:

1704
01:21:31,500 --> 01:21:35,866
its hope and its idealism.

1705
01:21:35,866 --> 01:21:39,966
♪ ♪

1706
01:21:43,200 --> 01:21:47,733
♪ ♪

1707
01:22:05,400 --> 01:22:07,900
ANNOUNCER:
"American Experience: Kissinger"

1708
01:22:07,900 --> 01:22:12,433
is available with PBS Passport
and on Amazon Prime Video.

1709
01:22:12,433 --> 01:22:14,200
♪ ♪

1710
01:22:29,433 --> 01:22:34,500
♪ ♪