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(THEME MUSIC PLAYS)
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NIRAJ CHOKSHI: A piece of the
plane's body is blown out at row 26.
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NIRAJ CHOKSHI: A piece of the
plane's body is blown out at row 26.
There's just chaos.
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There's just chaos.
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EVAN SMITH: A boy's shirt was sucked
There's just chaos.
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EVAN SMITH: A boy's shirt was sucked
off him and out of the plane,
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and his mother
was holding on to him.
EVAN SMITH: A boy's shirt was sucked
off him and out of the plane,
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and his mother
was holding on to him.
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I saw a half of his body
was getting sucked out,
and his mother
was holding on to him.
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I saw a half of his body
was getting sucked out,
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I saw a half of his body
was getting sucked out,
and then I was like, "Oh, my God!"
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and then I was like, "Oh, my God!"
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NEWSREADER: The plane suddenly
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lost a section of its fuselage
mid-flight.
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NEWSREADER: An FAA panel
is blasting the aircraft company.
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NARRATOR: Amid new problems
with Boeing's 737 Max...
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Where was the oversight to make sure
the most critical pieces were there?
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..a special update
to the award-winning investigation
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with The New York Times
into the problem-plagued aeroplane.
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NEWSREADER: Lion Air Flight JT610
went missing from radar.
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DAVID GELLES:
And then the second plane crashed.
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NEWSREADER: Ethiopia
crashed minutes after taking off.
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This was gonna be an existential
crisis for the company.
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They had no idea
how powerful MCAS was.
This was gonna be an existential
crisis for the company.
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They had no idea
how powerful MCAS was.
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They had no idea
how powerful MCAS was.
DOUG PASTERNAK:
FAA'S oversight was sorely lacking.
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DOUG PASTERNAK:
FAA'S oversight was sorely lacking.
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NEWSREADER:
The mounting pressure on Boeing...
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SYDNEY EMBER: This was supposed
to be one of the most
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highly scrutinised planes
in the world,
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and here you are
with another incident
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and here you are
that was risking passengers' lives.
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that was risking passengers' lives.
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VI NGUYEN: In that moment I'm just
that was risking passengers' lives.
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VI NGUYEN: In that moment I'm just
like, "Oh, God, I'm gonna die."
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FLIGHT RECORDING: We are emergency.
We are depressurised.
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GERRY SOEJATMAN:
On the morning of October 29,
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I was woken up by a colleague
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who alerted me
that a Lion aircraft crashed.
I was woken up by a colleague
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who alerted me
that a Lion aircraft crashed.
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who alerted me
that a Lion aircraft crashed.
He said, "It's the Max."
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He said, "It's the Max."
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And I was surprised
He said, "It's the Max."
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And I was surprised
because it was a new aircraft.
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And I was surprised
My company provided the air data
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My company provided the air data
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for aircraft
flying around the Jakarta area,
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so, I went to the computer
and looked at the data.
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It was immediately apparent
that something was wrong.
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It was immediately apparent
(INDISTINCT RADIO CHATTER)
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(INDISTINCT RADIO CHATTER)
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The plane went up to about 2,000ft
(INDISTINCT RADIO CHATTER)
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The plane went up to about 2,000ft
just over a minute after take-off,
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The plane went up to about 2,000ft
and the plane had a bit of a dive,
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and the plane had a bit of a dive,
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and then the plane climbed
to about 5,000ft.
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But then at 5,000ft the plane
was fluctuating up and down.
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And then the plane
just started diving.
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And then the plane
It just didn't make sense.
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It just didn't make sense.
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You don't see
It just didn't make sense.
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You don't see
planes diving on departure.
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You don't see
I was baffled.
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I was baffled.
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Why did it go down?
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NEWSREADER: Lion Air Flight JT610
went missing from radar.
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189 people were killed in the crash
of Lion Air Flight 610.
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NEWSREADER:
The Boeing 737 Max 8...
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NEWSREADER:
The plane was a new Boeing 737 Max...
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The plane was a new Boeing 737 Max...
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NEWSREADER: What do we know
The plane was a new Boeing 737 Max...
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NEWSREADER: What do we know
about this 737 Max 8?
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..the fastest-selling jet
in Boeing history,
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..the fastest-selling jet
just introduced the year before.
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just introduced the year before.
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REPORTER: We don't yet know
just introduced the year before.
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REPORTER: We don't yet know
what caused this crash.
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A breakthrough this evening -
the flight data recorder.
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A breakthrough this evening -
It holds many of the keys...
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It holds many of the keys...
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The data from the black box
quickly got to FAA engineers
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in the United States.
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There is a purity of this data.
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There is a purity of this data.
from the black boxes.
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It comes directly
from the black boxes.
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It comes directly
from the black boxes.
So, it's recording
air speed, altitude.
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So, it's recording
air speed, altitude.
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The data showed
what appeared to be a glitch,
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something repeatedly moving
part of the plane's tail,
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controlling its pitch.
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It didn't take long,
just a couple of minutes,
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It didn't take long,
to see that
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to see that
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there was a rapid movement
to see that
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there was a rapid movement
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of the horizontal stabiliser.
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of the horizontal stabiliser.
It's probably the fastest way
to kill yourself in an aeroplane
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It's probably the fastest way
to kill yourself in an aeroplane
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is to have
the stabiliser malfunction.
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JAMES GLANZ:
My spine literally tingled
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when I saw the traces
from the black box.
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The plane continually
tried to push the nose down,
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and the pilots were trying over
and over again to stop the plane,
The plane continually
tried to push the nose down,
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and the pilots were trying over
and over again to stop the plane,
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and the pilots were trying over
and over again to stop the plane,
and in the end
they lose that battle.
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and in the end
they lose that battle.
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What Boeing had not told airlines
or their pilots
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was that it had put a powerful
software system on the new aeroplane.
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was that it had put a powerful
In the Lion Air crash
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In the Lion Air crash
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this system
was receiving incorrect information
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and that made the plane
dive straight downward
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and that made the plane
and destroy itself.
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and destroy itself.
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Inside Boeing,
they quickly diagnosed the problem
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and began working on a fix,
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but they stood by the Max
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as hundreds of them took to the air
around the world,
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as hundreds of them took to the air
carrying thousands of passengers.
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carrying thousands of passengers.
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The company alerted pilots about
carrying thousands of passengers.
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The company alerted pilots about
handling a potential malfunction.
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NEWSREADER: Boeing and the FAA
today warned airlines
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that sensors on 737 Max 8 jets
can malfunction.
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REPORTER: Boeing are calling this
a formal advisory
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and it's been issued to the pilots.
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NATALIE KITROEFF:
The reporting showed
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NATALIE KITROEFF:
Boeing knew that it was risky,
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Boeing knew that it was risky,
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but their response
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was to blame the pilots.
but their response
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was to blame the pilots.
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was to blame the pilots.
REPORTER: Pilots did not hit
two cut-off switches.
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REPORTER: Pilots did not hit
two cut-off switches.
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Boeing says that action
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was part of well-established
Boeing says that action
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was part of well-established
protocols for all 737s.
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And that led
to a series of decisions
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And that led
that kept the plane in the air.
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that kept the plane in the air.
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And then we got another crash.
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NEWSREADER: Breaking news out of
Ethiopia, where a plane went down...
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It was Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302
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on its way to Nairobi
from Addis Ababa.
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NEWSREADER: A new 737 Max 8 jetliner
crashed minutes after taking off.
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Two crashes, the same plane,
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346 people killed,
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an iconic American company's
reputation in tatters.
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The story of the Boeing 737 Max
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would end up
exposing corporate deception
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and a broken regulatory process.
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But at the centre was a software
and a broken regulatory process.
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But at the centre was a software
system supposed to keep people safe
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But at the centre was a software
that instead led to their deaths.
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that instead led to their deaths.
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NEWSREADER: The black boxes from the
Ethiopian crash have been recovered.
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NEWSREADER: It's the second disaster
within five months
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NEWSREADER: It's the second disaster
involving the Boeing 737 Max.
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involving the Boeing 737 Max.
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NEWSREADER:
That's the same kind of aircraft
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that crashed back in October
in Indonesia.
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NEWSREADER: 157 people,
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including passengers
and crew members on board,
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including passengers
all dead.
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all dead.
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QUINDOS KARANJA: The first thing
you get to see at the site
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is a very big hole.
you get to see at the site
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is a very big hole.
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And then to only imagine
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this is the place
And then to only imagine
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this is the place
that they were last alive.
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We learned that
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there were no survivors
on the plane.
We learned that
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there were no survivors
on the plane.
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And then our objective
was to go and bring
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And then our objective
was to go and bring
my daughter's body home.
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my daughter's body home.
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Now you're in close proximity.
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You're able to see the fine details.
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You're able to maybe think
these are personal effects,
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"Belongs to Carol my sister
or my mum,"
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or, uh..."This bone,
whose bone is this?"
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And they told us
that there was no part of a human
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that was bigger than a femur
that was left.
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That whole experience
is just a jumble of images
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and painful thoughts
and blankness, really, to me.
That whole experience
is just a jumble of images
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and painful thoughts
and blankness, really, to me.
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and painful thoughts
I don't really...
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I don't really...
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I can't really make sense of it.
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The crash of Ethiopian Flight 302
in 2019
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was the second time in five months
that a Boeing 737 Max had gone down.
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As families gathered
at the crash site,
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across the world
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reporters at The New York Times
were investigating
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what had been going wrong
with Boeing's new commercial jet.
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NATALIE KITROEFF:
Statistically speaking,
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the likelihood
that these two accidents
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the likelihood
were not in some way connected
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were not in some way connected
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was extremely low.
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It suggested that there was
something going on with the plane,
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and, obviously,
we were determined to find out.
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(INDISTINCT CHATTER)
we were determined to find out.
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(INDISTINCT CHATTER)
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(INDISTINCT CHATTER)
that Boeing was in full crisis mode.
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It was clear from the get-go
that Boeing was in full crisis mode.
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It was clear from the get-go
that Boeing was in full crisis mode.
As the facts from the accident
become available
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As the facts from the accident
become available
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and we understand
the necessary next steps,
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and we understand
the necessary next steps,
we're taking action
to fully reassure airlines
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we're taking action
to fully reassure airlines
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and their passengers
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of the safety of the 737 Max.
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This was gonna be an existential
crisis for the company
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if these two events were related.
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China grounds the plane first.
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Other international regulators
ground the plane.
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Then the European Union
grounds the plane.
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NEWSREADER: But in the US, the FAA
says it's not grounding the plane.
Then the European Union
grounds the plane.
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NEWSREADER: But in the US, the FAA
says it's not grounding the plane.
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NEWSREADER: But in the US, the FAA
says it's not grounding the plane.
Boeing and the FAA
all were saying that they were
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Boeing and the FAA
all were saying that they were
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sort of waiting for the facts
before they rushed to judgement
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and grounded
such an important new plane.
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and grounded
But for months
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But for months
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The Times was reporting
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there was something wrong
The Times was reporting
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there was something wrong
with the 737 Max itself -
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the software system
that pilots had not known existed.
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JAMES GLANZ: The Manoeuvring
Characteristics Augmentation System,
233
00:09:19,860 --> 00:09:20,100
JAMES GLANZ: The Manoeuvring
or MCAS.
234
00:09:20,100 --> 00:09:21,780
or MCAS.
235
00:09:22,980 --> 00:09:26,700
The function of
this previously undisclosed system
236
00:09:26,700 --> 00:09:26,940
The function of
was to save the plane
237
00:09:26,940 --> 00:09:29,860
was to save the plane
238
00:09:29,860 --> 00:09:34,020
when it believed
that the plane might go into a stall
239
00:09:34,020 --> 00:09:35,300
and fall out of the sky.
240
00:09:35,300 --> 00:09:38,220
And, so, this system
was designed then
241
00:09:38,220 --> 00:09:38,460
And, so, this system
to sort of take over the stabiliser
242
00:09:38,460 --> 00:09:40,700
to sort of take over the stabiliser
243
00:09:40,700 --> 00:09:40,940
and push that nose back down
to sort of take over the stabiliser
244
00:09:40,940 --> 00:09:44,740
and push that nose back down
in case the pilot gets in trouble.
245
00:09:46,100 --> 00:09:49,500
Then a major setback
for the company.
246
00:09:53,460 --> 00:09:57,940
Radar showed the two plane's
flight patterns were eerily similar.
247
00:09:57,940 --> 00:10:00,820
Days after the rest of the world
had reached the same conclusion,
248
00:10:00,820 --> 00:10:01,060
Days after the rest of the world
they finally grounded the plane.
249
00:10:01,060 --> 00:10:03,060
they finally grounded the plane.
250
00:10:03,060 --> 00:10:06,100
For The New York Times reporters,
251
00:10:06,100 --> 00:10:08,460
all the signs pointed to MCAS.
252
00:10:08,460 --> 00:10:10,860
We knew that MCAS was the beginning.
253
00:10:10,860 --> 00:10:13,700
We knew that we needed to start
with this system.
254
00:10:13,700 --> 00:10:13,980
This was a really problematic
software system
We knew that we needed to start
with this system.
255
00:10:13,980 --> 00:10:17,260
This was a really problematic
software system
256
00:10:17,260 --> 00:10:17,500
This was a really problematic
software system
in the way it was designed.
257
00:10:17,500 --> 00:10:19,540
in the way it was designed.
258
00:10:20,660 --> 00:10:24,940
OK, well, then how the hell
did it end up in the plane this way?
259
00:10:27,820 --> 00:10:30,660
Boeing declined to be interviewed
for this film.
260
00:10:30,660 --> 00:10:34,820
In a statement, the company said
safety is its "top priority"
261
00:10:34,820 --> 00:10:35,060
In a statement, the company said
and it has "worked closely"
262
00:10:35,060 --> 00:10:36,620
and it has "worked closely"
263
00:10:36,620 --> 00:10:36,860
with regulators, investigators
and it has "worked closely"
264
00:10:36,860 --> 00:10:39,820
with regulators, investigators
and stakeholders
265
00:10:39,820 --> 00:10:40,060
with regulators, investigators
to "implement changes that ensure
266
00:10:40,060 --> 00:10:41,380
to "implement changes that ensure
267
00:10:41,380 --> 00:10:44,860
"accidents like these
never happen again."
268
00:10:46,540 --> 00:10:50,220
Within days
of the second 737 Max crash
269
00:10:50,220 --> 00:10:54,540
another investigation was underway
in Washington, DC.
270
00:10:54,540 --> 00:10:57,180
DOUG PASTERNAK:
We started getting information in
271
00:10:57,180 --> 00:10:57,420
DOUG PASTERNAK:
from whistleblowers, from people,
272
00:10:57,420 --> 00:10:59,100
from whistleblowers, from people,
273
00:10:59,100 --> 00:10:59,340
both current and former
FAA and Boeing employees.
from whistleblowers, from people,
274
00:10:59,340 --> 00:11:02,860
both current and former
FAA and Boeing employees.
275
00:11:03,820 --> 00:11:07,420
Doug Pasternak was leading
a congressional investigation.
276
00:11:07,420 --> 00:11:11,020
This is his first interview
about what he found.
277
00:11:12,500 --> 00:11:15,860
As soon as the second accident
occurred,
278
00:11:15,860 --> 00:11:16,100
As soon as the second accident
we started our investigation
279
00:11:16,100 --> 00:11:17,780
we started our investigation
280
00:11:17,780 --> 00:11:18,020
and our focus was on the design,
we started our investigation
281
00:11:18,020 --> 00:11:21,780
and our focus was on the design,
development and certification
282
00:11:21,780 --> 00:11:22,020
and our focus was on the design,
of the Max.
283
00:11:22,020 --> 00:11:23,020
of the Max.
284
00:11:23,020 --> 00:11:28,620
We got hundreds of thousands
of pages of documents from Boeing.
285
00:11:29,860 --> 00:11:32,180
One of the things
that really struck me
286
00:11:32,180 --> 00:11:35,340
from speaking
to a lot of Boeing employees
287
00:11:35,340 --> 00:11:39,380
was that they were so excited
to go to work at Boeing.
288
00:11:39,380 --> 00:11:40,540
(CHEERING, APPLAUSE)
289
00:11:40,540 --> 00:11:45,500
Boeing is a tremendous engineering
company and a technical marvel,
290
00:11:45,500 --> 00:11:45,740
Boeing is a tremendous engineering
but almost without failure
291
00:11:45,740 --> 00:11:48,220
but almost without failure
292
00:11:48,220 --> 00:11:48,460
they point to a degradation
but almost without failure
293
00:11:48,460 --> 00:11:52,180
they point to a degradation
of that mindset
294
00:11:52,180 --> 00:11:56,460
and that safety suffered
as a result.
295
00:11:56,460 --> 00:11:56,700
and that safety suffered
Looking backwards,
296
00:11:56,700 --> 00:11:58,540
Looking backwards,
297
00:11:58,540 --> 00:12:00,940
I think you can clearly see
298
00:12:00,940 --> 00:12:06,660
the trajectory, the tragedy,
along the way at Boeing.
299
00:12:06,660 --> 00:12:06,900
(ENGINES WHINE)
the trajectory, the tragedy,
along the way at Boeing.
300
00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:10,660
(ENGINES WHINE)
301
00:12:10,660 --> 00:12:12,140
Boeing publicly said
302
00:12:12,140 --> 00:12:16,380
the Max went through a deliberate
six-year development process.
303
00:12:16,380 --> 00:12:16,620
the Max went through a deliberate
six-year development process.
But in their first stories
304
00:12:16,620 --> 00:12:18,500
But in their first stories
305
00:12:18,500 --> 00:12:21,220
The New York Times reporters
found insiders
306
00:12:21,220 --> 00:12:24,700
who said that Boeing executives
had been putting the pressure on
307
00:12:24,700 --> 00:12:29,820
to design the new 737
quickly and cheaply.
308
00:12:29,820 --> 00:12:32,060
JACK NICAS: One specific engineer
we spoke to was Rick Ludtke.
309
00:12:32,060 --> 00:12:34,340
He helped design the cockpit
in the Max,
310
00:12:34,340 --> 00:12:34,580
He helped design the cockpit
and he talked a lot about
311
00:12:34,580 --> 00:12:35,660
and he talked a lot about
312
00:12:35,660 --> 00:12:35,900
how there was an obsession
and he talked a lot about
313
00:12:35,900 --> 00:12:38,900
how there was an obsession
in limiting changes.
314
00:12:38,900 --> 00:12:42,700
RICK LUDTKE: This program was
a much more intense pressure cooker
315
00:12:42,700 --> 00:12:42,940
RICK LUDTKE: This program was
than I've ever been in.
316
00:12:42,940 --> 00:12:44,540
than I've ever been in.
317
00:12:44,540 --> 00:12:49,060
The company
was trying to avoid costs.
318
00:12:49,060 --> 00:12:52,420
Minimum change to simplify
the training differences
319
00:12:52,420 --> 00:12:52,660
Minimum change to simplify
and to get it done quickly.
320
00:12:52,660 --> 00:12:55,020
and to get it done quickly.
321
00:12:55,980 --> 00:12:58,700
Speed was what
they seemed to desire.
322
00:12:58,700 --> 00:12:58,940
Speed was what
There was a lot of decision-making
323
00:12:58,940 --> 00:13:01,180
There was a lot of decision-making
324
00:13:01,180 --> 00:13:03,380
that was somewhat arbitrary
325
00:13:03,380 --> 00:13:05,660
and didn't involve as much the...
326
00:13:05,660 --> 00:13:05,900
..of what engineering
and didn't involve as much the...
327
00:13:05,900 --> 00:13:10,660
..of what engineering
considers healthy, um...debate.
328
00:13:10,660 --> 00:13:12,580
The challenge
to the Boeing designers
329
00:13:12,580 --> 00:13:12,820
The challenge
was that any designs we created
330
00:13:12,820 --> 00:13:15,940
was that any designs we created
331
00:13:15,940 --> 00:13:16,180
would not drive any new training
was that any designs we created
332
00:13:16,180 --> 00:13:21,300
would not drive any new training
that required a simulator.
333
00:13:21,300 --> 00:13:23,940
In his recorded interview
with The Times,
334
00:13:23,940 --> 00:13:24,180
In his recorded interview
Ludtke said Boeing management
335
00:13:24,180 --> 00:13:25,580
Ludtke said Boeing management
336
00:13:25,580 --> 00:13:29,340
was so determined
to avoid the expense of new training
337
00:13:29,340 --> 00:13:30,980
they made a bold promise.
338
00:13:30,980 --> 00:13:33,980
Sales had made a commitment
with Southwest
339
00:13:33,980 --> 00:13:36,500
that, for any aeroplane
they delivered
340
00:13:36,500 --> 00:13:39,820
that had a new
Level D differences training,
341
00:13:39,820 --> 00:13:42,060
Boeing would pay the company
$1 million
342
00:13:42,060 --> 00:13:44,380
per every aeroplane delivered.
343
00:13:44,380 --> 00:13:48,180
DAVID GELLES: If the Max
required simulator training,
344
00:13:48,180 --> 00:13:48,420
it would rebate Southwest
DAVID GELLES: If the Max
required simulator training,
345
00:13:48,420 --> 00:13:50,700
it would rebate Southwest
346
00:13:50,700 --> 00:13:53,620
$1 million per plane.
347
00:13:53,620 --> 00:13:55,100
And there's that incentive.
348
00:13:55,100 --> 00:13:55,340
And there's that incentive.
That's why it was so important
to Boeing
349
00:13:55,340 --> 00:13:57,620
That's why it was so important
to Boeing
350
00:13:57,620 --> 00:14:00,020
that pilot training
be kept to a minimum.
351
00:14:00,020 --> 00:14:00,260
All of this comes out of
that pilot training
be kept to a minimum.
352
00:14:00,260 --> 00:14:01,740
All of this comes out of
353
00:14:01,740 --> 00:14:04,700
trying to give airlines
354
00:14:04,700 --> 00:14:07,340
the most fuel-efficient
355
00:14:07,340 --> 00:14:07,540
the most fuel-efficient
version of a plane
356
00:14:07,540 --> 00:14:08,820
version of a plane
357
00:14:08,820 --> 00:14:12,900
that they can spend as little money
training their pilots on.
358
00:14:14,660 --> 00:14:18,380
JACK NICAS: That meant
Boeing had to do a number of things
359
00:14:18,380 --> 00:14:20,460
to make this plane
fly like the old one,
360
00:14:20,460 --> 00:14:20,700
to make this plane
and that was because
361
00:14:20,700 --> 00:14:22,620
and that was because
362
00:14:22,620 --> 00:14:22,860
the Max had much bigger engines on
it to make them more fuel-efficient.
and that was because
363
00:14:22,860 --> 00:14:27,540
the Max had much bigger engines on
it to make them more fuel-efficient.
364
00:14:27,540 --> 00:14:27,780
the Max had much bigger engines on
it to make them more fuel-efficient.
But because the 737
365
00:14:27,780 --> 00:14:29,460
But because the 737
366
00:14:29,460 --> 00:14:33,420
was a 50-year-old aeroplane
at this time, practically,
367
00:14:33,420 --> 00:14:38,820
when it came time for Boeing
to put those engines on the wings,
368
00:14:38,820 --> 00:14:40,220
the engines were so darn big
369
00:14:40,220 --> 00:14:44,220
they had to mount them
further forward on the wings.
370
00:14:44,220 --> 00:14:46,540
They were testing
in this wind tunnel
371
00:14:46,540 --> 00:14:46,780
They were testing
and they were discovering
372
00:14:46,780 --> 00:14:48,020
and they were discovering
373
00:14:48,020 --> 00:14:48,260
the plane was handling
and they were discovering
374
00:14:48,260 --> 00:14:49,980
the plane was handling
just a little bit differently,
375
00:14:49,980 --> 00:14:51,700
but they didn't even
have a plane built yet,
376
00:14:51,700 --> 00:14:53,700
so, this wasn't, you know,
happening in real flight.
377
00:14:53,700 --> 00:14:53,940
so, this wasn't, you know,
This is something you have to fix.
378
00:14:53,940 --> 00:14:55,940
This is something you have to fix.
379
00:14:55,940 --> 00:14:58,460
And they leaned on
380
00:14:58,460 --> 00:15:02,980
a system that they had used
once before in a military tanker.
381
00:15:02,980 --> 00:15:06,300
It was designed
as a system on the plane
382
00:15:06,300 --> 00:15:11,300
to really just smooth out
the way the plane handled.
383
00:15:11,300 --> 00:15:13,180
It was MCAS.
384
00:15:14,620 --> 00:15:18,980
It was designed for these extremely
unusual manoeuvres,
385
00:15:18,980 --> 00:15:22,620
situations that hopefully
the plane would never get in.
386
00:15:22,620 --> 00:15:26,820
And to prevent
the nose from getting too high,
387
00:15:26,820 --> 00:15:30,500
the system would move the stabiliser
on the back of the plane
388
00:15:30,500 --> 00:15:30,740
the system would move the stabiliser
to push the nose back down.
389
00:15:30,740 --> 00:15:33,060
to push the nose back down.
390
00:15:36,060 --> 00:15:39,380
But inside Boeing
there were early signs of trouble.
391
00:15:39,380 --> 00:15:43,300
DOUG PASTERNAK:
One of the first documents we found
392
00:15:43,300 --> 00:15:43,540
DOUG PASTERNAK:
was from November of 2012.
393
00:15:43,540 --> 00:15:46,460
was from November of 2012.
394
00:15:46,460 --> 00:15:46,700
A Boeing test pilot
was from November of 2012.
395
00:15:46,700 --> 00:15:51,980
A Boeing test pilot
was flying the Max
396
00:15:51,980 --> 00:15:52,220
in a flight simulator
A Boeing test pilot
was flying the Max
397
00:15:52,220 --> 00:15:54,100
in a flight simulator
398
00:15:54,100 --> 00:15:55,980
and trying to respond
399
00:15:55,980 --> 00:15:58,420
to an activation of MCAS,
400
00:15:58,420 --> 00:15:58,660
to an activation of MCAS,
and that resulted in what he
described as a 'catastrophic' event.
401
00:15:58,660 --> 00:16:03,700
and that resulted in what he
described as a 'catastrophic' event.
402
00:16:05,620 --> 00:16:09,300
It showed that,
if that had been in real life,
403
00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:11,020
he could have lost the aeroplane.
404
00:16:11,020 --> 00:16:13,780
They realised from that moment on
405
00:16:13,780 --> 00:16:18,780
even a Boeing test pilot
may have trouble responding to MCAS.
406
00:16:19,820 --> 00:16:23,540
The company kept quiet
about the simulator experience
407
00:16:23,540 --> 00:16:27,180
and appeared to have discounted
the test results.
408
00:16:27,180 --> 00:16:27,420
and appeared to have discounted
Still, in the following months,
409
00:16:27,420 --> 00:16:29,220
Still, in the following months,
410
00:16:29,220 --> 00:16:30,700
some Boeing employees
411
00:16:30,700 --> 00:16:30,940
suggested simply removing
some Boeing employees
412
00:16:30,940 --> 00:16:33,940
suggested simply removing
all references to MCAS
413
00:16:33,940 --> 00:16:34,180
suggested simply removing
from training manuals.
414
00:16:34,180 --> 00:16:35,860
from training manuals.
415
00:16:36,860 --> 00:16:39,980
Boeing,
from almost the very beginning,
416
00:16:39,980 --> 00:16:43,060
realised the significance of MCAS
417
00:16:43,060 --> 00:16:49,940
and the significance MCAS would have
on pilot simulator training.
418
00:16:49,940 --> 00:16:54,180
(READS) "If we emphasise
MCAS is a new function,
419
00:16:54,180 --> 00:16:58,180
"there may be a greater
certification and training impact.
420
00:16:58,180 --> 00:17:04,420
"Recommended action - investigate
deletion of MCAS nomenclature."
421
00:17:04,420 --> 00:17:04,660
"Recommended action - investigate
What that meant
422
00:17:04,660 --> 00:17:05,900
What that meant
423
00:17:05,900 --> 00:17:10,420
was that, if they said
MCAS was a new function,
424
00:17:10,420 --> 00:17:13,500
the FAA was gonna scrutinise it
a lot more.
425
00:17:16,180 --> 00:17:19,500
Boeing told Congress
it kept the FAA informed
426
00:17:19,500 --> 00:17:22,860
about MCAS's development
and final configuration.
427
00:17:23,860 --> 00:17:27,300
But Boeing has a complex
and close relationship
428
00:17:27,300 --> 00:17:27,540
But Boeing has a complex
with the agency that oversees it.
429
00:17:27,540 --> 00:17:30,020
with the agency that oversees it.
430
00:17:30,020 --> 00:17:30,260
NATALIE KITROEFF: The aeroplanes
with the agency that oversees it.
431
00:17:30,260 --> 00:17:32,900
NATALIE KITROEFF: The aeroplanes
are part of the story,
432
00:17:32,900 --> 00:17:33,140
NATALIE KITROEFF: The aeroplanes
but so are the regulators.
433
00:17:33,140 --> 00:17:34,980
but so are the regulators.
434
00:17:34,980 --> 00:17:37,380
The FAA regulated Boeing
435
00:17:37,380 --> 00:17:37,620
in part
The FAA regulated Boeing
436
00:17:37,620 --> 00:17:43,260
in part
with a handful of Boeing employees
437
00:17:43,260 --> 00:17:43,500
in part
whose paycheques came from Boeing
438
00:17:43,500 --> 00:17:46,220
whose paycheques came from Boeing
439
00:17:46,220 --> 00:17:49,060
but whose jobs
440
00:17:49,060 --> 00:17:51,580
were to represent
441
00:17:51,580 --> 00:17:51,820
the interests
were to represent
442
00:17:51,820 --> 00:17:54,340
the interests
of the FAA.
443
00:17:55,300 --> 00:17:59,140
It's a decades-old arrangement
known as 'delegation'
444
00:17:59,140 --> 00:17:59,380
It's a decades-old arrangement
that allows federal agencies
445
00:17:59,380 --> 00:18:01,100
that allows federal agencies
446
00:18:01,100 --> 00:18:01,340
to give oversight powers
that allows federal agencies
447
00:18:01,340 --> 00:18:04,940
to give oversight powers
to the companies they regulate.
448
00:18:04,940 --> 00:18:08,740
In the beginning there was
a really good reason for this.
449
00:18:08,740 --> 00:18:08,980
In the beginning there was
The FAA was certifying things
450
00:18:08,980 --> 00:18:12,020
The FAA was certifying things
451
00:18:12,020 --> 00:18:14,020
that made no sense
452
00:18:14,020 --> 00:18:14,260
to have them certify every single
that made no sense
453
00:18:14,260 --> 00:18:19,300
to have them certify every single
exit sign or bathroom sign or paint.
454
00:18:19,300 --> 00:18:24,060
The issue that many of the FAA
employees that we talked to had
455
00:18:24,060 --> 00:18:28,420
was that it went
way beyond bathroom signs.
456
00:18:29,380 --> 00:18:32,580
Over time, Congress passed laws
457
00:18:32,580 --> 00:18:36,860
that pushed the FAA
to hand over the responsibility
458
00:18:36,860 --> 00:18:37,100
that pushed the FAA
for more and more tasks
459
00:18:37,100 --> 00:18:39,180
for more and more tasks
460
00:18:39,180 --> 00:18:40,940
to the company, to Boeing.
461
00:18:40,940 --> 00:18:44,220
In the design of the 737 Max,
462
00:18:44,220 --> 00:18:46,900
many things
would be delegated to Boeing.
463
00:18:46,900 --> 00:18:47,140
many things
That included MCAS.
464
00:18:47,140 --> 00:18:49,420
That included MCAS.
465
00:18:51,820 --> 00:18:56,620
Under the impression that this
was a relatively benign system,
466
00:18:56,620 --> 00:18:56,860
Under the impression that this
the FAA agreed to delegate it,
467
00:18:56,860 --> 00:18:58,740
the FAA agreed to delegate it,
468
00:18:58,740 --> 00:19:02,300
as is the custom
with the FAA and Boeing.
469
00:19:02,300 --> 00:19:03,860
And that's what happened
in this case.
470
00:19:03,860 --> 00:19:04,100
And that's what happened
It handed it over.
471
00:19:04,100 --> 00:19:05,940
It handed it over.
472
00:19:09,940 --> 00:19:11,420
In a statement
473
00:19:11,420 --> 00:19:14,180
the FAA blamed
ineffective coordination
474
00:19:14,180 --> 00:19:17,780
and said it had not focused on MCAS
when it certified the Max
475
00:19:17,780 --> 00:19:22,340
because Boeing had not identified
MCAS as significant.
476
00:19:22,340 --> 00:19:23,780
Under orders from Congress,
477
00:19:23,780 --> 00:19:27,500
the FAA has since made changes
to the delegation process.
478
00:19:32,180 --> 00:19:35,860
After years of going through
design and development,
479
00:19:35,860 --> 00:19:39,860
a 737 Max prototype was rolled out
of Boeing's Renton Factory
480
00:19:39,860 --> 00:19:40,100
a 737 Max prototype was rolled out
for its maiden flight.
481
00:19:40,100 --> 00:19:41,540
for its maiden flight.
482
00:19:41,540 --> 00:19:43,140
(CHEERING)
483
00:19:43,140 --> 00:19:45,540
Ed Wilson is in the cockpit,
484
00:19:45,540 --> 00:19:47,780
he's the new chief pilot,
and he takes off.
485
00:19:47,780 --> 00:19:49,100
REPORTER:
And let's just take a listen
486
00:19:49,100 --> 00:19:51,620
as this aeroplane gets ready
for its very first take-off.
487
00:19:51,620 --> 00:19:54,700
(ENGINES WHINE)
488
00:19:57,580 --> 00:19:59,940
A short time after
this first maiden flight,
489
00:19:59,940 --> 00:20:04,100
Ed Wilson, he and his co-pilot
start to realise that
490
00:20:04,100 --> 00:20:04,380
the 737 Max is not handling
as smoothly as it should
Ed Wilson, he and his co-pilot
start to realise that
491
00:20:04,380 --> 00:20:07,900
the 737 Max is not handling
as smoothly as it should
492
00:20:07,900 --> 00:20:08,140
the 737 Max is not handling
in certain low-speed situations.
493
00:20:08,140 --> 00:20:10,060
in certain low-speed situations.
494
00:20:10,060 --> 00:20:10,260
in certain low-speed situations.
It's shortly after take-off,
495
00:20:10,260 --> 00:20:11,380
It's shortly after take-off,
496
00:20:11,380 --> 00:20:11,620
you know, it's still
It's shortly after take-off,
497
00:20:11,620 --> 00:20:13,020
you know, it's still
kind of climbing to ascend,
498
00:20:13,020 --> 00:20:13,260
you know, it's still
it's not going full speed.
499
00:20:13,260 --> 00:20:14,660
it's not going full speed.
500
00:20:15,620 --> 00:20:19,180
Boeing engineers had an idea
for how to deal with this.
501
00:20:19,180 --> 00:20:21,140
They know about MCAS
502
00:20:21,140 --> 00:20:25,900
and they know that MCAS was actually
used for a similar situation
503
00:20:25,900 --> 00:20:26,140
and they know that MCAS was actually
in these high-speed manoeuvres.
504
00:20:26,140 --> 00:20:28,220
in these high-speed manoeuvres.
505
00:20:28,220 --> 00:20:30,020
And, so, theoretically,
506
00:20:30,020 --> 00:20:34,140
MCAS could also be used
in these other situations
507
00:20:34,140 --> 00:20:34,380
MCAS could also be used
to also smooth out the handling.
508
00:20:34,380 --> 00:20:35,660
to also smooth out the handling.
509
00:20:35,660 --> 00:20:38,420
Crucially, it's already
been created,
510
00:20:38,420 --> 00:20:40,180
it's already been approved,
511
00:20:40,180 --> 00:20:43,700
and it's something
that we could just apply, you know,
512
00:20:43,700 --> 00:20:43,940
and it's something
to a different phase of flight.
513
00:20:43,940 --> 00:20:45,460
to a different phase of flight.
514
00:20:45,460 --> 00:20:49,260
It's actually a pretty easy fix.
515
00:20:50,380 --> 00:20:54,820
This ends up being
an extremely fateful decision.
516
00:20:54,820 --> 00:20:58,340
They enable the stabiliser
to move much more,
517
00:20:58,340 --> 00:20:58,580
They enable the stabiliser
actually four times as much.
518
00:20:58,580 --> 00:21:00,220
actually four times as much.
519
00:21:00,220 --> 00:21:00,460
Now the system's designed
actually four times as much.
520
00:21:00,460 --> 00:21:02,980
Now the system's designed
for low-speed situations,
521
00:21:02,980 --> 00:21:03,220
Now the system's designed
like just after take-off,
522
00:21:03,220 --> 00:21:04,940
like just after take-off,
523
00:21:04,940 --> 00:21:06,700
and after take-off
524
00:21:06,700 --> 00:21:06,940
is when the plane is still only
and after take-off
525
00:21:06,940 --> 00:21:10,700
is when the plane is still only
a few thousand feet over the ground.
526
00:21:10,700 --> 00:21:13,820
That means you have
much less room for error.
527
00:21:13,820 --> 00:21:18,380
It's happening in automated fashion
and a repeated fashion.
528
00:21:18,380 --> 00:21:21,500
This fundamentally changes MCAS.
529
00:21:22,460 --> 00:21:25,100
It makes it much more aggressive,
530
00:21:25,100 --> 00:21:26,820
much more risky.
531
00:21:26,820 --> 00:21:28,900
It's a far more dangerous system.
532
00:21:31,660 --> 00:21:34,380
Boeing was doubling down
on the system,
533
00:21:34,380 --> 00:21:34,620
Boeing was doubling down
expanding it
534
00:21:34,620 --> 00:21:35,860
expanding it
535
00:21:35,860 --> 00:21:40,100
despite the earlier catastrophic
result in a simulator test.
536
00:21:41,060 --> 00:21:45,980
The Times' reporting on MCAS
focused on a former Boeing pilot.
537
00:21:45,980 --> 00:21:50,980
NATALIE KITROEFF: I started to hear
about a pilot at Boeing
538
00:21:50,980 --> 00:21:52,620
whose name was Mark Forkner...
539
00:21:53,580 --> 00:21:57,340
..the chief technical pilot
for the 737.
540
00:21:57,340 --> 00:21:57,580
..the chief technical pilot
He was the person
541
00:21:57,580 --> 00:21:59,100
He was the person
542
00:21:59,100 --> 00:22:03,460
who personally emailed the FAA
543
00:22:03,460 --> 00:22:03,700
asking for MCAS
to be removed from the pilot manual.
who personally emailed the FAA
544
00:22:03,700 --> 00:22:07,660
asking for MCAS
to be removed from the pilot manual.
545
00:22:10,060 --> 00:22:11,740
That was an important piece of this
546
00:22:11,740 --> 00:22:11,980
because we understood
That was an important piece of this
547
00:22:11,980 --> 00:22:16,460
because we understood
that the FAA really didn't know
548
00:22:16,460 --> 00:22:16,700
because we understood
that MCAS became more powerful.
549
00:22:16,700 --> 00:22:18,460
that MCAS became more powerful.
550
00:22:20,300 --> 00:22:21,780
He was speaking
551
00:22:21,780 --> 00:22:22,020
absolutely on behalf
of the company.
He was speaking
552
00:22:22,020 --> 00:22:23,860
absolutely on behalf
of the company.
553
00:22:23,860 --> 00:22:26,180
This was not some
low-level employee.
554
00:22:26,180 --> 00:22:27,660
And he was asking
for something
555
00:22:27,660 --> 00:22:27,900
And he was asking
for something
that was really quite substantial -
556
00:22:27,900 --> 00:22:29,780
that was really quite substantial -
557
00:22:29,780 --> 00:22:31,700
that a new piece of software
558
00:22:31,700 --> 00:22:35,580
that made the plane behave in ways
that it previously hadn't
559
00:22:35,580 --> 00:22:35,820
that made the plane behave in ways
be concealed from the pilots.
560
00:22:35,820 --> 00:22:37,140
be concealed from the pilots.
561
00:22:37,140 --> 00:22:37,380
This is where the commercial
be concealed from the pilots.
562
00:22:37,380 --> 00:22:43,020
This is where the commercial
pressures from the executive level
563
00:22:43,020 --> 00:22:47,060
come right down
to the development of the aeroplane.
564
00:22:48,340 --> 00:22:51,980
DOUG PASTERNAK: Mark Forkner
certainly was not a lone actor
565
00:22:51,980 --> 00:22:52,220
DOUG PASTERNAK: Mark Forkner
in what he did.
566
00:22:52,220 --> 00:22:53,540
in what he did.
567
00:22:53,540 --> 00:22:53,780
He was following through
on a policy by Boeing
in what he did.
568
00:22:53,780 --> 00:22:56,860
He was following through
on a policy by Boeing
569
00:22:56,860 --> 00:22:57,100
He was following through
to ensure that the program
570
00:22:57,100 --> 00:23:00,100
to ensure that the program
571
00:23:00,100 --> 00:23:00,340
to ensure that the program
did not have to put pilots
in a flight simulator.
572
00:23:00,340 --> 00:23:03,900
did not have to put pilots
in a flight simulator.
573
00:23:03,900 --> 00:23:09,100
It got to the point
where Mark Forkner got an award
574
00:23:09,100 --> 00:23:14,100
for keeping training on the 737 Max
to a minimum.
575
00:23:15,060 --> 00:23:17,060
Nearly eight months
after requesting
576
00:23:17,060 --> 00:23:20,340
that MCAS be removed
from pilot training manuals,
577
00:23:20,340 --> 00:23:24,980
Forkner texted a colleague
with a shocking realisation.
578
00:23:24,980 --> 00:23:26,860
NATALIE KITROEFF:
This appears to be the moment
579
00:23:26,860 --> 00:23:30,940
where Mark Forkner learns
that MCAS has been expanded.
580
00:23:30,940 --> 00:23:31,180
where Mark Forkner learns
He writes in that message,
581
00:23:31,180 --> 00:23:32,500
He writes in that message,
582
00:23:32,500 --> 00:23:36,100
"I basically lied
to the regulators unknowingly."
583
00:23:36,100 --> 00:23:39,300
But he never went back
and corrected the record.
584
00:23:39,300 --> 00:23:41,820
He never went back
and fixed the error.
585
00:23:44,820 --> 00:23:47,180
Mark Forkner wouldn't speak to us.
586
00:23:47,180 --> 00:23:47,420
He was indicted for lying
Mark Forkner wouldn't speak to us.
587
00:23:47,420 --> 00:23:51,740
He was indicted for lying
to FAA investigators about MCAS,
588
00:23:51,740 --> 00:23:55,620
but later found not guilty
of all charges in federal court.
589
00:23:55,620 --> 00:23:55,860
but later found not guilty
His lawyer told The Times reporters
590
00:23:55,860 --> 00:23:57,860
His lawyer told The Times reporters
591
00:23:57,860 --> 00:23:58,100
that his communications with the FAA
His lawyer told The Times reporters
592
00:23:58,100 --> 00:24:01,020
that his communications with the FAA
were honest
593
00:24:01,020 --> 00:24:01,260
that his communications with the FAA
and that he would never jeopardise
594
00:24:01,260 --> 00:24:02,580
and that he would never jeopardise
595
00:24:02,580 --> 00:24:05,900
the safety of other pilots
or their passengers.
596
00:24:08,660 --> 00:24:12,020
When Boeing engineers
expanded the MCAS system
597
00:24:12,020 --> 00:24:15,860
they included a feature that would
make it particularly dangerous.
598
00:24:15,860 --> 00:24:19,140
DAVID GELLES: Planes have
millions of parts in them,
599
00:24:19,140 --> 00:24:22,180
and there's one little one
on the 737
600
00:24:22,180 --> 00:24:22,420
and there's one little one
that sticks out of the fuselage.
601
00:24:22,420 --> 00:24:24,700
that sticks out of the fuselage.
602
00:24:24,700 --> 00:24:28,060
REPORTER: See that little black
circle there? That is called...
603
00:24:28,060 --> 00:24:28,300
REPORTER: See that little black
The angle-of-attack sensor.
604
00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:29,900
The angle-of-attack sensor.
605
00:24:30,860 --> 00:24:32,620
On the 737 Max
606
00:24:32,620 --> 00:24:36,460
it had the power to trigger MCAS.
607
00:24:36,460 --> 00:24:37,740
It's the AOA sensor
608
00:24:37,740 --> 00:24:41,580
that is one of
the crucial parameters
609
00:24:41,580 --> 00:24:41,820
that is one of
to the computer
610
00:24:41,820 --> 00:24:43,180
to the computer
611
00:24:43,180 --> 00:24:47,700
to tell the plane
that it's in a perilous condition.
612
00:24:48,580 --> 00:24:51,060
The angle-of-attack sensor
would activate MCAS
613
00:24:51,060 --> 00:24:54,460
by telling the system
that the plane's nose was too high,
614
00:24:54,460 --> 00:24:56,980
and then MCAS
would try to push the nose down.
615
00:24:56,980 --> 00:25:00,700
But if this sensor is broken,
for whatever reason,
616
00:25:00,700 --> 00:25:00,940
But if this sensor is broken,
the MCAS never realises,
617
00:25:00,940 --> 00:25:05,420
the MCAS never realises,
618
00:25:05,420 --> 00:25:08,620
and, so, it keeps
pushing the nose of the plane down
619
00:25:08,620 --> 00:25:08,860
and, so, it keeps
over and over again.
620
00:25:08,860 --> 00:25:11,620
over and over again.
621
00:25:13,220 --> 00:25:16,020
Congressional investigators
would later find documents
622
00:25:16,020 --> 00:25:20,180
showing that Boeing engineers
had raised this very concern.
623
00:25:20,180 --> 00:25:21,780
DOUG PASTERNAK: An engineer asked,
624
00:25:21,780 --> 00:25:24,500
"What if we have
a faulty AOA sensor?"
625
00:25:24,500 --> 00:25:27,900
Because AOA sensors
are known to be faulty.
626
00:25:27,900 --> 00:25:30,420
You know, what happens
to the aeroplane?
627
00:25:31,380 --> 00:25:33,940
So, you have those concerns raised,
628
00:25:33,940 --> 00:25:37,580
and the response again
from Boeing engineers
629
00:25:37,580 --> 00:25:41,100
was to essentially dismiss those.
630
00:25:41,100 --> 00:25:45,860
Three! Two! One!
631
00:25:45,860 --> 00:25:50,820
Boeing began delivering
the new 737 Max in mid-2017.
632
00:25:50,820 --> 00:25:57,020
At the outset, 737 Max was arguably
one of Boeing's biggest successes.
633
00:25:57,020 --> 00:25:59,260
It had become
its best-selling jet ever.
634
00:25:59,260 --> 00:26:04,100
Advanced sales
were estimated at $370 billion.
635
00:26:04,100 --> 00:26:04,340
Advanced sales
American had orders for 100,
636
00:26:04,340 --> 00:26:07,220
American had orders for 100,
637
00:26:07,220 --> 00:26:09,460
Southwest Airlines for 200.
638
00:26:09,460 --> 00:26:11,340
Boeing had focused especially hard
639
00:26:11,340 --> 00:26:14,460
on selling to developing markets
in Asia,
640
00:26:14,460 --> 00:26:14,700
on selling to developing markets
where Lion Air's parent company
641
00:26:14,700 --> 00:26:16,380
where Lion Air's parent company
642
00:26:16,380 --> 00:26:16,620
became the first customer
where Lion Air's parent company
643
00:26:16,620 --> 00:26:20,340
became the first customer
to fly the 737 Max,
644
00:26:20,340 --> 00:26:24,900
signing an agreement
worth more than $20 billion.
645
00:26:24,900 --> 00:26:28,740
NEWSREADER: The new 737 Max 8
jetliner crashed today.
646
00:26:28,740 --> 00:26:31,260
NEWSREADER: Investigators say
that flight had similar problems
647
00:26:31,260 --> 00:26:32,620
to the Lion Air crash.
648
00:26:32,620 --> 00:26:35,660
Once again, the angle-of-attack
sensor is malfunctioning.
649
00:26:35,660 --> 00:26:38,940
But there is this question now
about systems within the aircraft.
650
00:26:38,940 --> 00:26:43,020
If MCAS hadn't been on those planes,
those planes wouldn't have crashed.
651
00:26:43,020 --> 00:26:43,780
It's that simple.
652
00:26:43,780 --> 00:26:47,380
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
latched on to findings
653
00:26:47,380 --> 00:26:50,180
that inexperience
and lack of training
654
00:26:50,180 --> 00:26:53,580
were part of a chain of events
that led to the crashes.
655
00:26:53,580 --> 00:26:53,820
were part of a chain of events
It was a controversial position.
656
00:26:53,820 --> 00:26:55,780
It was a controversial position.
657
00:26:55,780 --> 00:26:58,940
Understand that these aeroplanes
are flown in the hands of pilots
658
00:26:58,940 --> 00:27:01,460
and, in some cases,
our system safety analysis
659
00:27:01,460 --> 00:27:03,700
includes not only
the engineering design
660
00:27:03,700 --> 00:27:06,540
but also the actions
that pilots would take
661
00:27:06,540 --> 00:27:06,780
but also the actions
as part of a failure scenario...
662
00:27:06,780 --> 00:27:09,300
as part of a failure scenario...
663
00:27:09,300 --> 00:27:12,420
JAMES GLANZ: Boeing's contention
from the beginning
664
00:27:12,420 --> 00:27:18,100
was that, even though the pilots
did not know that MCAS existed,
665
00:27:18,100 --> 00:27:18,340
was that, even though the pilots
that they did not NEED to know that.
666
00:27:18,340 --> 00:27:21,140
that they did not NEED to know that.
667
00:27:21,140 --> 00:27:25,300
And in some cases those procedures
were not completely followed...
668
00:27:25,300 --> 00:27:29,740
Boeing believed that the pilots
should have been able to realise
669
00:27:29,740 --> 00:27:34,180
that it was very similar
to a runaway stabiliser situation.
670
00:27:34,180 --> 00:27:34,420
that it was very similar
'Runaway stabiliser'
671
00:27:34,420 --> 00:27:36,060
'Runaway stabiliser'
672
00:27:36,060 --> 00:27:40,820
is an aviation term
for a malfunctioning stabiliser.
673
00:27:40,820 --> 00:27:42,340
After the Lion Air crash,
674
00:27:42,340 --> 00:27:44,420
Boeing had issued
a directive to pilots
675
00:27:44,420 --> 00:27:44,660
Boeing had issued
to be aware of this possibility
676
00:27:44,660 --> 00:27:46,900
to be aware of this possibility
677
00:27:46,900 --> 00:27:49,500
and told them what to do
if it happened.
678
00:27:49,500 --> 00:27:51,740
NATALIE KITROEFF:
When that part of the tail
679
00:27:51,740 --> 00:27:53,900
was not acting
the way that it should be,
680
00:27:53,900 --> 00:27:54,140
was not acting
you take manual control of it.
681
00:27:54,140 --> 00:27:55,820
you take manual control of it.
682
00:27:55,820 --> 00:27:58,300
REPORTER: The pilots could have
stopped their roller-coaster ride
683
00:27:58,300 --> 00:28:00,580
by turning these two switches off.
684
00:28:00,580 --> 00:28:02,980
To shut off power to the stabiliser,
685
00:28:02,980 --> 00:28:04,300
you stop it from moving on its own,
686
00:28:04,300 --> 00:28:08,620
and then you start cranking a wheel
in the cockpit
687
00:28:08,620 --> 00:28:11,580
that literally will manually
move the stabiliser
688
00:28:11,580 --> 00:28:11,820
that literally will manually
back to where you want it to move.
689
00:28:11,820 --> 00:28:14,580
back to where you want it to move.
690
00:28:14,580 --> 00:28:19,700
The issue was were there things
happening inside the cockpit
691
00:28:19,700 --> 00:28:22,100
that might have made that
harder to do?
692
00:28:23,420 --> 00:28:25,700
That's what we were asking.
693
00:28:28,420 --> 00:28:31,740
DAVID GELLES: When we finally
got the preliminary black-box data
694
00:28:31,740 --> 00:28:31,980
DAVID GELLES: When we finally
from the Ethiopian crash,
695
00:28:31,980 --> 00:28:33,500
from the Ethiopian crash,
696
00:28:33,500 --> 00:28:35,620
we called up Dennis Tajer,
697
00:28:35,620 --> 00:28:38,620
an American Airlines 737 pilot,
698
00:28:38,620 --> 00:28:40,380
and sent him the data
699
00:28:40,380 --> 00:28:42,860
and we read through it
together.
700
00:28:42,860 --> 00:28:46,260
My mission was to provide them,
701
00:28:46,260 --> 00:28:46,500
"I'm in the cockpit.
My mission was to provide them,
702
00:28:46,500 --> 00:28:48,780
"I'm in the cockpit.
I see what's happening now."
703
00:28:48,780 --> 00:28:49,020
"I'm in the cockpit.
I see what's happening now."
So, we walk through each line...
704
00:28:49,020 --> 00:28:51,300
So, we walk through each line...
705
00:28:52,860 --> 00:28:55,060
..and I had no idea what was in it.
706
00:28:55,060 --> 00:28:56,980
I knew that the crew had
707
00:28:56,980 --> 00:29:01,780
an experienced captain and
a lesser-experienced first officer.
708
00:29:03,220 --> 00:29:08,660
We go second by second through
the few minutes of this flight.
709
00:29:08,660 --> 00:29:12,500
Going through the steps that
the pilots had taken and saying,
710
00:29:12,500 --> 00:29:15,380
"Yep, I would have done that.
Yep, I would have done that."
711
00:29:16,660 --> 00:29:18,700
And as soon
as they lift off the ground,
712
00:29:18,700 --> 00:29:20,620
all these different alerts
started popping up.
713
00:29:20,620 --> 00:29:23,740
The airspeed was unreliable,
the altitude was showing unreliable.
714
00:29:23,740 --> 00:29:23,980
The airspeed was unreliable,
There were alerts related to that.
715
00:29:23,980 --> 00:29:26,220
There were alerts related to that.
716
00:29:26,220 --> 00:29:29,780
But they bring the gear up
and they continue to climb out.
717
00:29:30,820 --> 00:29:32,700
Two minutes into the flight,
718
00:29:32,700 --> 00:29:32,940
based on faulty data
Two minutes into the flight,
719
00:29:32,940 --> 00:29:35,900
based on faulty data
from the AOA sensor,
720
00:29:35,900 --> 00:29:39,220
MCAS kicked in
and began pushing the nose down.
721
00:29:39,220 --> 00:29:39,460
MCAS kicked in
ALERT: Don't sink.
722
00:29:39,460 --> 00:29:40,300
ALERT: Don't sink.
723
00:29:40,300 --> 00:29:41,980
And I have...
724
00:29:41,980 --> 00:29:43,100
ALERT: Pull up.
725
00:29:44,900 --> 00:29:46,780
..very clear memory...
726
00:29:49,140 --> 00:29:52,020
..of noting a time mark
727
00:29:52,020 --> 00:29:54,420
where the first officer
728
00:29:54,420 --> 00:29:57,820
is quoted as saying,
"Stab trim cutout switches,"
729
00:29:57,820 --> 00:30:00,260
which takes the weapon away
from MCAS,
730
00:30:00,260 --> 00:30:02,500
which is what Boeing told us to do.
731
00:30:03,540 --> 00:30:05,380
And I have to confess...
732
00:30:08,300 --> 00:30:09,660
I probably swore.
733
00:30:09,660 --> 00:30:11,700
I said, "The kid got it right.
734
00:30:11,700 --> 00:30:13,820
"That kid got it right."
735
00:30:15,020 --> 00:30:20,220
What had happened was the pilots DID
do what they were supposed to do.
736
00:30:20,220 --> 00:30:20,460
What had happened was the pilots DID
They had cut the electricity off.
737
00:30:20,460 --> 00:30:22,740
They had cut the electricity off.
738
00:30:22,740 --> 00:30:25,900
ALERT: Don't sink. Pull up.
They hit these switches
739
00:30:25,900 --> 00:30:28,140
and they tried
to take manual control.
740
00:30:28,140 --> 00:30:31,820
The first officer is reaching
to this large wheel on his left...
741
00:30:31,820 --> 00:30:33,540
ALERT: Pull up.
..and that's the manual trim wheel,
742
00:30:33,540 --> 00:30:35,900
and trying to turn it.
ALERT: Pull up.
743
00:30:35,900 --> 00:30:40,380
It's like lifting up a 10-tonne
bucket of cement out of a deep well.
744
00:30:40,380 --> 00:30:42,580
ALERT: Don't sink.
The problem was at that point
745
00:30:42,580 --> 00:30:45,020
the plane was going so fast...
ALERT: Pull up.
746
00:30:45,020 --> 00:30:47,700
..that, even after
they took manual control,
747
00:30:47,700 --> 00:30:47,940
they could not physically
..that, even after
they took manual control,
748
00:30:47,940 --> 00:30:51,060
they could not physically
749
00:30:51,060 --> 00:30:53,700
get the plane to right itself.
750
00:30:53,700 --> 00:30:53,940
get the plane to right itself.
They shouldn't have been going
that fast.
751
00:30:53,940 --> 00:30:56,060
They shouldn't have been going
that fast.
752
00:30:56,060 --> 00:30:57,380
ALERT: Too low. Terrain.
753
00:30:57,380 --> 00:31:00,220
And they're continuing to accelerate
towards the ground.
754
00:31:00,220 --> 00:31:00,460
And they're continuing to accelerate
ALERT: Pull up.
755
00:31:00,460 --> 00:31:01,740
ALERT: Pull up.
756
00:31:01,740 --> 00:31:04,060
The ground is approaching them.
757
00:31:04,060 --> 00:31:07,020
Then, with no apparent recourse,
758
00:31:07,020 --> 00:31:09,580
the pilots reached
for the stabiliser switches.
759
00:31:09,580 --> 00:31:09,820
the pilots reached
I'm yelling into the cockpit,
760
00:31:09,820 --> 00:31:12,420
I'm yelling into the cockpit,
761
00:31:12,420 --> 00:31:13,860
"Don't do that!"
762
00:31:13,860 --> 00:31:15,460
But I don't know
what they're facing.
763
00:31:15,460 --> 00:31:15,700
But I don't know
ALERT: Caution - terrain.
764
00:31:15,700 --> 00:31:16,980
ALERT: Caution - terrain.
765
00:31:16,980 --> 00:31:18,540
The MCAS was reactivated.
766
00:31:18,540 --> 00:31:21,380
ALERT: Pull up.
MCAS says, "Hey, I'm back on.
767
00:31:21,380 --> 00:31:21,620
ALERT: Pull up.
"Here we go. Zzz-zzz."
768
00:31:21,620 --> 00:31:23,620
"Here we go. Zzz-zzz."
769
00:31:23,620 --> 00:31:27,940
And now the aeroplane
is in near-full nose-down trim,
770
00:31:27,940 --> 00:31:30,300
and you can pull back forever
771
00:31:30,300 --> 00:31:33,100
and there's not enough metal
in the back of the aeroplane
772
00:31:33,100 --> 00:31:35,860
to make that aeroplane
come up to a nose up.
773
00:31:35,860 --> 00:31:36,100
to make that aeroplane
ALERT: Terrain. Terrain.
774
00:31:36,100 --> 00:31:37,180
ALERT: Terrain. Terrain.
775
00:31:37,180 --> 00:31:41,140
Pull up. Pull up. Pull up.
776
00:31:42,220 --> 00:31:45,100
(BIRDS TWITTER)
777
00:31:46,460 --> 00:31:49,460
NADIA MILLERON:
She died when she was 24.
778
00:31:49,460 --> 00:31:54,780
It's unbearable
that she's not with us.
779
00:31:54,780 --> 00:31:55,020
It's unbearable
And the only thing I can do is...
780
00:31:55,020 --> 00:31:57,340
And the only thing I can do is...
781
00:31:59,500 --> 00:32:01,740
..try to prevent this
for other people.
782
00:32:04,140 --> 00:32:07,980
About four months
after the Ethiopian Airlines crash,
783
00:32:07,980 --> 00:32:09,580
the family of Samya Stumo
784
00:32:09,580 --> 00:32:14,100
was about to receive news
they would find bewildering.
785
00:32:14,100 --> 00:32:17,860
We were eating dinner and I hadn't
looked at my phone for a long time
786
00:32:17,860 --> 00:32:18,100
We were eating dinner and I hadn't
and it was blowing up.
787
00:32:18,100 --> 00:32:20,100
and it was blowing up.
788
00:32:20,100 --> 00:32:20,340
The Federal Aviation Administration,
now in the hot seat in Washington
and it was blowing up.
789
00:32:20,340 --> 00:32:23,980
The Federal Aviation Administration,
now in the hot seat in Washington
790
00:32:23,980 --> 00:32:27,740
over its certification
of Boeing 737 Max planes.
791
00:32:27,740 --> 00:32:28,020
over its certification
of Boeing 737 Max planes.
SUSAN COLLINS:
We are joined today by Ali Bahrami,
792
00:32:28,020 --> 00:32:31,540
SUSAN COLLINS:
We are joined today by Ali Bahrami,
793
00:32:31,540 --> 00:32:35,820
the Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety.
794
00:32:35,820 --> 00:32:36,100
We continue to evaluate Boeing's
software modification to the MCAS.
the Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety.
795
00:32:36,100 --> 00:32:40,460
We continue to evaluate Boeing's
software modification to the MCAS.
796
00:32:40,460 --> 00:32:41,500
In addition...
797
00:32:41,500 --> 00:32:41,700
In addition...
FAA official Ali Bahrami
798
00:32:41,700 --> 00:32:43,660
FAA official Ali Bahrami
799
00:32:43,660 --> 00:32:45,340
had been called before Congress,
800
00:32:45,340 --> 00:32:48,020
where he was questioned
about revelations
801
00:32:48,020 --> 00:32:52,980
the FAA had known there was a risk of
another Max crashing after Lion Air.
802
00:32:52,980 --> 00:32:53,220
the FAA had known there was a risk of
If the agency's own analysis
803
00:32:53,220 --> 00:32:56,500
If the agency's own analysis
804
00:32:56,500 --> 00:32:56,740
found MCAS
If the agency's own analysis
805
00:32:56,740 --> 00:33:01,180
found MCAS
to be an unacceptable risk,
806
00:33:01,180 --> 00:33:08,980
why did the FAA not take immediate
action to address those risks?
807
00:33:08,980 --> 00:33:11,140
The families
hadn't known that before.
808
00:33:11,140 --> 00:33:16,980
They didn't know that the safety
agency gambled with passenger lives.
809
00:33:16,980 --> 00:33:22,140
We knew that eventual solution
would be to have the modification,
810
00:33:22,140 --> 00:33:22,380
We knew that eventual solution
and, based on our risk assessment,
811
00:33:22,380 --> 00:33:24,180
and, based on our risk assessment,
812
00:33:24,180 --> 00:33:29,820
we felt that we had sufficient time
to be able to do the modification,
813
00:33:29,820 --> 00:33:30,060
we felt that we had sufficient time
you know, and get the final fix.
814
00:33:30,060 --> 00:33:32,540
you know, and get the final fix.
815
00:33:33,540 --> 00:33:35,540
After the Lion Air crash,
816
00:33:35,540 --> 00:33:38,020
the FAA had conducted an analysis
817
00:33:38,020 --> 00:33:38,260
of the likelihood
the FAA had conducted an analysis
818
00:33:38,260 --> 00:33:41,980
of the likelihood
of another 737 Max crashing.
819
00:33:42,940 --> 00:33:45,980
The worst-case scenario was grim.
820
00:33:45,980 --> 00:33:47,740
DOUG PASTERNAK: They looked at
821
00:33:47,740 --> 00:33:47,940
the probability that there could be
DOUG PASTERNAK: They looked at
822
00:33:47,940 --> 00:33:50,340
the probability that there could be
823
00:33:50,340 --> 00:33:54,780
another crash of a 737 Max
824
00:33:54,780 --> 00:33:58,260
if the FAA
didn't do anything to MCAS
825
00:33:58,260 --> 00:34:00,500
and just let the plane keep flying.
826
00:34:00,500 --> 00:34:02,740
And what that assessment showed
827
00:34:02,740 --> 00:34:05,140
was that FAA predicted
828
00:34:05,140 --> 00:34:12,980
there could potentially be 15 more
fatal accidents of 737 Max aircraft
829
00:34:12,980 --> 00:34:16,660
over the lifespan of the fleet.
830
00:34:16,660 --> 00:34:19,700
About one crash every other year.
831
00:34:20,740 --> 00:34:24,460
But, in explaining its decision
not to ground the plane,
832
00:34:24,460 --> 00:34:28,340
the FAA said in its statement
that the actual risk at the time,
833
00:34:28,340 --> 00:34:30,940
considering the number of planes
in the air,
834
00:34:30,940 --> 00:34:34,740
was as close to zero
as their calculations allowed.
835
00:34:37,260 --> 00:34:40,980
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
appeared before Congress.
836
00:34:40,980 --> 00:34:43,540
NEWSREADER: Boeing's CEO
is expected to acknowledge
837
00:34:43,540 --> 00:34:45,580
that his company made mistakes
in the...
838
00:34:45,580 --> 00:34:48,500
And here's the first time
this guy's in the hot seat.
839
00:34:48,500 --> 00:34:48,740
And here's the first time
We appreciate the opportunity...
840
00:34:48,740 --> 00:34:50,220
We appreciate the opportunity...
841
00:34:50,220 --> 00:34:54,540
By then he'd become the face
of the 737 Max crisis.
842
00:34:54,540 --> 00:34:56,660
PETER DEFAZIO: I've been
on this committee a long time.
843
00:34:56,660 --> 00:34:59,620
We have never undertaken
an investigation of this magnitude.
844
00:34:59,620 --> 00:35:03,780
We intentionally put the families
close to the witness.
845
00:35:03,780 --> 00:35:04,020
We intentionally put the families
They're the victims here,
846
00:35:04,020 --> 00:35:06,060
They're the victims here,
847
00:35:06,060 --> 00:35:06,300
and it should be like,
you know, a trial in court
They're the victims here,
848
00:35:06,300 --> 00:35:08,580
and it should be like,
you know, a trial in court
849
00:35:08,580 --> 00:35:12,860
where you get to face
the person who, you know...
850
00:35:12,860 --> 00:35:15,260
..who committed a violent act
against you.
851
00:35:18,020 --> 00:35:19,660
The committee confronted Muilenburg
852
00:35:19,660 --> 00:35:22,340
with an array
of internal Boeing documents.
853
00:35:22,340 --> 00:35:24,180
SHARICE DAVIDS:
Boeing's marketing representatives
854
00:35:24,180 --> 00:35:24,420
SHARICE DAVIDS:
emphasised to potential customers
855
00:35:24,420 --> 00:35:25,660
emphasised to potential customers
856
00:35:25,660 --> 00:35:25,900
that FAA had reduced the length
emphasised to potential customers
857
00:35:25,900 --> 00:35:28,260
that FAA had reduced the length
of pilot training...
858
00:35:28,260 --> 00:35:28,540
PETER DEFAZIO: A slow reaction-time
scenario - 10 seconds -
that FAA had reduced the length
of pilot training...
859
00:35:28,540 --> 00:35:31,100
PETER DEFAZIO: A slow reaction-time
scenario - 10 seconds -
860
00:35:31,100 --> 00:35:33,980
found the failure
to be catastrophic.
861
00:35:33,980 --> 00:35:35,900
NATALIE KITROEFF:
For those families,
862
00:35:35,900 --> 00:35:38,420
the pain of this was accentuated
863
00:35:38,420 --> 00:35:42,380
because this evidence
that was going up on the screen
864
00:35:42,380 --> 00:35:42,620
was information that they felt
that was going up on the screen
865
00:35:42,620 --> 00:35:44,820
was information that they felt
866
00:35:44,820 --> 00:35:47,260
that Mr Muilenburg COULD have used
867
00:35:47,260 --> 00:35:47,500
that Mr Muilenburg COULD have used
to inform his decision about
keeping the plane in the air or not.
868
00:35:47,500 --> 00:35:52,100
to inform his decision about
keeping the plane in the air or not.
869
00:35:52,100 --> 00:35:52,340
to inform his decision about
Nadia Milleron - she was...
870
00:35:52,340 --> 00:35:54,940
Nadia Milleron - she was...
871
00:35:54,940 --> 00:35:59,140
..radiating with anger over this.
872
00:35:59,140 --> 00:35:59,380
NADIA MILLERON:
..radiating with anger over this.
873
00:35:59,380 --> 00:36:01,100
NADIA MILLERON:
It's come to the point
874
00:36:01,100 --> 00:36:03,980
where you're not the person anymore
to solve the situation.
875
00:36:03,980 --> 00:36:06,900
I want to say it
to YOU directly
876
00:36:06,900 --> 00:36:09,420
because I don't think
you understand what we're saying.
877
00:36:09,420 --> 00:36:10,860
She was right in front of him.
878
00:36:10,860 --> 00:36:12,380
And here you have the CEO
879
00:36:12,380 --> 00:36:15,380
of what is one of the most important
American companies,
880
00:36:15,380 --> 00:36:17,460
one of the most
important companies in the world...
881
00:36:17,460 --> 00:36:19,100
In the end,
it's about safety, and I...
882
00:36:19,100 --> 00:36:21,620
Even if you're not CAPABLE
of doing that?
883
00:36:21,620 --> 00:36:21,860
Even if you're not CAPABLE
..looking in the eyes
884
00:36:21,860 --> 00:36:24,100
..looking in the eyes
885
00:36:24,100 --> 00:36:29,220
of the mother of a young woman
who died on his aeroplane.
886
00:36:30,980 --> 00:36:33,740
I know that she wasn't
afraid of flying at all
887
00:36:33,740 --> 00:36:37,420
until the last six minutes
of her life.
888
00:36:39,180 --> 00:36:42,780
That's just a horrible betrayal
889
00:36:42,780 --> 00:36:46,260
that Boeing and the FAA caused
890
00:36:46,260 --> 00:36:46,500
that Boeing and the FAA caused
for this person
in the last moments of their life.
891
00:36:46,500 --> 00:36:48,780
for this person
in the last moments of their life.
892
00:36:48,780 --> 00:36:53,420
And it kills me
that that trust was betrayed.
893
00:36:53,420 --> 00:36:56,340
REPORTER: Boeing's really
kind of stuck in a hard spot here...
894
00:36:56,340 --> 00:36:59,500
REPORTER: Dennis Muilenburg
was blasted on Capitol Hill...
895
00:36:59,500 --> 00:37:01,980
Two months later, with the company's
stock plummeting...
896
00:37:01,980 --> 00:37:04,140
REPORTER: Boeing's stock
has been dropping all day...
897
00:37:04,140 --> 00:37:08,140
REPORTER: But it's down 22% since
the 737 Max jet was first grounded.
898
00:37:08,140 --> 00:37:10,460
..and the Max still grounded,
899
00:37:10,460 --> 00:37:12,020
Dennis Muilenburg was out.
900
00:37:12,020 --> 00:37:16,460
(ENGINES WHINE)
901
00:37:18,460 --> 00:37:20,660
In March of 2021
902
00:37:20,660 --> 00:37:22,540
families gathered in Washington, DC,
903
00:37:22,540 --> 00:37:24,020
for the second anniversary
904
00:37:24,020 --> 00:37:28,940
of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302.
905
00:37:28,940 --> 00:37:30,860
Boeing had recently settled
a criminal charge
906
00:37:30,860 --> 00:37:33,380
of conspiracy
to defraud the United States
907
00:37:33,380 --> 00:37:35,620
brought by the Department of Justice.
908
00:37:35,620 --> 00:37:37,820
We have some breaking news
on Boeing...
909
00:37:37,820 --> 00:37:39,220
In the settlement,
910
00:37:39,220 --> 00:37:42,420
Boeing admitted
to misleading statements, half-truths
911
00:37:42,420 --> 00:37:42,660
Boeing admitted
and omissions about MCAS.
912
00:37:42,660 --> 00:37:45,900
and omissions about MCAS.
913
00:37:45,900 --> 00:37:48,420
It agreed to pay $2.5 billion -
914
00:37:48,420 --> 00:37:51,580
$500 million
to the families of the victims
915
00:37:51,580 --> 00:37:55,420
and most of the rest
to compensate the airlines.
916
00:37:57,460 --> 00:37:59,780
After 20 months of being grounded,
917
00:37:59,780 --> 00:38:03,780
the 737 Max was approved by the FAA
to fly again.
918
00:38:11,540 --> 00:38:13,980
(INDISTINCT FLIGHT RECORDING)
919
00:38:15,580 --> 00:38:18,820
(INDISTINCT YELLING)
920
00:38:27,820 --> 00:38:33,340
A 737 Max flown by Alaska Airlines
had taken off from Portland, Oregon,
921
00:38:33,340 --> 00:38:34,860
about seven minutes earlier.
922
00:38:34,860 --> 00:38:36,860
At an altitude
of 16,000ft
923
00:38:36,860 --> 00:38:38,740
there's
a very loud bang.
924
00:38:38,740 --> 00:38:42,740
A piece of the plane's body
is blown out at row 26.
925
00:38:42,740 --> 00:38:48,100
HUY TRAN: I opened my eyes
to a giant hole in the plane
926
00:38:48,100 --> 00:38:48,340
and I could see the city lights.
HUY TRAN: I opened my eyes
to a giant hole in the plane
927
00:38:48,340 --> 00:38:50,140
and I could see the city lights.
928
00:38:52,300 --> 00:38:53,220
OK.
929
00:38:53,220 --> 00:38:56,100
There's a deafening wind
howling through the plane.
930
00:38:56,100 --> 00:38:56,340
There's a deafening wind
The cockpit door flies open.
931
00:38:56,340 --> 00:38:58,140
The cockpit door flies open.
932
00:38:58,140 --> 00:39:00,340
One of the pilots loses her headset.
933
00:39:00,340 --> 00:39:00,580
Another pilot almost loses his
One of the pilots loses her headset.
934
00:39:00,580 --> 00:39:04,260
Another pilot almost loses his
after his head slams into a display.
935
00:39:04,260 --> 00:39:04,500
Another pilot almost loses his
There's just chaos.
936
00:39:04,500 --> 00:39:05,580
There's just chaos.
937
00:39:08,140 --> 00:39:10,940
EVAN SMITH: A boy's shirt was
sucked off him and out of the plane,
938
00:39:10,940 --> 00:39:11,220
and his mother
was holding on to him.
EVAN SMITH: A boy's shirt was
sucked off him and out of the plane,
939
00:39:11,220 --> 00:39:12,580
and his mother
was holding on to him.
940
00:39:12,580 --> 00:39:12,860
I saw a half of his body
was getting sucked out,
and his mother
was holding on to him.
941
00:39:12,860 --> 00:39:15,980
I saw a half of his body
was getting sucked out,
942
00:39:15,980 --> 00:39:16,220
and then I was like, "Oh, my God!"
was getting sucked out,
943
00:39:16,220 --> 00:39:18,220
and then I was like, "Oh, my God!"
944
00:39:19,500 --> 00:39:21,820
VI NGUYEN: I look over and there's
a hole on the side of the plane,
945
00:39:21,820 --> 00:39:24,580
and in that moment I'm just like,
"Oh, God, I'm gonna die."
946
00:39:29,660 --> 00:39:33,380
The plane was able to make an
emergency landing back in Portland.
947
00:39:34,740 --> 00:39:39,820
But the incident resurrected concerns
about Boeing and the Max.
948
00:39:39,820 --> 00:39:40,100
We were very fortunate we didn't
have a third crash on January 5.
But the incident resurrected concerns
about Boeing and the Max.
949
00:39:40,100 --> 00:39:44,020
We were very fortunate we didn't
have a third crash on January 5.
950
00:39:45,620 --> 00:39:47,100
We're gonna (BLEEP!) die!
951
00:39:47,100 --> 00:39:47,340
We're gonna (BLEEP!) die!
Joe Jacobsen
has continued to monitor the Max
952
00:39:47,340 --> 00:39:50,260
Joe Jacobsen
has continued to monitor the Max
953
00:39:50,260 --> 00:39:53,380
since retiring from the FAA in 2021.
954
00:39:53,380 --> 00:39:59,060
Alaska 1282 could have
very easily been a fatal crash.
955
00:39:59,060 --> 00:40:04,820
Higher altitudes, some passengers
may have lost consciousness,
956
00:40:04,820 --> 00:40:06,700
pilots could have lost
consciousness.
957
00:40:06,700 --> 00:40:11,260
This time the FAA immediately
grounded similar Max 9s
958
00:40:11,260 --> 00:40:13,060
so that each plane
could be inspected.
959
00:40:13,060 --> 00:40:15,500
NEWSREADER: Hundreds of flights
are cancelled across the US.
960
00:40:15,500 --> 00:40:17,540
NEWSREADER: Boeing 737 Max...
NEWSREADER: Pulled out of service...
961
00:40:17,540 --> 00:40:19,580
..now grounded around the world...
..forcing hundreds...
962
00:40:20,940 --> 00:40:22,420
At The New York Times
963
00:40:22,420 --> 00:40:22,660
a new team was picking up
At The New York Times
964
00:40:22,660 --> 00:40:25,460
a new team was picking up
the reporting on the Max
965
00:40:25,460 --> 00:40:25,700
a new team was picking up
and what it meant for Boeing.
966
00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:27,460
and what it meant for Boeing.
967
00:40:27,460 --> 00:40:29,260
SYDNEY EMBER:
The real bombshell moment
968
00:40:29,260 --> 00:40:29,500
comes in early February
SYDNEY EMBER:
The real bombshell moment
969
00:40:29,500 --> 00:40:31,300
comes in early February
970
00:40:31,300 --> 00:40:31,540
when the National Transportation
comes in early February
971
00:40:31,540 --> 00:40:33,540
when the National Transportation
Safety Board
972
00:40:33,540 --> 00:40:33,780
when the National Transportation
releases its preliminary report
973
00:40:33,780 --> 00:40:36,020
releases its preliminary report
974
00:40:36,020 --> 00:40:37,580
on the incident.
975
00:40:37,580 --> 00:40:39,980
What the NTSB's report makes clear
976
00:40:39,980 --> 00:40:43,860
is this was a problem
on Boeing's factory floor.
977
00:40:43,860 --> 00:40:44,100
is this was a problem
This was Boeing's problem.
978
00:40:44,100 --> 00:40:45,380
This was Boeing's problem.
979
00:40:46,340 --> 00:40:48,580
The NTSB focused
on a piece of the plane
980
00:40:48,580 --> 00:40:53,220
that replaced an unused
emergency exit called a door plug.
981
00:40:53,220 --> 00:40:53,460
that replaced an unused
Boeing workers had failed to install
982
00:40:53,460 --> 00:40:55,180
Boeing workers had failed to install
983
00:40:55,180 --> 00:40:56,740
four bolts
984
00:40:56,740 --> 00:40:58,580
that secured it to the plane.
985
00:40:58,580 --> 00:41:02,700
The company later said
it had no documentation of the work.
986
00:41:02,700 --> 00:41:05,220
MARK WALKER:
Where was the oversight?
987
00:41:05,220 --> 00:41:07,340
Where was the redundant checks
988
00:41:07,340 --> 00:41:08,940
for someone to come back
989
00:41:08,940 --> 00:41:09,180
to make sure that the most critical
pieces to it were there?
for someone to come back
990
00:41:09,180 --> 00:41:14,100
to make sure that the most critical
pieces to it were there?
991
00:41:14,100 --> 00:41:14,380
to make sure that the most critical
pieces to it were there?
NIRAJ CHOKSHI: Nothing
in plane design or plane production
992
00:41:14,380 --> 00:41:17,620
NIRAJ CHOKSHI: Nothing
in plane design or plane production
993
00:41:17,620 --> 00:41:20,300
is done without several layers
of redundancy,
994
00:41:20,300 --> 00:41:23,180
without frequent inspections,
without frequent checks,
995
00:41:23,180 --> 00:41:23,420
without frequent inspections,
and the idea that
996
00:41:23,420 --> 00:41:24,900
and the idea that
997
00:41:24,900 --> 00:41:27,980
something as important
as a part of the plane's body
998
00:41:27,980 --> 00:41:31,220
could leave the factory without
the bolts needed to hold it in place
999
00:41:31,220 --> 00:41:31,460
could leave the factory without
is...shocking.
1000
00:41:31,460 --> 00:41:33,100
is...shocking.
1001
00:41:33,100 --> 00:41:34,580
SYDNEY EMBER:
This was supposed to be
1002
00:41:34,580 --> 00:41:38,740
one of the most highly scrutinised
planes in the world,
1003
00:41:38,740 --> 00:41:41,020
and here you are
with another incident
1004
00:41:41,020 --> 00:41:41,260
and here you are
that was risking passengers' lives.
1005
00:41:41,260 --> 00:41:43,540
that was risking passengers' lives.
1006
00:41:44,500 --> 00:41:47,860
Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun
was quick to own the failure
1007
00:41:47,860 --> 00:41:49,340
in a series of appearances.
1008
00:41:49,340 --> 00:41:54,060
We're gonna approach this, number
one, acknowledging our mistake.
1009
00:41:54,060 --> 00:41:54,340
I want everybody,
everybody on every aeroplane
We're gonna approach this, number
one, acknowledging our mistake.
1010
00:41:54,340 --> 00:41:57,460
I want everybody,
everybody on every aeroplane
1011
00:41:57,460 --> 00:41:58,740
to know that Boeing owns it.
1012
00:42:00,500 --> 00:42:03,300
The door plug
was a production failure,
1013
00:42:03,300 --> 00:42:03,540
The door plug
MCAS was a design flaw,
1014
00:42:03,540 --> 00:42:05,580
MCAS was a design flaw,
1015
00:42:05,580 --> 00:42:07,180
but both raised questions
1016
00:42:07,180 --> 00:42:11,180
about Boeing's safety culture
and the FAA's oversight.
1017
00:42:11,180 --> 00:42:18,580
The shocking thing about the Max
is the sheer number of problems,
1018
00:42:18,580 --> 00:42:21,460
design problems,
manufacturing problems.
1019
00:42:21,460 --> 00:42:24,700
Joe Jacobsen is now working
with families of the victims
1020
00:42:24,700 --> 00:42:24,940
Joe Jacobsen is now working
of the 737 Max 8 crashes
1021
00:42:24,940 --> 00:42:27,420
of the 737 Max 8 crashes
1022
00:42:27,420 --> 00:42:30,860
to bring other safety concerns
to the FAA.
1023
00:42:30,860 --> 00:42:32,460
And this is after, you know,
1024
00:42:32,460 --> 00:42:36,500
the supposedly most comprehensive
recertification
1025
00:42:36,500 --> 00:42:36,740
the supposedly most comprehensive
in the history of aviation.
1026
00:42:36,740 --> 00:42:37,980
in the history of aviation.
1027
00:42:37,980 --> 00:42:38,220
DAVID GELLES:
in the history of aviation.
1028
00:42:38,220 --> 00:42:40,180
DAVID GELLES:
I think what's most scary
1029
00:42:40,180 --> 00:42:42,740
is that you have both kinds
of accidents
1030
00:42:42,740 --> 00:42:42,980
is that you have both kinds
happening at the same company.
1031
00:42:42,980 --> 00:42:45,020
happening at the same company.
1032
00:42:45,020 --> 00:42:49,540
That, to me, reveals a culture
inside the company.
1033
00:42:49,540 --> 00:42:51,780
I mean, I know we keep coming back
to this word 'culture',
1034
00:42:51,780 --> 00:42:56,500
but it's right at the root of what
happened in both sets of accidents.
1035
00:42:56,500 --> 00:42:56,740
In a statement
but it's right at the root of what
happened in both sets of accidents.
1036
00:42:56,740 --> 00:42:58,380
In a statement
1037
00:42:58,380 --> 00:43:01,780
Boeing said
it is dedicated to transparency
1038
00:43:01,780 --> 00:43:04,580
and it is implementing
a comprehensive plan
1039
00:43:04,580 --> 00:43:04,820
to strengthen safety and quality.
a comprehensive plan
1040
00:43:04,820 --> 00:43:07,500
to strengthen safety and quality.
1041
00:43:07,500 --> 00:43:07,740
to strengthen safety and quality.
Less than seven weeks after
the Alaska Air incident,
1042
00:43:07,740 --> 00:43:10,500
Less than seven weeks after
the Alaska Air incident,
1043
00:43:10,500 --> 00:43:13,420
the executive running
the Max program was out.
1044
00:43:14,940 --> 00:43:16,420
In early March
1045
00:43:16,420 --> 00:43:21,260
the FAA said it had found multiple
quality control issues with the Max.
1046
00:43:21,260 --> 00:43:24,700
The agency also released a report
that found Boeing's safety culture
1047
00:43:24,700 --> 00:43:24,940
The agency also released a report
has been inadequate and confusing.
1048
00:43:24,940 --> 00:43:27,340
has been inadequate and confusing.
1049
00:43:28,300 --> 00:43:31,900
And now the Justice Department
is investigating the company.
1050
00:43:32,860 --> 00:43:35,100
Cultural change
doesn't happen overnight,
1051
00:43:35,100 --> 00:43:37,780
especially at big corporations
like this.
1052
00:43:37,780 --> 00:43:41,780
And it doesn't happen just because
he got slapped with a fine.
1053
00:43:41,780 --> 00:43:44,660
It's the product
of millions of decisions,
1054
00:43:44,660 --> 00:43:44,900
It's the product
whatever it might mean
1055
00:43:44,900 --> 00:43:46,580
whatever it might mean
1056
00:43:46,580 --> 00:43:51,820
in terms of lost profits that impact
the share price in the short term.
1057
00:43:51,820 --> 00:43:56,300
But if Boeing wants to get back
to that place of grandeur
1058
00:43:56,300 --> 00:43:57,660
where it was for so long,
1059
00:43:57,660 --> 00:44:00,620
one of the most important
American companies,
1060
00:44:00,620 --> 00:44:00,860
one of the most important
it's gonna take...not four years,
1061
00:44:00,860 --> 00:44:03,340
it's gonna take...not four years,
1062
00:44:03,340 --> 00:44:05,540
but it might take 14.
1063
00:44:07,060 --> 00:44:10,700
More than 170 Max 9s
were grounded by the FAA
1064
00:44:10,700 --> 00:44:10,940
More than 170 Max 9s
after the Alaska Airlines incident.
1065
00:44:10,940 --> 00:44:13,820
after the Alaska Airlines incident.
1066
00:44:14,780 --> 00:44:17,700
Nearly all are now back in service.
1067
00:44:20,820 --> 00:44:22,580
(THEME MUSIC PLAYS)
1068
00:44:38,620 --> 00:44:40,620
Captions by Red Bee Media
1069
00:44:40,620 --> 00:44:42,820
Copyright
Australian Broadcasting Corporation